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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance Performance: The Dynamics Between Performance and Funding Sources Across 
Microfinance Institution Legal Charters and Age Groups 
by 
Anthony Annan 
May 2018 
Chair: Conrad S. Ciccotello 
Major Academic Unit: Robinson School of Business 
 
Because microfinance is an essential financial inclusion tool in helping to reduce poverty, 
it is vital that we understand the factors that help microfinance institutions (MFIs) achieve both 
their financial and social performance goals. Using an international sample of 2,955 MFIs across 
123 countries from 1999 to 2016, my research contributes to this understanding by providing 
empirical insights into the dynamic relationship between these dual performance goals and the 
MFI funding source mix. It further offers an empirical test of the popular Microfinance Life Cycle 
Theory (MLCT) for explaining MFI development, growth, and performance.  
My findings show that donation funding is negatively associated with MFI profitability 
across legal charters and age groups, but, for mature bank MFIs only, it has a positive impact on 
increasing the breadth and depth of client outreach. I also find that equity and deposits funding are 
positively related to financial improvement for all MFIs, but they have mixed impacts on the social 
goals of various MFI legal charters.  
The insights from my research are an essential contribution to the conversation on MFI 
performance in the extant literature. My study also offers useful and detailed performance-funding 
 xiii 
 
metrics based on MFI legal structure and age to inform and enhance decision-making among 
managers, funders, and policymakers.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Age, Dual Performance, Funding Source, Life-cycle Theory, Legal Charter, 
Microfinance, Return on Assets, Unbalanced Panel Analysis. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
I.1 The Problem 
According to the World Bank, approximately four billion people on Earth live in poverty. 
In response to this level of poverty, developmental organizations and other concerned entities have 
established programs to help eradicate, or at least alleviate, this poverty. Microfinance has been 
adjudged an effective tool in this effort. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer essential financial 
services—including savings, credit, funds transfer, and insurance—to individuals and micro-
businesses that would otherwise have no access to mainstream banking services. By providing 
small loans, MFIs help to ease the financial constraints the poor experience and support their 
consumption choices, increasing household welfare and providing avenues for future ongoing 
income (Yunus, 1999).  
According to the 2015 Microcredit Summit report (Murdoch, 2016), MFIs have helped 
more than 211 million people access credit and savings. This finding is of particular importance 
because loans assist the poor in covering unexpected expenses and in cultivating a long-term 
adjustment in their consumption decisions (Karlan & Zinman, 2010). Studies have shown that 
MFIs also support the creation and growth of small businesses (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & 
Kinnan, 2015). Microfinance delivers further benefits by focusing on female borrowers (Cobb, 
Wry, & Zhao, 2016), who usually commit a considerable portion of their loan proceeds to health 
and education expenses—both of which contribute to an overall reduction in poverty (Angelucci, 
Karlan, & Zinman, 2015). By extending credit to the poorest communities, MFIs act as catalysts 
for the poor to create wealth and improve the economic well being of their local economies. MFIs 
also focus on the financial inclusion (Brown et al., 2016) of the most economically disadvantaged 
members of developing economies (e.g., women), with the belief that their financial services will 
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drive their clients’ development and growth (Morduch, 1999; Imai et al., 2012; Donou-Adonsou 
and Sylwester 2016). Indeed, research has shown that the microfinance sector explains a significant 
portion of the growth in financial inclusion being observed in many parts of the world (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Klapper, Singer, & Van Oudheusden, 2015). Finally, MFI loan and deposit volumes have 
gained significant market shares in some countries, making MFIs essential contributors to financial 
development in those economies (Di Bella, 2011). 
At its most basic form, the microfinance industry has three principal actors: 1) borrowers, 
who apply for and receive loans from MFIs and benefit from the services they provide; 2) the 
MFIs, who provide the financial services; and 3) funders, who provide capital and act as funding 
sources for the MFIs.  
Unfortunately, many MFIs fail due to capital (funding) constraints that negatively impact 
their operations (Wagner and Winkler 2013; Dominice, 2012; Aijazuddin and Iravantchi, 2015; 
Dorfleitner et al., 2014; Abrams and Trant, 2009; Schicks, 2014). Some research finds that MFIs 
fail in servicing their debt (Abrams and Trant, 2009), while other work finds outright default 
(Aijazuddin and Iravantchi 2015). Dwindling donations, grants, and subsidies for the 
developmental financing of projects have not helped the situation either (Johnson, 2015; Millson, 
2013). MFIs are constrained by 1) inadequate capital, 2) unsuitable funding mixes, and 3) 
unsustainable funding flows. Access to funding is a deciding factor in determining the 
microfinance industry’s overall health, as well as its effectiveness as a poverty-reduction tool 
(Cobb et al., 2016). Lafourcade et al. (2006) argue that the expansion of MFI activities in Africa 
is being hindered primarily by funding constraints. Further, Bogan (2012) concludes that over-
dependence on donations funding is inhibiting the growth of MFIs into sustainable, competitive, 
and efﬁcient institutions.  
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However, addressing the funding problem with the view that MFIs are homogeneous and 
identical financial services entities oversimplifies the issue. This research instead views MFIs as 
heterogeneous legal entities with charters that make them significantly different in terms of both 
the types of opportunities available to them and the risks they face. I therefore look at MFIs’ 
performance at each life-cycle stage through two lenses—that of their legal structure or charter, 
and that of their capital structure, or funding source mix—as they strive to achieve their 
performance goals.  
In this dissertation, my primary focus is on providing insights into how the relative 
performance of MFIs’ social and financial metrics varies across legal charters and funding source 
mixes at each life-cycle stage. In grouping MFIs into legal charters to review their performance 
across the life cycle, I hope to contribute in-depth understanding of MFI development and thereby 
fill a gap in the microfinance academic literature; I also hope to extend the theoretical model to 
reflect better the processes that impact MFI performance. MFI managers, investors, policymakers, 
and other stakeholders should benefit from my findings as they put measures in place to help 
microfinance achieve its dual performance goals. The practical contribution will be in finding 
proven links between funding source mix strategies, relative performance, and the life cycle of 
various MFI legal charters.  
 Most of the extant microfinance literature has focused much attention on how MFIs affect 
the poor and very little on who funds them and how. While it is essential to understand how 
microfinance affects borrowers, it is also important to investigate how MFIs effectively fund their 
operations and capital needs, especially because that funding strongly impacts MFI profitability 
and outreach. Research indicates that the mix of an MFI's capital can adversely affect its 
performance—that is, its efﬁciency and its ﬁnancial sustainability (Bogan, 2012). Access to and 
 4 
 
the mix of funding are therefore crucial factors that should be taken seriously if the MFI’s overall 
health and efficacy as a poverty-reduction tool is to be maintained.  
Although some researchers have explored the link between MFI performance, funding, and 
relative profitability, there are very few systematic studies of how changes in the funding source 
mix impact MFIs’ performance given their legal charters. Of the few studies that attempt to address 
the MFI performance and how it varies by funding mix, Bogan (2012) and Muriu (2011) are of 
particular importance to my research. Muriu (2011) analyzes about 210 MFIs across 31 countries 
in Africa, operating from 1997 to 2008, to determine the impact of financing choices on 
microfinance profitability in Africa. In addition to the fact that his research focuses on Africa, 
Muriu (2011) did not consider the gaping differences between the MFIs as legal entities that may 
further explain the variations between funding and performance. Bogan (2012) explores how 
changes in capital structure could improve MFI efficiency and financial sustainability. Her 
research also provides useful insights into the importance of donation funding and the link between 
donations and MFI sustainability. Here, I seek to extend Bogan’s research in several ways. First, I 
will offer insights into how MFIs’ financial and social performance varies at each developmental 
stage of the life cycle, as well as the role of the funding source mix in each stage. More importantly, 
MFI research should examine these institutions as heterogeneous entities with very different 
attributes and characteristics; I, therefore, analyze MFI performance by grouping firms into the 
five fundamental legal charters established in the microfinance literature. Second, Bogan’s (2012) 
model for investigating the relationship between capital structure and MFI sustainability does not 
control for firm-level performance factors, which could moderate the impact of capital structure 
on sustainability factors. Firm-level factors that the extant literature documents as impacting MFI 
performance include: a) portfolio yield, b) the operating-expense-to-assets ratio, c) portfolio at risk 
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for more than 30 days, d) percentage of women borrowers, and e) the gross-loan-portfolio-to-assets 
ratio (Campbell and Rogers, 2012). I controlled for these factors in my research as I examined the 
impact of capital structure—which I refer to here are funding source mix—on profitability and 
outreach to the poor. Third, Bogan's (2012) model utilizes limited observations covering only the 
years 2003–2006. The microfinance industry has changed considerably since that time. My dataset 
has financial and social variables for 2,955 MFIs collected in 123 countries over an 18-year period 
(1999–2016), with 18,492 observations of unbalanced panel data. My data offers several 
advantages, including that it is both recent and quite large. The data’s size and scope lets me 
categorize MFIs into legal charters and age groups, and do a truly systematic study; it also lets me 
examine the implications of performance and funding source mix variables over a much longer 
period. Finally, the data’s breadth and depth let me effectively contribute insights on the impact of 
MFIs’ funding choices on their financial and social performance.  
Understanding the impact of funding source choices on MFIs’ financial and social 
performance goals can offer valuable insights into financial intermediaries' performance as well. 
This is a key issue given that frictions restricting the supply and demand of financing for MFIs can 
prevent the flow of credit throughout the economies where these firms operate; events from the 
great recession attest to this connection.   
I.2 Theoretical Framing 
To gain insight into the role that funding source mix plays in the variability in MFIs’ dual 
performance, we need a better theoretical approach to analyzing MFIs’ performance and funding 
at each institutional development stage. Simply analyzing MFIs as if they are homogeneous legal 
entities limits the ability to show how these institutions are funded and perform from one 
development stage to another. A more rigorous approach would be to analyze these dual-
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performance goal institutions in terms of how each legal charter survives the earlier life-cycle 
stages to succeed in the next stage, using different funding sources to achieve growth, profitability, 
and social impact. In the finance discipline, the impact of funding source mix on nonfinancial 
companies’ valuation and profitability has been thoroughly researched and hotly debated for many 
years. Likewise, the economic performance of corporations is heavily reliant on the choice of 
financing and its link with optimal risk exposure (Leland, 1998).  
In the microfinance literature, the most popular theory for explaining MFI development, 
growth, and performance is the LCT (Muriu, 2011; Bogan, 2012). The LCT seeks to explain how 
industries and businesses start, grow to maturity, and die (de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004); 
it has also been used to show how product development phases evolve (Porter, 1980). O’Rand & 
Krecker (1990) and Porter (1980) assert that the LCT provides fundamental insight into the growth, 
financing, marketing, pricing, survival, and production strategies of companies. A general version 
of the theory states that an organization’s capacity to access and adapt to its funding sources may 
determine its development (Little, 1974; Channon, 2006).  
Given their dual performance goals, we might conclude that MFIs evolve and develop 
differently than ordinary for-profit firms examined using the general LCT lens. Yet De Sousa-
Shields (2004) argues that, at each stage of their evolution, MFIs and ordinary for-profit firms 
exhibit similar management capacity, market development, and financing structure standards, and 
that the LCT would point MFIs toward high financial and higher social performance as they grow. 
De Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz (2004) therefore developed a version of the LCT for 
microfinance, the microfinance life-cylce theory (MLCT) that captures specific development 
factors related to the use of funding mix sources for MFI operations and capital requirements, the 
stability of their profitability, and their outreach to the poor. Additionally, because MFI legal 
 7 
 
charters can vary significantly, it is reasonable to assume that MLCT will capture the development 
of an MFI’s funding and performance differently depending on its specific legal charter. In this 
regard, Schneider and Greathouse (2004) note that, as MFIs evolve, their capital and funding 
structures change; further, the degree of leverage MFIs use increases at different life-cycle phases 
and their sources of funding become more diverse and sustainable (Hoque, Chishty, and Halloway 
(2011).  
With the help of de Soussa and Frankiewicz’s (2004) MLCT framework, I provide insights 
here to answer the research question: 
How does the relationship between social/financial performance outcomes and funding 
source mix vary across MFI legal charters and age groups?  
I.3 Methods 
To attempt an answer to this research question requires a methodology. Below, I summarize 
my data sampling and collection method, define and analyze the major MFI groups, describe the 
dependent and independent variables, and specify models and approaches to the analysis. 
 A significant issue for this research is to test whether empirical evidence actually supports 
the MLCT, which seeks to explain how MFI performance and funding evolve through three 
developmental stages of MFI existence. To explore this, I combine microfinance industry and 
macroeconomic-level datasets comprising 2,955 MFIs from 123 countries. I then examine two 
important categories of MFI characteristics—legal charter and age—as reported in financial, 
social, and macroeconomic data for the most recent 18-year time period (1999–2016). This 18-
year window provides adequate variation among legal charters and age group characteristics; it 
also offers a robust set of observations for the analytical inquiry. Conducting a global MFI study 
offers both benefits and challenges. The primary benefit is that the microfinance industry is 
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thriving across the world, and an in-depth, rigorous global study is long overdue. Such a study will 
help unify some industry concepts and observations. The primary challenge is that there are many 
regional, country, and firm-level specifics for which controls are needed. However, global factor 
variations can be effectively controlled for using statistical tools, such as the fixed-effect models.  
Overall, I originally considered 18,492 observations for inclusion in the study. However, I 
dropped observations that either had missing values for legal charter or were declared as “Other.” 
The research therefore contains a total of 18,024 observations. I reviewed a rather robust body of 
microfinance literature to determine the model’s dependent and independent variables to ensure 
that their relationship is well established in the extant literature (Hartarska, 2005; Cull et al., 2007; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2009; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). 
The data collected is from two well-respected and trusted sources for microfinance 
research: 1) the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) market database, and 2) the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The significant advantages of using these 
two databases are that they are well known; compiled by third parties; cover a broad range of 
organizational and economic features, as well as social and financial indicators; and have been 
widely used in research published in leading and well-respected journals.  
MIX asks MFIs to self-report; its in-house analysts then check the reported data and make 
adjustments. The MFIs that publish their information to the MIX database are typically sustainable 
institutions with the resources to report the requested information on a consistent basis.  
The 18-year data window provides adequate variation among the target MFI characteristics 
and provides a robust set of observations for a rigorous global analysis. Dataset is entirely 
representative of the microfinance field. The MIX database contains a significant amount of data 
from mega-sized MFIs—creating a large-firm bias—but it also has substantial numbers of small 
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savings and credit cooperatives. As such, the MIX data provides a unique and comprehensive 
picture of the microfinance market.  
The MFIs provide MIX with the data in local currency, after which MIX staff members 
convert the data into US dollars at contemporaneous exchange rates. The MIX market database is 
credited with being the best available representation of MFIs in the entire microfinance industry 
(Krauss/Walter, 2008; Di Bella, 2011; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007) and has been used in many 
publications by leading microfinance researchers.1  
 WDI is the World Bank’s premier annual compilation of data about development. The 
database contains more than 1,400 indicators for 217 economies dating back more than 50 years. 
WDI offers a current overview of the most recent data obtainable, as well as valuable regional data 
and income group analysis. As with MIX, the WDI database is used in key microfinance and 
economic research.  
I.4 Proposed Analysis 
I use standard analytical techniques to test for central tendencies, significant relationships, 
and differences among performance by legal charter and age, as well as to establish the expected 
impacts of funding mix sources on both performance categories in the context of the dataset’s 
2,955 MFIs. 
To compute descriptive data analyzing means, medians, and standard deviations, I use 
univariate statistical techniques to determine central tendencies and evaluate data skewness and 
kurtosis. I use Stata software tools for modeling data with outliers to ensure data consistency, and 
T-testing to establish differences between means variables and identify significant differences 
                                                 
1 Among these researchers are Bogan (2008, 2012), Morduch (1999,2000, 2005, 2010), Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2005), Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010, 2012), Hartarska (2005, 2007), Cull et al. (2007), and Nadolnyak (2007). 
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across the MFI dataset subsets. The data analyses compared relative performance variables and 
funding source metrics in aggregate across legal charters and age group levels. I used correlation 
analysis to describe the strength and direction of linear relationships between all variables. I 
calculated Pearson Moment Correlation Coefficients (r) for the model’s continuous variables and 
calculated Spearman (rho) for the binary dummy variables. To determine the variation in the 
dependent variables that can be explained by the independent variables, I ran 80 models through 
linear-panel, fixed-effects multivariate regression models. Additionally, I evaluated regressors 
with statistically significant relationships and their marginal effects on the dependent variables.  
I reviewed the results across MFI legal charter and age groups and identified important 
trends. To evaluate the models’ overall adequacy, I used the F statistic and its associated p-factor. 
I reviewed the R2, comprising overall, within, and between variation metrics, to determine how 
much of the variation in the dependent variable was explained by the independent variables. I 
evaluated each model for power and the implied factor effects of its results. I also conducted 
individual independent variable analysis to ensure significance and assess the impact on beta 
coefficients, t-scores, and p-values. Finally, I compared the results to determine common themes 
across the dataset and provide insight into the how the dual performance outcomes vary given 
variability in funding source metrics across MFI legal charters and age groups. The analysis 
provided the insights needed to answer the research question:  
“How do the relationships between social/financial performance outcomes and funding 
source mix vary across MFI legal charters and age groups?”  
I.5 Research Contribution 
Regarding contribution to theory, I provided empirical evidence on the MLCT using data 
collected over an 18-year period from more than 2,955 MFIs covering 123 countries. To the best 
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of my knowledge, this analysis is the first time the MLCT has been tested on such broad scale in 
the microfinance literature. This research provides insights into the evolution of MFI development 
and offers theoretical insights into MFI processes that drive improvements in both profitability and 
social performance goal achievement. This research helps fill a gap in the microfinance literature 
on the relationship between funding and performance. 
In terms of practical contribution, this work finds proven links between profitability, social 
performance outcomes, and funding source mix strategies. Understanding the funding source mix’s 
role in the relative performance outcomes of the different MFI legal charters at various life-cycle 
stages is essential to MFI management, shareholders, and policymakers entrusted with making 
effective decisions to boost their institutions' profitability, growth, and social impact. My 
contributions may also provide valuable insights into other financial intermediaries' performance 
as, in many ways, these intermediaries’ activities resemble those of MFIs. Further, this research 
provides tools that will help microfinance stakeholders keep MFIs in business by offering policy 
inputs to help MFIs identify optimal funding sources for various legal structures and age groups. 
The research will also benefit creditors by shedding light on funding structures, which can help 
improve their understanding of MFI risk management strategies. 
Finally, my findings will be significant for a growing category of MFI microfinance 
investment vehicles (MIV) financiers. These MIVs tend to be commercially oriented in their 
funding decisions (Julie Abrams & Ivatury, 2005), i.e. they raise financing from investors who 
expect to be paid returns that are comparable to market rates. Understanding MFI funding needs 
and the impact of funding source mix on the performance objectives MIVs will assist them to make 
better investment decisions. 
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I.6 Outline of the Research  
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter that 
provides an overview and summary of the research. Chapter 2 offers a literature review and the 
theoretical framing and buildup of the applicable theory. Chapter 3 develops the argument for the 
using the MLCT to analyze performance across MFI legal charters and ages; it also offers 
hypotheses to help answer research questions. Chapter 4 describes the study’s research 
methodology, analytical approach, and techniques. The study’s results are then presented in 
Chapter 5, followed by a discussion and summary of contributions in Chapter 6. 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1 Microfinance Legal Forms 
Although most research presents MFIs as if they are homogeneous entities, MFIs have diverse 
attributes that make them vary significantly in many respects. One major attribute is the legal form 
under which the MFI is registered. In the extant microfinance literature, this attribute is referred 
to as either a legal structure or, as I refer to it here, a legal charter. The literature identifies five 
primary legal charters: a formal commercial microfinance bank (referred to here as bank); a credit 
union or cooperative (here, credit union); a non-bank financial institution (NBFI); a non-
governmental organization (NGO), and a rural or community bank (rural bank). These charters 
differ significantly regarding governance, ownership, organizational structure, products, services 
offered, and supervision by authorities or regulators. The type of legal charter or structure 
influences an MFI’s financial products and services, regulation, mandate, and target market. 
Similarly, the legal charter determines the degree to which the state supervises the MFI and the 
categories of clients it serves; these factors, in turn, affect its product offerings, financial 
management, reporting needs, funding sources, and overall profitability and outreach. Thus, 
contrary to what most microfinance research seems to demonstrate, MFIs are not homogeneous 
financial services institutions. Table 1 summarizes the major MFIs legal charters and associated 
attributes. 
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Table 1: Major Attributes of MFI Legal Charters  
 
Source: Based on Ledgerwood (2013) 
 Main MFIs Legal Charters 
Attributes Banks Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank 
Legal Status Licensed as a bank or 
other form as per 
regulatory 
requirements 
Registered with 
central authority 
Licensed as a NBFI 
or modified 
financial institution 
(determined by 
country-specific 
legal charter 
Registered as an 
NGO, not-for-
profit institution, 
or company 
limited by 
guarantee 
Licensed as a 
bank 
Regulation 
and oversight 
Regulated and 
supervised by central 
bank, ministry, or a 
specialized body 
Credit unions may 
be regulated; 
oversight by 
specialized body 
Regulated by central 
bank or specialized 
body or by one or 
more government 
units 
Not regulated; 
may be subject to 
government 
oversight 
Regulated by 
central bank or 
specialized body 
or by one or 
more 
government 
units 
Ownership Mostly private 
shareholders; some 
development banks as 
initial shareholders 
Owned by 
members 
Mix of public and 
private 
shareholders; 
sometimes other 
financial institutions 
or other companies 
No private 
ownership, strong 
ownership 
characteristics 
among founders 
and board 
Shareholders, 
government and 
private 
Governance Board of directors 
appointed by 
shareholders 
Board of directors 
or management 
committee elected 
by members 
Board of directors 
appointed by 
shareholders 
Board of 
directors, 
appointed by 
founders and 
funders 
Board of 
directors 
appointed by 
shareholders 
Client type Unserved or 
underserved 
individuals or micro or 
small businesses; In 
the urban areas they 
may serve commercial 
micro, small, and 
medium enterprise  
clients, 
fewer poor individual 
clients 
A range of clients, 
depending on 
members 
Clients vary 
depending on type 
of products (for 
example, credit or 
insurance) 
Poor, "unbanked" 
clients; for 
multipurpose 
NGOs, various 
target clients, and 
beneficiaries 
Broad target 
group: poor and 
nonpoor; rural 
Products Credit, savings, 
insurance, payment 
services; terms may be 
modified for client 
needs 
Basic savings and 
credit, although 
inherently savings 
led 
Range from credit 
only, leasing, 
insurance; normally 
not able to 
intermediate 
deposits 
Traditionally 
credit led; 
multipurpose 
NGOs add 
financial services 
to other activities 
Primarily 
savings; wide 
distribution 
network 
leveraged for 
payment 
services 
Management 
and reporting 
Professionally 
managed; report to 
central bank or 
supervisory authority 
Professionally 
managed to 
varying degrees; 
report to 
supervisory 
authorities 
Professionally 
managed; report to 
supervisory 
authority 
Professionally 
managed to 
varying degrees; 
may need to 
report to 
registration body 
Professionally 
managed to 
varying degrees; 
report to 
regulators 
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II.1.1 MFI Banks 
In the broadest sense, banks are regulated financial institutions licensed to accept saving 
from depositors and make loans to borrowers. They are supervised by a central bank or other 
government agency or ministry, which ensures that banks are well capitalized to support economic 
activities and are not vulnerable to systemic economic risks. The term “banks” are therefore 
reserved for only certain types of financial institutions (Ledgerwood, 2013). Microfinance banks 
or bank MFIs share certain standard features with commercial or retail banks, but their lending 
and outreach are targeted to customers not usually reached by traditional banks. Several types of 
MFI bank provide financial services to the poor, including loan and savings banks, postal services, 
state banks, commercial banks, and rural banks.  
II.1.1.1 Loans and Savings Banks  
Loans and savings banks are regulated financial institutions that provide retail banking 
services such as accepting private depositors’ savings, making payments, and extending credit and 
insurance to individuals and small- and medium-size enterprises. Loans and savings banks’ service 
outreach extends across broad geographic areas; their objective is to reach clients not served by 
commercial banks. Ordinarily, their purpose is not to maximize profit but rather to be financially 
inclusive while sustaining their operations (Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004). Loans and 
savings banks are regulated by the banking authorities and could be either privately or publicly 
owned. Data from 2000 to 2003 showed that non-postal loans and savings bank assets made up 
approximately 20 percent of total banking assets (Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004). Also, 
according to the World Loans and Savings Banks Institute, these banks held 75% of the 1.5 billion 
accounts managed by financial institutions with dual performance goals, in 2006 (De Noose, 
2007). Loans and savings banks have larger branch networks than other financially inclusive 
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service providers. As a result, they have greater access to the poor through geographic proximity 
to their communities. Additionally, some offer financial educational programs that contribute to 
developing the financial capabilities of poor communities and individuals (De Noose, 2007). 
II.1.1.2 Postal Savings Banks (PSBs) 
PSB financial services typically include small-amount money transfers, bill payment, and 
savings. That said, their services and products vary widely from country to country and may 
include some credit or insurance products, and even deposit intermediation. PSBs may also serve 
as commercial bank agents mobilizing deposits and extending credit to specific communities. In 
most countries, PSBs are entirely government owned, but in some countries that can be jointly 
owned with the private and public sectors. Central banks and their agencies provide direct 
supervision for PSBs (Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004). Many PSBs have point of sale 
locations in rural, peri-urban, or remote areas; they, therefore, have a substantial advantage in 
providing basic banking services to diverse communities (World Savings Banks Institute [WSBI], 
2010).  
II.1.1.3 State Banks  
State banks comprise commercial state banks, agriculture development banks, and PSBs. 
Governments or state agencies own and control these banks, which are therefore considered 
semipublic or public entities. State banks are funded mostly by public capital and by deposits from 
clients (Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek 1997). Because they have many savers and extensive branch 
networks, they are effective at reaching the poor with financial services. 
State banks primarily serve the agriculture sector, extending credit and providing savings 
services to small-scale farming production, cottage and village industries, and other rural 
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livelihood activities in remote areas. Their target clients include farmers, merchants, cooperatives, 
and various associations (Robinson 1995).  
Several risks can impact a state bank’s ability to reach the poor with financial services. 
First, because state banks are primarily established to correct market failures and provide resources 
to underserved or high-priority economic sectors, they may be disposed to incumbent 
governments’ political priorities and to political influences that may conflict with institutional 
objectives (Young and Vogel 2005). Second, state banks may not be accountable to regulators in 
the same way as private banks and financial services companies and might, therefore, become 
inefficient. Third, state bank board members might be appointed not due to professional 
competencies but rather to political considerations or other criteria or business rationales, limiting 
effective governance and perpetuating the challenges of fiduciary responsibility. Finally, 
governments have often been willing to subsidize continuing losses in state banks, weakening 
management discipline (Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004). 
II.1.1.4 Private Commercial Banks  
Commercial banks are regulated financial institutions that provide the most complete list 
of financial services to clients. Among their many services are extending credit, providing clients 
with the systems to make payments, and mobilizing savings for financial intermediation. They 
operate mostly in urban areas serving businesses and wealthier clientele, although some have 
begun reaching lower-income populations and markets with their services.  
Commercial banks control many more resources than other financial providers. As a result, 
they attract different funding types, especially in relation to deposits and debt; they are also highly 
leveraged. They access debt from commercial sources, such as development finance institutions, 
other commercial banks, MIVs, and debt issuance through capital markets. Additionally, 
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commercial banks can raise equity from private placements or through the capital markets. 
Typically, commercial banks engage in microfinance in one of the following three ways. 1) 
Downscaling: creating an internal subsidiary or an affiliate that extends the bank’s product offering 
to micro clients that otherwise cannot access financial services. 2) Green-fielding: creating an 
external institution to offer structured or regulated financial services to micro clients. 3) 
Partnering: entering into a partnership with an experienced microfinance organization or other 
providers on an agency relationship basis. 
II.1.2 Credit Unions and Financial Cooperatives (Credit Unions) 
Credit unions are not-for-profit organizations that provide financial services to their 
members; they are also known as savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), building societies, 
or savings and loan associations. Credit unions are member-owned and –controlled institutions 
with no external shareholders. Each member has the right to one vote. Credit unions are usually 
affiliated with geography, employment, or religion. Potential credit union members must purchase 
a specific number of shares to become members or clients (Johnson, Malkamaki, and Wanjau 
2005). Each member purchases the same amount of shares by value, and the organization sets the 
share price for all members at specified times. Once a member, clients can deposit savings with 
and/or take out loans from the institution. Aside from offering plain-vanilla savings and credit 
products to members, many credit unions currently provide sophisticated financial products and 
services, such as contractual savings, housing loans, money transfer and payments, and insurance 
services (Branch 2005). Once they turn a profit, credit unions either reinvest the profit to expand 
their business or return the profit to members as dividends. These dividends sometimes act as 
subsidies to make loan costs more affordable, and savings returns more attractive to members 
(WOCCU, 2011). Christen and Mas (2009) found that, during the 2008 Great Recession, local 
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credit unions performed better than other financial services organizations that use external 
investments, primarily due to the stability and local nature of their deposits. Credit unions are 
customarily governed by volunteers, who are elected to the board of directors by other members.  
As institutions that create loans from member savings, larger credit unions are typically 
supervised by regulators. Again, this supervision varies from one country to another. However, in 
most countries, the regulators who oversee agricultural, marketing, transport, and other 
cooperatives also supervise credit unions. The risk in using such regulators in developing countries 
is that these authorities may not have the necessary skills to properly supervise financial 
intermediaries. Thus, the general lack of financial oversight in such cases, coupled with weak 
governance, can compromise credit union safety and soundness, especially when poor people’s 
savings are at risk (Ledgerwood, 2013). Although many still struggle with poor management, 
credit unions play a significant role as financial services providers to the poor in many developing 
countries. 
II.1.3 Non-banking Financial Institutions (NBFI) 
Here, I discuss two types of NBFIs: deposit-taking MFIs, and what I’ll refer to here as 
“other NBFIs.” Deposit-taking MFIs are NBFIs that are licensed to accept or mobilize savings 
from clients. These institutions, more than other NBFIs, can be easily transformed into fully 
licensed banks (Ledgerwood, 2013). As Ledgerwood and White (2006) note, deposit-taking MFIs 
can carry out financial intermediation, using deposits to fund their loans; this gives them access to 
commercial funds, which allows them to grow. Deposit-taking MFIs are shareholding institutions 
funded both by shareholder-contributed equity and by debt (that is, loans from lenders and capital 
markets). It is always tremendously challenging both structurally and culturally to turn a nonprofit 
organization into a for-profit company with shareholders. To achieve this transformation, the board 
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and top managers must commit fully to engaging with and managing the change, as well as to 
achieving equilibrium between their purpose—offering financial services to the poor—and 
shareholder desire for value and return. 
Other NBFIs include insurance, leasing, consumer credit, and specialist credit companies 
seeking to provide more-inclusive financial services. Compared to deposit-taking NBFIs, these 
NBFIs offer fewer services and have fewer financing opportunities. For example, they typically 
cannot use deposits for loans or use payment/settlement systems. Because of these regulatory 
restrictions, these NBFIs have lower capital requirements and lower systemic risk, and thus 
obtaining a license to operate one is easy relative to obtaining one for a bank. 
II.1.4 Nongovernmental organization (NGO) MFIs 
NGO MFIs are a diverse group—ranging from large organizations with diverse services to 
small local firms—and differ from credit unions and community-based financial service providers 
primarily2 because they are not managed or own by members. Instead, they are board-run. The 
board members, who are appointed by funders or founders, oversee and offer input on the MFI’s 
activities and strategies. NGO MFIs are organized to suit their specific funding and mission. 
Typically, they must register in their host country, and that country outlines both what the MFI 
can do and how its incoming money from donors and operations is taxed. Because NGO MFI 
board members do not answer to investors and are rarely overseen by regulatory authorities, they 
are often not governed in a way that encourages fiscal responsibility.  
                                                 
2Mostly nonprofit organizations, which use their surplus revenues to achieve a social goal or mission. They do not 
distribute surplus income to their shareholders (or equivalents) as profit or dividends. NGOs provide public benefits 
by pursuing specific goals related to areas such as public safety, science, religion, education, literacy, and cruelty-
prevention. 
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Typically funded by borrowings, donations,3 accumulated equity, and debt, most NGO 
MFIs provide only credit-granting services, offering individuals or groups microenterprise loans—
often using community-based guarantees such as group solidarity or village banking.4 Some NGO 
MFIs also act as bank or insurance company agents, and most require compulsory savings. 
However, these MFIs cannot legally use their clients’ savings as loan money. Operations revenue 
is expected to pay for the firm’s daily operations and its growth (Pollinger, Outhwaite and Cordero-
Guzman, 2007; Vanelli, 2002). Most firms spend their donations and grants on products, technical 
help, and channel development. As I discuss later, the NGO MFIs in my sample frequently use 
long-term debt rather than other funding sources to finance their operations; their next-largest 
funding comes from short-term borrowing and equity. This equity includes money donated to 
support capital and retained earnings—that is, a firm’s revenue after expenses. NGO MFIs often 
have a weak ratio of debt-to-equity because their informality limits their ability to borrow. 
Increasingly, however, they are using debt (typically short-term loans). Funders previously require 
these MFIs to have collateral (that is, cash or their pledged loan portfolio), but today well-
performing organizations can borrow with guarantees and little to no collateral requirements. 
Compared to regulated firms, NGO MFIs are informally structured and have fewer reporting 
requirements. They can thus more easily respond to client needs. Still, NGO firms often have weak 
management (particularly during expansion), making ongoing stability and growth a challenge. 
Although they were among the first microfinance providers in underserved areas, NGO MFIs’ 
prominence has declined for two reasons: they often struggle to both cover costs and fund growth, 
and they are unable to offer savings services. So, while thousands of multipurpose NGOs offer 
                                                 
3 Donations include grants and subsidized loans from donors and public developmental institutions 
4 Village banking usually comprises 5–30 neighbors who regularly meet with financial services providers to borrow 
and save money; the neighbors provide guarantees for each other's loans. 
 22 
 
microcredit, the number of clients they actually serve is quite small. They might deal with this in 
various ways; some seek regulation, while bigger NGOs that offer many different services might 
make their financial offerings a completely separate and self-sustaining operation. 
II.1.5 Rural Banks  
As their names imply, rural banks and community banks (here, simply rural banks) provide 
agricultural loans and savings services in rural areas. Banking authorities license and oversee rural 
banks, which are typically owned by members, the government, or a private firm. Although often 
small, rural banks nonetheless support professional management and staff and restrict product 
offerings to a particular geographic area. These products include short- and long-term savings 
services, and investment/consumption loans for agriculture, petty trading, and so on. Some rural 
banks are licensed to let clients transfer money and make payments. Because they are small, these 
banks are often linked to larger institutions and thus benefit from technical support for mobilizing 
funds, building capacity, and managing their capital. In countries that support rural banks—
including China, Ghana, India, and the Philippines—the banks are often established by the national 
government to encourage development in rural areas. In India, for example, rural banks offer basic 
banking services and actively support credit programs among community self-help groups (Linder 
2010a, 2010b). Further, in the Philippines, some rural banks offer both banking and 
microinsurance services (BSP 2011). 
II.2 MFI Performance Overview 
MFIs are a unique set of financial institutions because they have a double bottom line—that is, 
they pursue a combination of financial and social-impact goals. MFIs thus follow good banking 
principles to sustain profitability, while also pursuing their social impact objective of alleviating 
poverty. The financial performance goal of profitability entails reducing dependence on subsidies 
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and reducing risk exposure. The social performance goals vary, and include achieving a stated 
social mission and commitments to corporate social responsibility. Examples include reducing 
financial exclusion and poverty, empowering women, and following ethical standards for 
consumer protection. Clear indicators and strategies to support such goals are often lacking, 
however. Some critics have cautioned that MFIs that become too focused on financial performance 
at the expense of outreach to poorer customers drift from their objectives of serving the poor 
(Murdoch, 2000; Cull, 2009). Other researchers (Rhyne, 1998; Christen and Drake (2002) have 
asserted that a more profitable microfinance industry can better meet its social goals of reaching 
the poorest members of their communities because being profitable makes MFIs more efficient 
and more willing to seek out new markets for their loan products. Focusing on profitable operations 
only, however, might require that MFIs charge high-interest rates and fees, which may discourage 
future customers who fear to get into excessive debt and not being able to pay off their loans 
(Roberts, 2013). On the other hand, an excessive focus on social orientation can make MFIs 
unsustainable. A careful tradeoff between financial and social performance can help MFIs avoid 
compromising microfinance’s credibility and future as a poverty reduction tool (Servin, Lensink, 
& Van den Berg, 2012). 
II.2.1 Financial Performance 
The most prominent driver of an institution’s financial performance is profitability; this 
profitability is determined by internal factors such as the institution’s balance sheet and income 
statement, risk management, operations management, and technology, as well as external factors 
such as the economy, financial markets, regulations, and competition. Profitability ratios measure 
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an MFI’s net income against the structure of its balance sheet5 and help investors and managers 
determine whether the funds they invested in the MFI are earning an adequate return.  
Profi6tability is also a sustainability measure for financial institutions, as the costs of 
capital, inflation, non-cash items, and operating expenses are paid out of operating revenues only. 
Commercial banks become profitable by competing to attract money through deposits and through 
lending money out as loans. A bank’s profitability rests on its ability to attract deposits at a cost 
sustainably lower than the return on assets (mainly loans). MFIs are specialized financial 
institutions and exhibit most of these same characteristics. The MFI’s balance sheet and income 
statement are similar to those of retail/commercial banks and are both asset and liability driven 
(see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix for examples). Low profitability weakens an MFI’s 
capacity to absorb adverse shocks, which subsequently affects solvency (Muriu, 2011), while a 
profitable MFI’s surpluses are used to expand its outreach (Rosenburg, 2009; Ayayi & Sene, 2010; 
Tehulu, 2013). 
An MFI’s financial performance is determined by examining its financial statements and 
ensuring that the items they include are consistent with generally accepted accounting principles. 
The Appendix includes tables that show example financial statements and definitions.  
Determining profitability is quite straightforward: Does the MFI earn enough revenue, 
excluding grants and donations, to make a profit? Typically, three profitability ratios are used to 
assess a financial institution’s financial performance: return on assets (ROA), return on business 
(ROB),7 and return on equity (ROE). In the microfinance literature, however, the leading measure 
of profitability is ROA. 
                                                 
5 Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix show a sample of an MFI balance sheet and income statement, respectively. 
6 Cash flow matters a great deal too 
7 “Business” refers to the result of adding assets and liabilities together and dividing by two; this ratio is useful for 
MFIs that use mobilized savings to fund a majority of their assets. 
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The microfinance literature defines ROA as the MFI’s net operating income after taxes 
divided by its assets. ROA is an important measure because it lets analysts compare the MFI's 
performance with that of other MFIs (Ledgerwood, 2013). It also tells investors the return they 
can expect from an investment in the MFI. A return should cover the risk-free rate and a markup 
to cover the MFI’s systematic risk (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). Such a risk-adjusted return is hard 
to calculate for MFIs because only a few of these institutions are listed as publicly traded firms. 
The following equation is adapted from the MIX market database’s definition of ROA:  
Equation 1. ROA Definition  
 ROA =
(Net operating income,   less Taxes)
Average assets
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Source: Adapted from Benjamin and Ledgerwood (1998) 
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ROA is a standard measure of an institution’s long-term health (Koch, 1992; Ledgerwood, 
1999). Many researchers use it to measure how well a firm is using its assets to generate profits 
(Bogan, 2012). Figure 1 shows a detailed breakdown of ROA into components to help further 
analyze an MFI’s financial performance. This analysis reveals the sources of an MFI’s profitability 
and may signal areas in which the institution could improve its operations and asset management 
from a profitability viewpoint. In particular, it can determine the portfolio yield and the performing 
assets and compare them with projected returns and between periods. At a top level, ROA can be 
decomposed into profit margin and asset utilization. When analyzing an MFI, it is useful to break 
down the profit margin and asset utilization into a series of ratios and relate each to the total income 
or total assets. This lets analysts examine the primary source of the MFI’s revenue, along with 
other funding sources. The profit margin is the profits relative to total revenue earned. Further 
breaking down the profit margin ratio into the four costs an MFI incurs—showing each as a 
percentage of total revenue—provides insight into the MFI’s risks and costs. Asset utilization is 
revenue as a ratio of total assets, which can be further broken down into interest and non-interest 
income to assets. These two components of asset utilization indicate the MFI’s revenue source 
based on where the assets are invested (loan portfolio versus other investments). Breaking ROA 
into components shows just why this ratio is such a robust profitability measure. 
Clearly, the objective of MFIs is not simply to maximize their value; they also aim to 
reduce poverty. However, in asserting that MFIs should rely less on donors and government funds 
and more on attracting commercial sources to fund their operations, many researchers have 
significantly boosted the idea of using ROAs as financial performance measures for MFIs 
(Benjamin and Ledgerwood, 1998). In the MIX market database, ROA is measured by net 
operating income (excluding taxes) compared to average total assets. This ratio, which is the net 
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of income taxes and excludes donations and non-operating items, shows how the MFI is managing 
its assets to optimize profitability. 
II.2.2 Social Performance 
Zeller, Lapenu, and Greeley (2003) define the social performance of an organization 
(whether a private-for-profit firm, cooperative, or NGO) as the organization’s relations with its 
clients and other stakeholder groups. Obtaining a unique measure of an MFI’s social performance 
is hard. However, two groups of metrics that have been used extensively in the microfinance 
literature are 1) outreach to the poor (Cull et al., 2007; De Bruyne, 2008; Mersland and Strøm, 
2010; Lensink et al., 2011; van den Berg, Lensink and Servin, 2015), and 2) women’s 
empowerment.  
The MIX market database defines a measure for outreach breadth by the number of 
borrowers an MFI serves: a large outreach refers to an MFI that serves 30,000 borrowers or more, 
a medium one serves 10,000–30,000 borrowers, and small one serves less than 10,000 borrowers. 
Using the number of active borrowers as a measure of outreach breadth has weakness, however. 
For example, while big bank MFIs have many borrowers due to their size, it does not necessarily 
mean that they have a better social performance than, say, NGO MFIs. To ensure a reasonable 
basis for comparing outreach breadth across MFI legal charters, I scale the number of active 
borrower to the size of the MFI’s assets. The MIX database also provides the depth of outreach 
definition as already described in this paper. 
Outreach to the poor is usually measured by the breadth of outreach (i.e., the MFI’s total 
number of clients) and depth of outreach (i.e., average outstanding balance as a percentage of gross 
national income, or GNI, per capita) (Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 
2007; Tchuigoua, 2010). Schreiner (2002) contends that a lower loan amount could be interpreted 
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as a better outreach to poorer customers, so a lower average loan size could mean that the MFI is 
reaching poorer clients, which is a key microfinance goal. Also, D’Espallier, Hudon, and Szafarz 
(2017) argue that MFIs use average loan size to signal commitment to their social mission. To 
compare across countries, the average loan size can be taken as a percentage of per capita GNI 
(Bogan, 2012; De Bruyne, 2008; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2010; D’Espallier et al., 2011).  
Microfinance is essential not just as a tool for offering the poor social inclusion and 
financial access, but also as a significant vehicle for empowering women. Morduch (1999) argues 
that one reason microfinance has succeeded in reducing poverty is that it targets women. As is 
widely known, women are more likely than men to live in poverty, so increasing women's 
economic well-being can reduce poverty not just for the women themselves, but also for children, 
extended families, and thus the community as a whole. Some researchers have also explored the 
impact of women on microfinance sustainability and social performance. Ayayi and Sene (2010), 
for example, studied MFI sustainability as measured by financial sustainability by considering 
credit portfolio quality and, on several outreach ratios—including the percentage of women 
borrowers—concluded that women clients significantly and positively impact MFI profitability 
and the general well-being of poor communities. It is therefore not surprising that the number of 
women with access to credit has been steadily growing (Spina, 2013, Carney 1998; Scoones 1998; 
Ellis 2000, Hulme and Rutherford 2002). MFIs have expanded the boundaries of institutional 
finance and helped include the poor, especially poor women, in the formal financial system by 
giving them access to credit to fight poverty (Bogan, 2011). These factors drove my decision to 
include a women empowerment indicator as a social performance metric in my research. I measure 
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the women-empowerment construct by the MFI’s percentage of female borrowers; a measure 
tracked in the MIX market database. 
II.2.3 Relative Social and Financial Performance and Funding Mix Sources 
Few studies have clearly established the dynamic relationship between an MFI’s social 
impact and its financial return (Conning, 1999; Paxton, 2003; Cull et al., 2007; Quayes, 2011). 
Further, existing research often offers conflicting findings, thus creating confusion for 
policymakers in the financial industry. I discuss this conflicting research outcomes below: 
Conning (1999) differentiates between three MFI categories: low-end, high-end, and 
broad-end.8 Among his findings are that MFIs that are more socially oriented - as measured by 
average loan balances - show lower efficiency in relation to their staffing expenses; and that the 
interest rates charged by low- and broad-end MFIs are approximately twice as high on average as 
those of high-end MFIs. The latter is presumably because higher interest rates are needed to cover 
higher administrative costs. Conning also found that low- and broad-end MFIs’ leverage level is 
lower than high-end MFIs. While extensive, Conning’s research falls short of clearly delineating 
a relationship between financial and social returns.  
Quayes (2011) adds to the body of research by clarifying financial and social performance, 
yet neglects to compare the dynamics between them. He analyzes 702 MFIs from the MIX database 
and offers empirical evidence emphasizing that an MFI’s financial performance does not 
necessarily negatively impact outreach (Quayes, 2011). To measure social performance, Quayes 
divides that average loan balance by the per capita GNI (ALB_GNI). He uses a dummy variable 
                                                 
8 Low-end MFIs serve clients with loans that are less than 20% of GNP per capita on average; high-end MFIs serve 
clients with loans greater than 85% of GNP per capita on average; and broad-end MFIs serve clients in between the 
high and low rates. 
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for financial self-sustainability (FSS) to represent a firm’s financial performance and finds that 
FSS is positively related to outreach depth (using ALB_GNI) for high-disclosure MFIs. In one 
provocative result, Quayes finds that having lower average loan balances increases the probability 
that a high-disclosure MFI will achieve FSS; this comes close to providing evidence of a 
relationship between financial and social performance. 
Paxton’s (2003) poverty outreach measure includes outreach depth and scale; it shows, at 
best, a zero relationship between the reliance on subsidies and outreach. This suggests that MFIs 
that are financially self-sufficient tend to improve outreach to the largest number of poor people.  
Cull et al. (2007) analyze trade-offs between outreach and MFI profitability, finding no 
significant connection between average loan size and profitability. They also use financial self-
sufficiency as the primary way to asses profitability and operational self-sufficiency (OSS); for 
robustness checks, they use ROA. Among the authors findings are that lenders charge lower fees 
for bigger loans, regardless of whether the loans are for individuals or solidarity groups. Further, 
village banks showed the highest costs and subsidy levels, and lenders that focused on individual 
borrowers had the highest profits and the lowest outreach levels. 
Hermes et al. (2011) analyze the interaction between MFI efficiency and social return. 
They investigated a possible trade-off between MFI efficiency and outreach and found that 
efficiency and the number of female borrowers and average loan balances are negatively related. 
The literature shows inconsistent findings on the relationship between financial and social 
performance. In some research, deeper MFI outreach relates to lower efficiency (e.g., Conning, 
1999; Cull et al., 2007; Hermes, 2011), while other research shows that financial self-sufficiency 
and outreach are positively related (e.g., Paxton, 2003; Quayes, 2011). Further, Cull et al. (2007) 
examined return measures and outreach, and they found no significant relationship. Additional 
 31 
 
detailed analysis is clearly needed on these contradictory results. In addition to using traditional 
estimating factors to measure costs and return, I also analyze portfolio yield to identify how factors 
driving cost and yield—that is, the return measures—relate to outreach measures.  
Existing research indicates that outreach to the poor can positively impact portfolio yield, 
but it also might increase MFI costs—resulting in little to no impact on return measures. Conning 
(1999) indicates that MFIs offering smaller loans charge higher interest rates. Because portfolio 
yield measures clients’ gross interest payables by dividing interest and fee income by the average 
loan portfolio, researchers use it as a proxy for interest rate. Further, because smaller loans indicate 
higher outreach levels, researchers assume that higher financial return would link to greater 
outreach, if all else is constant. Until now, research has shown no significant relationship between 
financial return, measured as profitability, and social return, measured using various indicators 
(Cull et al., 2007; Quayes, 2011). With more secondary data and using different methods, I intend 
to add to the discussion of the dynamic relationship between financial and social performance; my 
goal is to help policymakers understand how to improve the odds of MFI success and solvency.  
II.3  Funders of MFI Operations and Capital Requirements 
Due to their social appeal, MFIs receive funding from governments, investors, and donors. 
In return, they are expected to provide financial services to their targeted market and ensure 
operational sustainability that benefits both the borrowers and the institution (Hermes & Lensink, 
2011). MFIs use funding to fuel various ventures—including growth, product and channel 
development, and service to novel regions and market sectors—while their direct institutional 
funding targets loan portfolio expansion (El-Zoghbi et al., 2011). Microfinance funders can be 
classified as public or private, intermediary or direct, or local or cross-border. As microfinancing 
has progressed, so have the types of funders. The base has increased significantly from generous 
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(development-focused) donors to investors from private-sector firms, local and international 
banks, and private equity funds, and individual investors. 
More recently, impact investing has emerged and brought funders into the fold who pursue 
investments that explicitly target social development goals. Furthermore, MFIs are looking to 
capital markets both for fundraising and to offer an exit mechanism for investors. By engaging 
with capital markets, MFIs are developing the capacity and sophisticated fundraising needed to 
showcase themselves to institutional investors as becoming “investment ready.” Different funder 
types have different motives, ranging from straight profit-seeking to improving the public good.  
Microfinancing is primarily funded publically, but private financing is rapidly increasing, 
driven by foundations and institutional investors and their often differing motivations. Foundations 
focus on development goals and usually fund through donation, while institutions and individuals 
want financial and social results. Regardless of type, funder motivations increasingly focus on 
commercialization, broad inclusion, and scale.  
Debt financers rarely stipulate how their money can be used, but some other lenders require 
that MFIs use funds for particular products (such as agricultural loans) or markets (such as rural 
women), and donation funders specify how their funding can be used in explicit detail. 
Typically funded by donations and equity, greenfield and early-stage institutions direct 
their resources mainly toward start-up, infrastructure, and capacity building. Because they generate 
enough income to cover costs, more mature institutions use debt and equity funding. Funders 
support different MFI types based on their mandate and their expectation of returns, both overall 
and in terms of social vs. financial. Young firms looking to grow toward profitability require 
patient capital, often from investors who want both financial and social returns and view 
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investments as a long-term engagement. Funders who want rapid returns and have constraints on 
liquidity and return typically fund only developed institutions. 
Public funders—which include development finance institutions (DFIs) and government, 
local, bilateral, and multilateral agencies—aim to draw private investment to underfunded markets. 
Their funding targets development goals and their activities support defined social objectives. 
National budgets fund bilateral agencies; examples agencies include the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Swedish International Developmental Agency 
(SIDA). Countries also fund multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, 
while DFIs are funded by in-country shareholder contributions at first, then by retained earnings. 
Examples of DFIs include Germany’s KfW, the Netherlands’ FMO, and the World Bank’s private 
sector affiliate, the International Finance Corporation. DFIs also issue bonds on capital markets; 
they seek both social and financial returns and are accountable to the general public. Public funders 
use various tools—including donations, guarantees, debt, and equity—to provide resources in 
areas that private investors cannot or will not support. In so doing, public funders help create an 
environment that will encourage private-sector involvement.  
• Bilateral and multilateral agencies. Bilateral agencies are country-specific and work 
directly with the host country’s government, often in relation to its foreign policy 
initiatives. Bilateral agencies support specific MFIs and service market development; 
channeled through NGOs or the government, their funding is targeted at capacity 
expansion. Multilateral agencies have the same goals, but are supported by and work in 
multiple countries at the same time. Both bilateral and multilateral agencies have strong 
credit and thus can offer guarantees when providers issue debt for private sector 
participants to purchase. 
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• Development finance institutions. DFIs seek both social and financial returns, and can 
invest in MFIs in one of two ways: directly, or through holding companies, investment 
funds, or other intermediaries. DFIs often fund companies and projects that the private 
sector shows no interest in (at least initially). 
Private funders include institutional investors, NGOs, banks, foundations, and individuals. Private 
funders are more diverse in their objectives and focus than public funders. For example, 
foundations focus more on market development, while other types of investors target dual 
performance goals that balance financial performance and social impact improvements.9 The latter 
recognize that, on their own, charitable organizations and governments may not have adequate 
capital to address global problems. Many invest funds in this way out of a sense of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), while others are interested in risk profiles that might offer increased financial 
and social rewards (Reille et al., 2011).  
• Foundations. Endowments from multinational companies such as Microsoft (via the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation) and other private enterprises and individuals are the primary 
source of foundation capital. Recognizing private money’s crucial role in addressing 
poverty, foundations fund global philanthropic initiatives to support development. 
Foundations fund MFIs in various ways, but mainly either offer seed capital for start-up 
institutions or donate to existing MFIs to train staff members, build capacity, and develop 
products. Further, foundations motivate other investors by agreeing to absorb a portfolio’s 
first loss. In this way, they cushion more risk-averse investors, who otherwise would not 
invest in the MFI portfolios. As I describe below, some foundations also invest in MIVs. 
                                                 
9 Various investments in businesses or funds—including sustainable investment, double- and triple-bottom-line 
investment, and impact investment—are made purposefully to generate social or environmental good alongside 
financial returns. 
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• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). An NGO operates independently of any 
government and does not get directly involved in government-run programs. NGOs’ 
primary purpose is to address a social or political issue. Many local and international NGOs 
fund microfinance using either multiple public and private sector funding sources or direct 
fundraising efforts that target individual donors. NGO donations typically fund product 
development or nonfinancial services, or provide seed capital for operations aimed at 
specific underserved groups within their general mission/target clientele. They can also 
help start or even be a direct shareholder10 of a local MFI (Ledgerwood, 2013). 
• Institutional investors. Institutional investors—including insurance companies and 
pension, hedge, and mutual funds—are increasingly investing in the microfinance sector 
both for social value and to diversify the returns they typically get with other investments; 
such investments are becoming well known as impact investing.11 Institutional investors 
typically invest in microfinance through intermediaries. True to their dual goals, they seek 
financial benefit; thus, most of their funds are channeled into MFIs that are both established 
and profitable. Further, by influencing the way MFIs and intermediaries gather information 
for and meet their operational, financial, and social-impact reporting requirements, 
institutional investors have had a tremendous impact on MFI reporting standards. 
• Banks. Commercial banks that invest equity and debt in MFIs initially did so in support of 
their CSR goals. Today, however, many use microfinance activities to meet financial goals 
as well. While local banks in some countries offer no MFI funding, in other countries, they 
                                                 
10 NGOs with successful MFIs include Acción Comunitaria del Perú (MiBanco); Bolivia’s FIE NGO (Banco FIE); 
Peru’s Separ (Confianza); Rwanda’s Urwego (UOB); and Cambodia’s Acleda (Acleda). 
11 Socially responsible investing’s “doing well by doing good” motto highlights its focus on making investments that 
have a positive social impact. 
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are the main providers of financial services for the poor. Further, some banks sell money 
management products to smaller MFIs and, once a connection is solidified, they offer other 
services, including credit or term loans. These banks typically have conservative lending 
conditions, such as requiring collateral from MFI borrowers or offering only shorter-term 
financing. In an effort to expand the local financing sector or reach new market segments, 
local banks might offer MFIs equity or create cobranded subsidiaries that focus on 
particular services.  
• Individual investors. Individual investors may include ordinary community members—
such as members of credit unions and rural banks—as well as high-net-worth individuals. 
These investors are often driven by trends. High-net-worth individuals typically use MIVs 
to directly invest equity in financial service providers, while retail investors donate funds 
through NGOs, foundations, MIVs, or, as I discuss later, peer-to-peer aggregators. 
II.3.1 Direct vs. Intermediary Funders.  
Direct funders provide their own funds directly to MFIs. For example, a banking institution 
is considered a direct funder because its board or management makes decisions on allocating funds 
to microfinance. In contrast, microfinance investment intermediaries (MIIs)—which include 
microfinance holding companies and MIVs—are funded from diverse public and private investors 
and in turn invest their funds into individual MFIs. Investors are attracted to MIIs because they 
offer industry and regional expertise, diverse portfolios, and economies of scale. 
• Microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs). MIVs are private, managed investment funds 
that target underserved markets and rural areas and play a key mediating role between 
financial service providers and (usually foreign) investors. Approximately half of all 
development finance institutions investments in MFIs are channeled through MIVs (El-
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Zoghbi et al., 2011). Although mainly funded by institutional investors, some MIVs allow 
retail investors. These debt and hybrid MIVs—which might, for example, be set up as 
mutual funds—provide short- to medium-term funding and let investors buy and sell their 
fund shares on a monthly or quarterly basis. Most MIVs target established, well-performing 
institutions and operate internationally to increase their geographical outreach and 
diversification. However, some MIVs—typically churches and support associations—are 
structured more like NGOs, are member-owned, focus on social performance, and target 
smaller institutions. Some MIVs set up debt funds as structured finance vehicles for a fixed 
time period. These products are often called collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) or 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Finally, equity fund MIVs have a fixed duration 
and investors cannot sell their interest in them until the fund’s term ends. Figure 1 shows 
the typical operations of an MIV fund. 
Figure 2: How Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) Operate 
 
Source: Adapted from International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
• Microfinance holding companies. International microfinance networks channel donor and 
investor funding—in the form of equity, debt, donation, or guarantees—into global affiliate 
operations. These networks, which are established as holding companies or NGOs, include 
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ACCION International and Opportunity International. Some holding companies own 100 
percent of the subsidiaries, with shareholders at the holding level, while others have 
investors at both holding and subsidiary levels to ease strategic investments (such as from 
local shareholders). As formal institutional models increasingly gain favor, interest in the 
microfinance holding companies model is declining.  
• Local apex organizations. An apex pools domestically created funds and lends those 
funds—typically as subsidized loans, but sometimes as donations—to MFIs. Apexes use 
public money and include government programs, NGOs, development banks, and 
commercial banks (Ledgerwood, 2013). In 2009, the 15 largest apexes lent funds to more 
than 1,500 NGOs, MFIs, and other finance companies providing microfinance services 
(Forster et al., 2012). 
• Peer-to-peer aggregators. These intermediaries help individuals make direct, small-scale 
investments in MFIs through Internet-based platforms. At the local level, this approach has 
disadvantages, including that most aggregators have detailed and costly reporting 
requirements and do not provide funding in the local currency. Further, because 
aggregators have limited control over local providers, these providers might fund risky 
clients and products and thus create losses for investors.  
II.4 MFI Funding Sources or Tools  
MFIs fund their capital requirements and operations by accessing financial tools or sources 
such as debt, equity, client deposits and savings, short-term borrowings, donations, or hybrids of 
these basic sources. The institution’s choice of funding depends on its mission and scope, as well 
as its performance and ability to gather deposits. It also depends on the environment the MFI 
operates in—specifically, the regulatory framework and the overall financial system’s 
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sophistication level. As MFIs mature, various funding options become available for different 
financing needs. For instance, they typically use debt financing to refinance mature debt and fund 
portfolio growth, while equity supports regulatory goals, eases the process of obtaining other 
financing, and serves as a financial buffer for debt funders. Various structured finance innovations 
give both high- and lower-risk investors seeking diverse return conditions access to similar funding 
vehicles—for example, some investors might accept the first loss, while others take a more secure 
standing. Further, local currency debt lets MFIs borrow in the currency they use to serve their 
clients, while donations (grants and subsidies) can support frontier projects and organizations that 
private investors might find unattractive at the outset. 
II.4.1 Debt 
MFIs usually access debt funding to get the capital they need to make loans and grow 
operations (Morduch, 2000). Debt is funding that is lent to the MFI for a specified time period, 
during which the MFI must repay the debt and any added interest. Seniority in relation to debt 
defines which lender is paid first if the issuer has cannot repay all of its obligations. A secured debt 
means that the borrower has collateralized the debt by pledging an asset; the lender can then legally 
claim that asset if the borrower does not repay the debt. Unsecured debt requires no collateral and 
is backed only by the borrower’s credit worthiness and willingness to pay.  
Estimates suggest that debt financing outstrips both equity financing and donor funding by 
a ratio of 5:1. Debt financing includes debt issuance and loans from commercial lenders. MFIs 
annually receive approximately US$30 billion in funding, mostly in the form of interest-bearing 
loans (Lahaye et al., 2012), of which about 80% are extended as credit to MFI clients. As I now 
describe, MFIs typically use two types of debt: syndicated loans and bonds. 
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II.4.1.1 Syndicated Loans 
MFIs enter into syndication with other services providers to issue debt when the amount 
they need is greater than the exposure they can manage. In this syndicated loan, the negotiations 
required to raise a large amount of debt are reduced as the investor group members agree to the 
same structure and terms, which the MFI negotiates with the lead syndication firm.  
II.4.1.2 Bonds 
Bonds are debts that lenders (or bondholders) can easily transfer among themselves. The 
bond issuer agrees to pay the bondholders the principle and interest due on designated dates, similar 
to a standard loan. Even if they are operating in a market that permits bond sales, few providers 
issue them because they have significant administrative, regulatory, and reporting requirements. 
They therefore make sense only if the amount borrowed is quite large or the MFI is trying to 
establish its name in the market to issue a later (and larger) bond.  
II.4.1.3 Borrowings 
Borrowings are the balance of funds received through a loan agreement. Borrowings might 
include loans from other financial institutions (payable within one year), commercial papers, 
repurchase agreements or similar debt securities, and credit lines. Borrowings are a reliable source 
of liquidity for MFI operations; the downside is that they are expensive. Many MFIs do not have 
the required collateral to secure borrowing; they are therefore risky for the lenders, who charge 
high interest rates commensurate with that risk. Borrowing significantly increases the cost of 
funding for MFIs, although it can give them much-needed liquidity to support their operations.  
II.4.2 Equity 
Equity offers ownership interest in an MFI provider through shares. These shares act as a 
claim on the providers' assets in proportion to the percentage owned. Conning (1999) argued that 
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sustainable MFIs that serve the poor successfully should use equity to finance their operations. 
Tehulu (2013) asserts that equity financing’s low costs can boost MFI profitability as they are not 
required to pay dividends. However, according to empirical evidence, MFI banks often hold extra 
equity to protect their franchises’ value (Berger & di Patti, 2006). Also, it seems that MFIs with 
low liquidation options are likely to use more debt for funding, thus cutting back on equity levels. 
Equity shareholders are owners and, as such, assume the greatest risk; if an MFI fails, these 
shareholders are the last to be paid (if they are paid at all). With added risk, however, comes the 
potential for greater reward. Unlike debt, which has fixed returns, dividends or gains from selling 
shares offer equity owners the potential for unlimited returns.  
Unlike regular firms, MFIs also receive equity donated in the form of paid-in capital to 
support their loan portfolio growth. Also known as loan capital, donated equity consists of the 
funds donated to support microloan creation. MFIs often treat these donations as equity and record 
them on their balance sheets as an equity increase. Because loan fund capital donations are intended 
to fund assets rather than cover expenses incurred, they differ from donations for operations. 
II.4.3 Deposits 
Having cheaper sources of funds, such as short-term deposits, can make a difference in 
MFI profitability. Because deposits are inexpensive to mobilize and are used to generate loans, 
MFIs can achieve significant profit margins from the interest rate differential. Deposit-collecting 
MFIs can decrease the size of pricey borrowings they may require to fund operations (Kiiru, 2008; 
de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004). As Cull et al. (2008) discuss, many countries prohibit 
MFIs from collecting deposits unless they operate in an environment where regulators can license 
them. Such regulation can be expensive for MFIs, however, especially if they must meet capital 
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requirements, hire experts, and upgrade their information systems to comply (CGAP, 2005; 
Tehulu, 2013; Cull et al., 2009).  
Deposits are important for MFIs. Not only do they provide a cheap source of funding for 
credit creation, but they are also liquid assets and thus ensure that clients can withdraw their funds 
when desired. However, to ensure institutional soundness and protect the funds of public 
depositors, deposits are strictly regulated. Although they vary depending on the country, these 
regulations typically include information system standards, reporting standards, and minimum 
capital ratios. Deposits mature quickly—depositors can withdraw demand deposits whenever they 
want, for example, while term deposits must mature, but typically do so in two to three months. 
Practically, deposits are usually a secure funding source, with long holding periods due to frequent 
depositor rollover. That said, if depositors feel unsure about the safety of their funds, they can 
make a sudden run on deposits and potentially jeopardize the institution’s health. Finally, licensed 
MFIs that take deposits are more liquid, as they depend less on external—and more expensive—
funding sources.  
II.4.4 Donations 
Donations include donated funds to finance operations and concessional loans (also known 
as subsidies or donations), but exclude donated equity for cushioning capital. Traditional 
intermediaries use debt, loans, and savings to fund their loan portfolios, but many MFIs rely 
primarily on concessional loans and donated equity. 
Donations to cover operational costs directly subsidize MFIs. These funds are recorded on 
the MFI’s income statement as revenue, but the funds are separated from revenue generated by 
lending and investment.  
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Donations are nonreimbursable and encourage MFIs to create new products, support 
microfinance market development, and expand their outreach. MFIs can use donations to cover 
their technical needs, or they can use them to attract investment to risky products and frontier 
markets. As frontier investments, donations serve as a cushion for providers, who can take greater 
risks up front and thus expand both outreach and innovation. Subsidized funding is primarily 
donation-based. For new or risk MFIs that lack commercial financing options, subsidized funding 
is a suitable alternative.  
Donations give new microfinance programs breathing room to improve their operations 
and ensure adequate staffing. As MFIs continue their work in inclusive financing, donations remain 
an important and stable source of funds (Hudon & Traca, 2011).  
II.5 MFI Performance12 and Funding Sources  
Total funding for MFIs broadly includes debt or borrowings (commercial and 
noncommercial), equity, donations, and deposits (both savings and time deposits) (Cull, 
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). Microfinance experts put the industry’s total market 
funding needed at more than $300 billion13; only 10% of this need was met in 2008. Increasingly, 
short-term loans, mostly from commercial banks, are used to meet the funding shortfall (Tulchin, 
2004; MacFarquhar, 2007). However, these commercial bank funds are expensive, with a global 
average effective interest rate of approximately 37%. The high interest rates paid on funding 
sourced from banks increases already high MFI operating costs and exacerbates the capital 
                                                 
12 Throughout this paper, I define metrics for performance as follows. I define financial performance in terms of 
profitability, as measured by returns on assets. I define social performance in terms of the MFI’s outreach, measured 
by the number of active borrowers (breadth) and the average loan per borrower per GNI/per capita. These are the 
most popular measures used in academic research.   
13 (Harald Hüttenrauch & Claudia, 2008; Ingrid Matthäus-Maier & J.D. von Pischke, 2008) 
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constraints in the MFI industry. This, in turn, prevents and limits MFIs from meeting the enormous 
demand for their resources (Bogan, 2012; Dehejia et al., 2005).  
II.5.1 Debt Funding and Microfinance Performance 
Most MFIs are non-deposits-taking (Galema, Lensink, & Spierdijk, 2011). Because 
deposits are a low-cost, short-term funding source for financial institutions, the lack of this funding 
resource and the mostly undeveloped domestic credit markets limit MFI ﬁnancing opportunities 
and create ﬁnancial constraints (Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2014). Similarly, the inelastic demand for 
credit by the poor (Dehejia, Montgomery, & Morduch, 2012) collaborates with the high interest 
rates charged on funding to limit MFIs’ ability to serve poorer potential clients.  
 Robinson (2001) claims that commercial funding has created accountability, transparency, 
efficiency, economic interest rate setting, capital mobilization, and appropriate management 
remuneration. However, to successfully mobilize commercial funds, MFIs should have the ability 
to accept savings or deposits, issue bonds in capital markets, attract funding from commercial 
investors and sources, and compete with other funds seekers to attract funding. But MFIs cannot 
successfully compete for commercial financing unless they are financially profitable. And, even if 
they are profitable, there is no guaranteed that MFIs could obtain commercial debt, as providers 
often see microfinance services and unsecured lending to the poor as too risky (UNCDF, 2002).  
II.5.2 Equity Capital and MFI Performance 
MFIs could arguably raise equity capital from capital markets. But, as previously 
mentioned, most MFIs are not profitable enough to attract profit-seeking equity investors. Without 
becoming profitable and developing the ability to offer competitive returns to investors, MFIs will 
fail to attract equity funding from commercial investors, who typically expect at least some 
sustainable returns on their investment. Research on profit-seeking firms’ capital acquisition has 
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found that investors are attracted to organizations with low investment risk and the potential to 
generate substantial returns (e.g., Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). As testimony to the 
power of proﬁt, researchers point to some major MFIs that have aggressively expanded their 
operations, fueled by retained earnings. One such institution is Compartamos, whose 2007 public 
offering was heralded as the future of MFI funding strategy—that is, routinely attract investment 
from the private sector and thus liberate MFIs from high-minded, donor-supported initiatives (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009); Rosenberg (2007); Malkin (2008); Accion International, 
2007).   
II.5.3 Donation and MFI Performance 
Many developments and donor organizations already believe that it is only by weaning-off 
donor dependency and adopting a commercial orientation that MFIs can truly attract the capital 
and savings base they need to scale up their microloan portfolios, increase sustainability and 
outreach, lower lending rates, and meet the demand for financial services for the poor. Most experts 
see donor funding as useful only in an MFI’s start-up phase and thus unsustainable as an ongoing 
funding source(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Indeed, researchers argue that cost 
efficiency in microfinancing is now being driven by this shift from concessionary to commercial 
funding (Forkusam, 2014).   
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III THEORETICAL FRAMING AND HYPOTHESIS 
Many metaphors have been adopted in the academic literature to explain an organization’s 
development from its inception to termination. One of the prominent metaphors is the life cycle; 
usually used for ventures and organizations, products, and the developmental stages of an 
individual’s career. The Life-cycle theory has been used to describe how an organization starts, 
develops to maturity and eventually ceases to exist (Kimberly & Miles, 1980). According to Van 
de Ven and Poole (1995), life-cycle is the most common explanation of development in the 
management literature, next to teleology. 
The life-cycle theory (LCT) posits that “the developing entity has within it an underlying 
form, logic, program, or code that regulates the process of change and moves the entity from a 
given point of departure toward a subsequent end that is prefigured in the present state.” In this 
inherent process of change, external environmental events and processes play a role in 
transforming the entity, but only through mediating the immanent logic, rules, or programs that 
govern the entity's development (Van de Ven & Poole, 1988). 
The life-cycle model typically exhibits a single sequential progression of change events in 
stages or phases, where characteristics acquired by the entity in earlier stages are retained in later 
stages. Also, the stages are related to each other as they derive their sequence of events from a 
common underlying process. As such, each stage of development is seen as a necessary precursor 
of the succeeding stages. 
Life-cycle theories of organizational entities often explain development regarding 
institutional rules or programs that require developmental activities to progress in a prescribed 
sequence.  
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Rogers (1983) building on the life-cycle theory proposed by Kimberly and Miles (1980), 
argued that not only do organizations’ development follow its life-cycle but innovations in 
organizations may follow a logical or natural sequence developmental stages. He posited five 
stages of innovation: need recognition, research on problem, development of idea into useful form, 
commercialization, and diffusion and adoption. The order among these stages is necessitated both 
by logic and by the natural order of Western business practices. 
Kapper (2007) outlines and describes four stages of the MFI life cycle: start-up, expansion, 
consolidation, and integration. In the start-up phase, MFIs are financed through donations and 
concessionary funds. At this point, Kapper says, MFI investment is too risky to attract commercial 
equity investors, so donors provide equity to control the lending in line with their goals. NGO 
MFIs are most successful in this phase because of the subsidies and donations they receive. 
In the expansion phase, MFIs focus on extending their operations and expanding credit 
outreach to their clients. They also begin receiving equity capital from public investors to help 
stabilize their performance. International finance institutions provide seed capital, which offers 
excellent signals for commercial funding. However, subsidies, soft loans, and donations still flow 
in from donors (Brau & Woller, 2004). 
The consolidation stage is characterized by the availability of commercial funding—
including debt and short-term bank borrowings—for MFI operations. Some MFIs may acquire 
licenses to accept savings or deposits during this phase. Such deposits help expand loan creation 
at a low cost. Due to their low risk, only large MFIs can typically afford low-cost commercial 
funding, and private investors who expect good returns find them increasingly attractive. Also in 
this stage, local debt becomes a primary financing source for MFIs, because foreign debt—with 
its inherent exchange-rate risk and capital-flow regulations—can be quite expensive. Bank MFIs 
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may avoid this transition process, while others are most likely to progress in this way (Kapper, 
2007).  
In the final integration stage, subsidies and donations are no longer a significant part of the 
MFI funding structure. Most MFIs are financially sustainable and profitable during this stage, 
which is associated with high outreach. However, some researchers have warned that MFIs may 
begin to neglect the core responsibility to the poor and focus on profitability alone (Morduch & 
Haley, 2002; Morduch, 2000). This phenomenon, known as mission drift, is the theme of much 
research. Rhyne (1998), however, has argued that as MFIs develop, their clients thrive as well. As 
such, depth of outreach increases—that is, the average loans to clients get much bigger. 
This approach to the MLCT is not the only framework in the microfinance literature. Helms 
(2006) and Hoque & Chishty (2011) identified three MFI growth stages: formative, maturing, and 
matured. Another schema organizes stages by time, with years 0–4 categorized as the start-up 
stage, years 5–8 as the growing stage, and 9 years and older as the mature stage (Robinson, 2001). 
For this research, I adopt the MLCT framework proposed by Robinson (2001) and de 
Soussa & Frankiewicz (2004). In this framework, each of three stages is defined by an MFI’s years 
of operation: 1) the new phase (0–4 years); 2) the young phase (4–8 years); and 3) the mature phase 
(8+ years). New MFIs are not financially viable and rarely show a profit, while young MFIs are 
profitable and mature MFIs are financially viable (de Soussa & Frankiewicz, 2004). Several other 
authors (Kooi, 2001; Van Maanen, 2005; Bogan, 2008) largely agree with this funding 
development framework and further argue that, in the new phase, MFIs need highly risk-tolerant 
subsidized capital in the form of donations and donated equity to support their early years of 
operation, as MFIs are not yet sustainable enough to attract commercial funding.  
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III.1 The MLCT and MFI Performance 
The MLCT asserts that most MFIs start out as NGOs. They have a social vision and fund 
their operations with donations and concessional loans from donors and international financial 
institutions. I do not find such switching in my sample, as all MFIs maintain their legal status 
throughout their development.  
I did find, however, that MFIs wean off donations as they evolve through the development 
stages. The MLCT seems to explain this “weaning” phenomenon by suggesting that donor 
donations and soft loans typically constitute most of the funding in MFIs’ formative stages. As 
MFIs mature, commercial debt funding becomes increasingly available to finance operations. The 
debt contracts, however, may have restrictive covenants or guarantees. In the maturity stage, 
traditional equity financing becomes available from NGOs and from public and private investors 
(Fehr & Hishigsuren, 2004; Bogan, 2012). This stage is characterized by the commercialization of 
funding and operations. By becoming regulated entities, MFIs invest in and achieve sustainability 
and formalize their activities. At this stage, MFIs also can be licensed to accept deposits (Bogan, 
2012). An initial summary analysis of the MFIs in my sample shows, however, that they need not 
reach the maturity stage before obtaining a license to mobilize deposits. Deposit-taking can start 
at any stage, depending on the MFI’s charter and factors such as institutional and regulatory 
environments (Ledgerwood, 1998, 2013). Although these factors are outside my research scope, 
my sample shows that MFIs reporting as banks, credit unions, and rural banks have a substantially 
high median-deposit-to-assets ratios, even in the life cycle’s new and young phases.  
Deposits expand loan creation at a low funding cost. Commercial debts also become very 
important in the MFI funding structure. By obtaining stability, MFIs can acquire funding from 
domestic banks. Further, foreign funds are used as guarantees for debt obtained by MFIs in the 
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local market, and MFIs can mobilize increasing commercial capital. However, as I noted early, 
because only large mature MFIs can afford such funding (due to their low risk), they can attract 
private investors who are keen on receiving high returns. 
As described below in detail, I test the central hypothesis that variations in an MFI's capital 
structure can explain the changes in its performance across its developmental stages, and that its 
performance gets increasingly better with age. Figure 3 shows the various relationships, constructs, 
and observable metrics typically used in the microfinance literature to quantify MFI’s financial 
and social performance and funding source mix; I define the measurements later. 
Figure 3. MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix and MLCT 
 
Source: Own analysis 
 For corporate business, capital structure can be defined as the mix of debt, equity, and 
other financing types that firms employ to finance their operations. Although optimal capital 
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structure for nonfinancial firms has been thoroughly studied since Modigliani and Miller published 
their famous “Irrelevance Theory” in 1958 and 1963 (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Harris 
& Raviv, 1991; Titman & Wessels, 1988), Modigliani-Miller (MM) and other corporate finance 
theorems do not adequately apply to lending institutions (Cohen, 2004). While MM capital 
structure theory is popular in corporate finance, it is irrelevant to MFIs, which, as lending 
institutions, are licensed to attract deposits, and which depend heavily on donations and subsidies 
to fund their operations. MM theory posits that, depending on relevant considerations (tax 
advantages, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, transaction costs, asymmetric information, or 
corporate control), firms can choose an optimal capital structure to produce desired profitability. 
To suit lending institutions, MM theory requires adjustments14 (Cohen, 2003; Rosenzweig, 2004). 
Unlike traditional financial institutions, MFIs pursue dual performance objectives reflecting their 
social and financial obligations (Murdoch, 1999; Mersland & Strom, 2010; Kumar, 2012). Thus, 
the issue of donation money, soft loans, and donations complicate capital structure question for 
MFIs. Also, MFIs operate in markets with less well-established institutions and weaker 
regulations. In such markets, adverse selection considerations make it expensive for MFIs to raise 
funds. These constraints, among others, make an MFI’s optimal funding source mix entirely 
different from that of corporations.  
                                                 
14objective of social performance goal in addition to fiscal performance like profits  
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Figure 4. High-level model of MFI performance 
 
Source: Own Analysis 
 Figure 4 shows a high-level model of the relationship between an MFI’s funding mix and 
its dual performance. As the figure shows, the MFI’s funding mix or capital structure may directly 
impact variations in the institution’s performance, but that impact can be mediated by the MFI’s 
age (which is used as a proxy for the different MFI development stages). Additionally, micro-
economic characteristics of the MFI’s country of operations, as well as the MFI’s internal 
performance factors, can moderate the relationship between funding mix and performance.  
III.1.1 The MLCT and MFI Financial Performance 
As discussed earlier, MFI financial performance is measured by profitability and 
sustainability. Here, I focus on profitability. The observable for profitability is ROA. The evolution 
of MFI development and growth suggested by the MLCT implies that mature MFIs, having made 
it through earlier stages of transformation, are financially profitable. In these earlier stages, MFIs 
may focus on acquiring customers, developing products, investing in staff and other assets that 
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sharpen the business model, and developing information systems to improve service delivery at 
acceptable cost. As MFIs mature, their access to various financing sources increases, which in turn 
lowers their cost of capital, improves their risk management, and increases their profitability 
(Maisch, 2011). Schneider & Greathouse (2004) also argue that regulatory provisions, 
profitability, regulation status, accessibility of donations, and country-specific factors contribute 
to MFI development and growth.15  
III.1.2 The MLCT and MFI Social Performance 
Social performance is measured by MFI client outreach. I measure the breadth and depth 
of outreach by their proxies: the number of active borrowers per assets and the average loan per 
borrower over GNI per capita, respectively. Although useful measures, these indicators can be 
misleading; loans vary in their terms and in what they are used for, and they may not be linked to 
client income level. Further, outreach depth can have many different meanings. If it is viewed as 
providing financial services to those excluded from formal financial services, then it is important 
to define which sectors of society have little or no access to formal financing (adapted from Paxton 
and Fruman 1998). 
Below, I examine the five MFIs legal charter models. I use the MLCT to formulate a 
hypothesis to explore whether social and financial performance metrics vary across MFI legal 
charters, given the variations in their funding source mix, and whether these performances get 
better with age. This approach is significant given how different MFIs are depending on their legal 
charters, which include being registered as banks, credit unions, NBFIs, NGOs, or rural banks. 
                                                 
15 Farrington and Abrams (2002) discuss trends that will prevail as MFIs develop across the various life-cycle 
stages, including a) the tendency toward increased leveraging of capital, b) increase in public deposits mobilization, 
and (c) a shift away from subsidized donor money toward commercial funding.  
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III.2 The MLCT and Bank MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
In line with the MLCT (Schneider and Greathouse, 2004), I expect that, as Bank MFIs 
evolve, their capital and funding structures also change. Specifically, the degree of debt they utilize 
should increase at different life-cycle phases and their funding sources should become more 
diverse and sustainable. As funding sources diversify, bank MFIs should be able to choose less 
expensive funding sources for capital and operational needs and thereby become more profitable 
as they age. I also expect that, the more expensive a bank MFI’s funding sources, the more negative 
the link between funding source mix and social and financial performance. Given this, I posit the 
following set of hypotheses:  
Figure 5: Bank MFI Performance Model 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The debt-to-assets ratio will be negatively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for bank MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 1b: The donations-to-assets ratio will also be negatively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
bank MFIs. 
Hypothesis 1c: The equity-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for bank MFIs. 
Hypothesis 1d: The deposits-to-assets ratio will also be positively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
bank MFIs. 
Hypothesis 6a: As the bank MFIs age, the funding source mix will positively impact their 
ROA, the number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per 
capita. 
III.3 The MLCT and Credit Union MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
A major difference between credit union MFIs and bank MFIs is the ownership form and 
profits distribution. Credit unions are owned by their members/clients and are nonprofit, while 
banks are owned by shareholders and are for-profit. However, beyond a lower variation between 
funding and performance, I do not expect the funding source mix/performance relationship to be 
any different for credit union MFIs than for bank MFIs.  
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Figure 6: Credit Union MFI Performance Model 
 
In line with the discussions on MLCT and bank MFIs, I posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: The debt-to-assets ratio will be negatively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for credit 
union MFIs. 
Hypothesis 2b: The donations-to-assets ratio will also be negatively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
credit union MFIs. 
Hypothesis 2c: The equity-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for credit 
union MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 2d: The deposits-to-assets ratio will also be positively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
credit union MFIs. 
Hypothesis 6b: As credit union MFIs age, the funding source mix will positively impact 
their ROA, the number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over 
GNI per capita. 
III.4 The MLCT and NBFI MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Figure 7: Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) MFI Performance Model 
 
In line with earlier discussions on MLCT, I posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The debt-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for NBFI 
MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The donations-to-assets ratio will be negatively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
NBFI MFIs. 
Hypothesis 3c: The equity-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for NBFI 
MFIs. 
Hypothesis 3d: The deposits-to-assets ratio will also be positively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
NBFI MFIs. 
Hypothesis 6c: As NBFI MFIs age, the funding source mix will positively impact their 
ROA, the number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans, per borrower, over GNI 
per capita. 
III.5 The MLCT and NGO MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
In line with the MLCT, NGO MFIs use high levels of donations in the new stage, but 
gradually wean off them as they transition into the mature stage. NGO MFIs use minimum 
deposits, because most of them are not licensed to intermediate deposit. They also seem to 
increasingly use debt as they transition to the mature stage. 
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Figure 8: Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) MFI Performance Model 
 
In line with the MLCT discussions, I posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The debt-to-assets ratio will be negatively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for NGO 
MFIs. 
Hypothesis 4b: The donations-to-assets ratio will also be negatively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
NGO MFIs. 
Hypothesis 4c: The equity-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for NGO 
MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 4d: The deposits-to-assets ratio will also be positively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
NGO MFIs. 
Hypothesis 6d: As NGO MFIs age, the funding source mix will positively impact their 
ROA, the number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per 
capita. 
III.6 The MLCT and Rural Bank MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Figure 9: Rural Bank MFI Performance Model 
 
In line with the MLCT discussions, I posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: The debt-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for rural bank 
MFIs. 
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Hypothesis 5b: The donations-to-assets ratio will be negatively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
rural bank MFIs. 
Hypothesis 5c: The equity-to-assets ratio will be positively related to ROA, the number of 
active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for rural bank 
MFIs. 
Hypothesis 5d: The deposits-to-assets ratio will also be positively related to ROA, the 
number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over GNI per capita for 
rural bank MFIs. 
Hypothesis 6e: As rural bank MFIs age, their funding source mix will positively impact 
their ROA, the number of active borrowers per assets, and the average loans per borrower over 
GNI per capita. 
III.7 Possible limitations of the MLCT  
Despite the MLCT’s popularity, evidence on it remains scanty as few researchers have 
studied it. To answer the question: Do MFIs develop towards financial sustainability? Bogan 
(2012) used cross-sectional data on the top 300 MFIs. Results did not support the MLCT. 
However, they did underscore the importance of capital in determining financial sustainability, as 
capital constraints and costs limit microfinance expansion. De Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz 
(2004) noted that the shift to private capital has already begun, and some MFIs are now being fully 
funded by private capital. The authors emphasized that an MFI’s ability to survive any MLCT 
stage depends on its ability to attract the ideal financing resources. However, Fehr and Hishigsuren 
(2006) note that, while market-oriented MFI financing is noticeable, evidence of noncommercial 
funding remains and opposes the MLCT evolution style. Financing programs (such as ACCION) 
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linking MFIs with investors and commercial banks through credit enhancement lower the MFI 
financing costs as they turn into commercially viable entities, thus defying the MLCT. 
Evidence shows, however, that opposing factors shape how MFIs are funded and which 
funding instruments may be available for financing their operations. Some researchers have argued 
that such factors may underline the regional variations in MFI funding patterns—variations that 
may have been shaped by historical factors, including traditional savings and lending patterns 
(Jansson, 2003; Conger, 2003; Bogan, 2012). Variations in regulatory environments and capital 
market maturity in the MFI's country also impact allocation of funding and other resources 
(Banerjee, Duflo, & Munshi, 2003). 
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IV METHODS 
Two key questions here are: How do the relative performances of social versus financial 
metrics vary across the MFI legal charters given variations in funding source mix? Do these 
performances improve as MFIs age?” In an attempt to quantify these questions, I developed an 
empirical methodology. Here, I further clarify the data sampling and the collection method, and 
also define and describe dependent and independent variables and specified models. 
Prior research from the microfinance performance literature informed my choice of the 
appropriate variables for financial and social performance, as well as my expectations about the 
impact of firm-level and macroeconomic country-level factors that impact MFI performance. 
Among the previous work that fueled these insights were Muriu (2011), Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 
(2010), Hartarska (2005), Cull et al. (2007), Hartarska & Nadolnyak (2007), R Mersland and RØ 
Strøm (2009), and Campbell and Rogers (2012). 
IV.1 Data Collection 
My research is empirical and quantitative and uses model specification similar to that in 
Bogan (2012). I collected data for the study from two sources: 1) the MIX market database, and 
2) the WDI. The significant advantages of choosing these two databases are that they are widely 
known, compiled by third parties, and cover a broad range of organizational and economic 
features, as well as social and financial indicators; they have also been used widely in research 
published in leading, well-respected journals. To provide a robust dataset, the study uses MFI data 
from more than 18 years (1999–2016) on 2,955 MFIs from 123 countries. I thus have a global 
sample of unbalanced panel data, most of which belongs to the 2003–2015 time period. Because 
MFIs neither enter nor drop out of the sample in a systematic way, I can perform panel data 
analyses in a regular manner (Greene, 2010). Using unbalanced panel data offers a truly effective 
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representation of the market: it includes all MFIs, and prevents survivorship bias (Baum, 2006). 
The 18-year data window offers adequate variation among the MFI characteristics I am analyzing, 
and it may provide a robust set of observations for a rigorous and truly global analysis. Although 
an enhanced dataset with additional observation is always preferable, the benefit of going further 
back in time than the prescribed 18 years may be outweighed by constraints on data availability 
and accuracy. No dataset is entirely representative of the microfinance field. In particular, the MIX 
database contains a significant amount of data from mega-sized MFIs, creating a large firm bias, 
but it also includes many small savings and credit cooperatives. Data on the MFIs used are included 
in a special data package that provides a unique, comprehensive picture of the microfinance 
market. Data are converted into US dollars at contemporaneous exchange rates and closely 
monitored by MIX. Participating MFIs must disclose detailed information on their performance, 
including their financial statements and annual reports. However, because MFIs report their data 
themselves on a voluntary basis, it is always possible that data retrieved from MIX are biased. 
MFIs participating in the MIX presumably receive some potential benefit from their data 
disclosure, such as attracting investor interest and being included in research analyses. It is 
therefore likely that some of the more commercially orientated banks are under-represented in the 
database. MIX does not check the reliability of each participating MFI, although it does adjust data 
to make comparison easier, such as correcting for inflation, loan loss provisioning/write-offs, and 
subsidies (MIX [ed.], 2007). MIX’s data on MFIs is credited with being the best available 
representation of MFIs in the entire microfinance industry (Krauss and Walter, 2008; Di Bella, 
2011; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). However, because its data quality has often been criticized, 
MIX began using a “diamonds” rating system, with a 1–5 scale to indicate MFI reporting quality 
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and completeness. For example, an MFI receiving five diamonds publishes audited financial 
statements on a yearly basis, accompanied by a rating or due diligence report.  
IV.2 Statistical Models of Performance and Funding Source Mix 
My analytical framework uses an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 2,955 MFIs16 from 
123 countries observed over an 18-year period (1999–2016) to explore how funding mix impacts 
MFI profitability and outreach. Also, given my much larger sample size, I compare my results 
with those of Bogan (2012), analyzing how MFI capital structure (funding source mix) behaves in 
relation to MFI age and legal status. These categories may be significant in establishing the link 
between funding source mix and the key MFI success metrics of sustainability, profitability, and 
outreach. 
 
In the dataset, NBFIs make up the largest number of legal charters, followed by NGO 
MFIs. However, NGO MFIs constitute the highest percent (33.5%) of the MFIs/Years observation, 
                                                 
16 These institutions are united in their strong commitments to achieving financial self-sufficiency and a willingness 
to open their accounts to careful scrutiny. Thus, these MFIs represent some of the best hopes for achieving poverty 
reduction while concurrently earning a profit (or at least operating without ongoing subsidies).   
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followed by NBFIs. Rural banks make up the lowest percentage of observations and number of 
MFIs in the dataset. Banks make up 9.3% of the dataset, yet their median asset value is 80% of the 
dataset’s value. By comparison, with 31.2% frequency, NBFIs’ median assets make up only 8% 
of the total dataset value. 
Figure 10: Frequency of MFIs in Observation 
 
Most of the observations are from 2004 to 2015, with the highest number occurring in 2010 
and 2011. 
IV.2.1 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables for modeling MFI’s financial performance are ROA, while the 
average loan per borrower per GNI/per Capita (the ALB), the number of active borrowers (the 
NAB), and the percentage of female borrowers (the PFB) model social performance. I chose these 
variables to help quantify variations in MFI financial and social performance with variations in 
funding source mix. I also group these selected variables by legal charter and MFI age to help 
determine whether performance gets better with age. I offered detailed definitions and rational for 
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choosing these variables earlier (Chapter 2, section 2.2). Figures 13-15 show the median values of 
each dependent variables by legal charter and age. Due to extreme values or outliers in the data it 
is proposed that the median is used as the measure of central tendency instead of the mean. 
IV.2.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Figure 11: Median ROAs by MFI Legal Charter and Age 
 
As I described earlier, the ROA is the net operating income (less taxes) compared to 
average assets. ROA measures how the MFI is managing its assets to optimize its profitability. 
This ratio is the net of income taxes and excludes donations and non-operating items. Young rural 
bank MFIs record the highest median ROA (2.9%), while new NGO MFIs record the lowest. For 
bank, NBFI, and NGO MFIs, median ROA increases with age, while the medians for credit union 
MFIs decrease with age. Young rural bank MFIs seem to be more profitable than new and mature 
ones. The median bank ROA is highest at the mature stage. 
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IV.2.1.2 Median Loan per Borrower/GNI per Capita17(ALB)  
Figure 12: Median Loan per Borrower/GNI per Capita by MFI Legal Charter and Age 
 
The median loan per borrower per GNI/per capita is computed from the average 
outstanding loan balance compared to local GNI per capita to estimate loan outreach relative to 
the country’s low-income population. The GNI per capita is calculated in the national currency 
converted to US dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, but an 
alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge considerably from the 
rate applied to international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, the 
World Bank uses a special Atlas conversion method. 
As Figure 11 shows, bank MFIs have the highest median outreach depth, while NGO MFIs have 
the lowest. Also, the median loan per borrower per GNI/per capita (the measure for outreach depth) 
does not increase with age for all legal charters. Young bank MFIs have the highest outreach depth, 
                                                 
17 The variable is equivalent to the target market (depth = avg. loan balance per borrower/GNI per capita) 
categorized into 1) Low end: depth < 20% OR average loan size < USD 150; 2) Broad: depth between 20% and 
149%; 3) High end: depth between 150% and 250%, and 4) Small business: depth greater than 250%. 
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followed by mature bank MFIs. Median outreach depth increases with age for credit union and 
NBFI MFIs, but not for the other legal charters.  
 
IV.2.1.3 Number of Active Borrowers per Assets 
Figure 13: Median Number of Active Borrowers per Assets by MFI Legal Charter and Age 
 
The median number of active borrowers per assets is computed from the number of 
individuals or entities that currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are primarily 
responsible for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio. This number is divided by total 
assets to scale it for comparison across legal entities. Individuals with multiple loans with MFIs 
are counted as a single borrower. 
NGO MFIs lead the median breadth of outreach, measured by the number of active 
borrowers per assets. It is interesting to note that the median outreach breadth decreases with MFI 
age across all legal charters. As expected, bank MFI’s have the lowest outreach breadth, followed 
by credit union, NBFI, and rural bank MFIs. Again, the median outreach breadth is consistent with 
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Mature 0.49432 0.52876 0.99523 3.04496 1.23711
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insights from the microfinance literature, which shows that NGO MFIs demonstrate a greater 
capacity for reaching the poor.  
 
IV.2.1.4 Number of Active Borrowers per Assets 
Microfinance benefits include a focus on female borrowers (Zhao &Wry, 2016). On 
average, women dedicate a larger portion of loan proceeds to health and education expenses, both 
of which contribute to poverty reduction (Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2012). For unmarried 
women, loans also provide an avenue for economic participation beyond the informal or illegal 
economy (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). Outreach to women is therefore an important outcome 
for achieving social performance. 
Figure 14: Median Percentage of Female Borrowers by MFI Legal Charter and Age 
 
 The median percentage of female borrowers is computed from the number of active women 
borrowers as a percentage of total borrowers at the period’s end. As Figure 13 shows, NGO MFIs 
have the highest median percentage of female borrowers and thus seem to empower more women 
than the other legal entities. Additionally, for NGO and credit union MFIs, the median reduces 
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with institution age; for bank and NBFI MFIs, the median percentage of female borrowers is flat 
across time. 
 
IV.2.2 Independent Variables.  
Independent variables include MFI capital structure variables—that is, debt to assets ratio, 
donations18 to assets ratio, equity to assets ratio, and deposit to assets ratio. “Donations” here are 
synonymous with donations and subsidies. MFIs firm-level characteristic variables include 
percentage of female borrowers, personnel, portfolio at risk > 30 days, provision for loan 
impairment/assets, yield on gross portfolio (real), operating expense/assets, and the natural log of 
assets. The microfinance literature agrees on these variables as being determinants of MFIs 
performance (Muriu, 2011; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010; Hartarska, 2005; Cull et al., 2007; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; R Mersland and RØ Strøm, 2009; Campbell and Rogers, 2012). 
Further, studies testing bank-risk developments across countries also include country control 
variables that cover macroeconomic and structural characteristics—that is, GDP growth, inflation, 
GDP per capita, and bank concentration. I include these macroeconomic variables as moderators 
because preliminary evidence (Ahlin & Lin, 2006) suggests that macroeconomic factors could 
affect MFI performance. Major independent variables in the model include the following: 
IV.2.2.1 Model Predictor Variables (Independent Variables) 
• Debt-to-assets ratio: The amount of interest-bearing liabilities or debts as a 
percentage of total assets. Interest-bearing debts include borrowings, subordinated 
debt, and other short-term financial liabilities. They do not include deposits, which 
                                                 
18 as a percent of assets, deposits relative  
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I examine separately below. Borrowings are all the funds received through loan 
agreements, and they may include bonds or similar debt securities issued and credit 
lines. They could be short-term, in which the principal balance is due within or at 
12 months from the statement date, or long-term, in which the principal balance is 
due in more than 12 months for all funds received through a loan or other 
contractual agreement.19 Other short-term financial liabilities include debts with an 
initial term of less than one year such as overdrafts or other short-term financing 
arrangements. 
 
• Equity-to-assets ratio: The total equity compared to assets. This is a measure of a 
financial institution’s solvency, and it helps to assess its ability to meet its 
obligations and absorb unexpected losses. It is the reciprocal of the debt-to-equity 
ratio. Equity includes paid-in capital, share premium, donated equity, retained 
earnings, reserves, treasury shares, and other equity interest. (For definitions of 
these accounts, see the Appendix). 
 
• Donation-to-assets ratio: The amount of donations received as a percent of total 
assets. This includes the value of all donations recognized as revenue during the 
period, whether they were restricted or not. It includes 1) donations for loan capital, 
which are used for funding the loan portfolio; and 2) donations for operating 
                                                 
19 Examples of short term include money market loans, inter-bank borrowings, repos, commercial papers; long term 
borrowings include debentures.  
 73 
 
expenses, including paying personnel and administrative expenses, and purchasing 
fixed assets.  
 
• Deposit-to-assets ratio: The total deposits compared to assets. Deposits are funds 
placed in an MFI account that are payable to a depositor. They include accounts 
such as current/transactional accounts, term accounts, interest-bearing accounts, 
and e-money accounts. Deposits could be categorized as 1) demand deposits by the 
general public and MFI members, which the MFI is liable to repay on demand; 2) 
short-term time deposits by the general public and MFI members, which the MFI is 
liable to repay on a fixed date within 12 months of the statement date; or 3) long-
term time deposits by the general public and MFI members, which the MFI is liable 
to repay with a fixed maturity date greater than 12 months from the statement date. 
IV.2.2.2 MFIs Firm-level Performance Control Variables 
• Personnel: The number of individuals actively employed by an MFI, including 
contract employees or advisors who dedicate a substantial portion of their time to 
the institution, even if they are not on the employee roster. 
 
• Loans per staff member: Total number of loans divided by total personnel. This 
helps assess the overall productivity of the financial institution's employees 
regarding outstanding loan management. 
 
• Portfolio at risk > 30 days (PAR30): This represents the portion of loans more than 
30 days past due, including the value of all renegotiated loans (restructured, 
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rescheduled, refinanced, or otherwise revised) compared to the gross loan portfolio. 
PAR30 is the most accepted measure of the portfolio quality of financial institutions 
(including MFIs), and therefore of their risk and profitability. I use this variable to 
control for different risk structures by measuring the portion of the portfolio with 
payments more than 30 days overdue.  
 
• Provision for loan impairment/assets: This includes impairment losses on loans—
that is, the net of written-off loan recoveries—compared to average assets. This 
variable represents the actual expense incurred due to credit losses or write-offs in 
the portfolio. 
 
• The yield on gross portfolio (real): Financial revenue from loans compared to the 
average gross loan portfolio. This helps estimate the financial institution's ability to 
generate revenues from interest, fees, and commissions on its gross loan portfolio. 
It also includes income from late fees and penalties. The results are the nominal 
yield on the gross portfolio, which is then adjusted for inflation. 
 
• Operating expense/assets: The total operating expense compared to the average 
assets. This variable helps determine the proportion of total operating expenses 
incurred to support the MFI’s core microfinance activities. As I noted earlier, 
operating expenses to assets is included because ROA could be affected by the type 
of borrower an MFI attracts; it could be argued that servicing lower-income clients 
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is costlier and hence may lead to lower ROA. This variable controls for such a 
possibility. 
 
• Natural log of assets: The asset balance is the total value of all resources that the 
MFI controls as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are 
expected to flow to the institution. For calculation purposes, assets are the sum of 
each asset account listed. I use assets balance as a proxy for MFI size. Size, as 
measured by assets, has been found to significantly relate to MFI performance 
metrics (Cull et al., 2007; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Zacharias, 2008; Bogan, 
2012). The larger the MFI (as measured by assets), the higher the expected self-
sufficiency in terms of delivering service to a group of clients or even of extending 
larger loan amounts to clients. I introduce the natural log of assets to control for 
size, ensuring that any relationship between social and financial performance is 
unaffected by differences in MFI size. I use the natural logarithm of total MFI assets 
to control for the impact of size (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007).  
IV.2.2.3 Country-level Macroeconomic Performance Control Variables 
• GDP per capita growth (%): The World Bank defines GDP per capita growth as the 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2010 US dollars. GDP per capita is the GDP 
divided by the midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the products’ value. It is calculated without 
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deducting for the depreciation of fabricated assets or the depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. 
 
• Rural population growth (%): Rural population refers to people living in rural areas 
as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated as the difference between 
total population and urban population. 
 
• Population growth (%): This is the annual population growth rate for the target year. 
It is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from the previous year to 
the year in question, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of their legal status 
or citizenship. 
 
• Inflation (%): Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, reflects the 
annual percentage change in what it costs the average consumer to acquire a basket 
of goods and services; that change may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, 
such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is used. 
IV.2.2.4 Fixed-Effects Dummy Variables 
In addition to the variables listed above, I add to the model multiple dummy 
variables that result in different intercepts for each observation. These dummy 
variables control for various fixed effects of particular variables such as year, age, 
profit status, target market, scale of outreach, region and country of operations, and 
extent of financial intermediation (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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• Year fixed-effects dummies: These variables take on value of 1 for the year they 
represent and 0 for all other years. The year fixed-effect dummies control for 
variations in social and financial performance not adequately captured by the 
model’s explanatory variables. They capture the influence of aggregate (time 
series) trends. Not including a year fixed-effect dummy can lead to omitted variable 
bias. 
• Age fixed-effects dummies: The age dummy variables control for the impact of the 
MFI’s business experience on financial and social performance. Age indicates the 
number of years an MFI has been in operation. It takes on three values: new, for 
MFIs operating for 1–4 years; young, for those operating 4–8 years; and mature, 
for those operating more than 8 years. Research has found that age may positively 
impact MFI efficiency (Caudill et al., 2009).  
• Other MFI-characteristic dummies: These dummy variables are peer-group-
specific categories that the literature indicates may help differentiate MFI financial 
performance. The variables include financial intermediation and scale (gross loan 
portfolio); see the Appendix for detailed definitions.  
IV.3 Dataset Descriptive Statistics and Analysis 
Of the total MFIs observed in the dataset, 50% were observed for five years or less, while 
only 5% were observed for 15 years or more. The largest group of MFIs observed over time was 
from 2009 to 2011. Still, this group comprised only 3.23% (95 MFIs) of the sample. The second 
largest group, 2.28% (67 MFIs), was observed from 2014 to 2015. MFIs reported data or were 
observed in each of the 18 total years of data collection. 
IV.3.1 MFI Dataset Description by Legal Charters 
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To effectively evaluate the variations in the relative MFI performance as funding mix varies, I 
classified the institutions into the five different legal charters noted earlier in this paper.  
 
Figure 15: Total Number and Size of Assets by MFI Legal Charter  
 
Source: Own analysis 
 
Figure 14 shows the number, observations, and asset values of the dataset MFIs according 
to legal charter. The dataset’s 260 bank MFIs comprise $64.4 million, or 79.4%, of the median 
total asset value in the entire sample. Although NGO MFIs are the second highest legal charter 
reporting in the sample, they comprise only 3.2% of the total assets by value, indicating that they 
are small institutions.  
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Table 2: MFI Descriptive Statistics by Legal Charter 
 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the major variables in the study. The next step of the 
initial statistical analysis is to group legal charter data by age (new, young, and mature) to analyze 
how the dual performance varies across the MFI life cycle. Admittedly, some power is lost if the 
dataset of 2,955 transactions is reduced to define 15 subsets of MFI legal charters by age 
groupings; however, the probative value of splitting the dataset this way is a worthwhile tradeoff. 
I also group the dataset by legal charter and age to summarize the funding source mix. Statistically 
significant relationships are identified at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. Figure 15 shows the funding 
source mix measured by the median of each funding type over the assets of bank MFIs by age.  
 
 
 
 
Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD
Return on Assets -1.95 0.53 0.02 0.087 -0.93 0.97 0.01 0.082 -2.14 0.84 0.02 0.126 -7.46 2.09 0.02 0.240 -0.33 0.16 0.03 0.046
Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita 0 145.91 0.65 6.573 0 557.73 0.62 11.167 0 3,827.53 0.36 52.121 0 22.36 0.15 0.811 0.00 40.25 0.44 1.581
Number of Active Borrowers over Assets 0 2,492 0 61 0 4 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 12,734 0 173 0 5 0 0
Percentage of female borrowers 0 100 52 25.0 0 100 48 23.1 0 100 60 26.6 0 100 85 26.4 0 100 55 31.8
Debt to Assets  Ratio 0 4.98 0.15 0.284 -0.05 18.81 0.04 0.502 0 3.21 0.37 0.322 -0.09 11.53 0.32 0.397 0 72.18 0.06 2.541
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.62 1.70 0.17 0.214 -14.82 17.75 0.20 0.585 -2.78 3.83 0.31 0.304 -18.35 156.07 0.34 2.122 -0.64 1.98 0.14 0.133
Donations to Assets Ratio 0 1.30 0.00 0.054 0 1.62 0.00 0.070 0 686.77 0.00 9.094 0 7.36 0.00 0.278 0 0.37 0.00 0.020
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.00 4.87 0.55 0.317 0.00 14.62 0.63 0.458 0.00 2.05 0.28 0.278 0.00 0.99 0.24 0.178 0.00 8.96 0.66 0.385
Natural Log of Personnel 0.69 10.65 5.95 1.543 0.00 8.44 3.30 1.512 0.00 12.48 4.50 1.618 0.00 10.46 4.04 1.628 1.39 8.16 4.30 1.208
Portfolio at risk > 30 days 0 7.11 0.03 0.260 0 6.84 0.05 0.203 0 3.73 0.03 0.120 0 1.00 0.03 0.112 0 1.00 0.07 0.130
Provision for loan impairment/ assets -0.05 0.36 0.01 0.023 -0.34 0.47 0.01 0.032 -0.18 1.26 0.01 0.046 -0.30 1.08 0.01 0.039 -0.06 0.26 0.01 0.017
Yield on gross portfolio (real) -0.17 1.79 0.16 0.164 -0.22 2.02 0.15 0.129 -0.25 2.86 0.24 0.220 -1.31 10.62 0.21 0.240 -0.06 0.81 0.20 0.114
Operating expense/ assets 0 2.21 0.11 0.115 0 1.19 0.10 0.096 0 2.22 0.16 0.163 -1.08 12.75 0.17 0.324 0.00 0.44 0.11 0.067
Natural Log of Assets 1.93 24.47 17.98 2.404 3.01 21.41 14.71 2.211 3.29 21.82 15.68 2.075 -0.69 21.53 14.75 1.934 6.11 21.94 15.44 1.650
GDP per capita growth (%) -47.92 33.03 3.47 4.141 -17.87 33.03 2.70 3.745 -47.92 33.03 4.03 4.384 -47.92 50.12 3.40 3.232 -1.53 11.28 3.56 1.761
Rural population growth (%) -3.58 5.54 1.60 1.007 -2.85 3.97 1.67 1.204 -10.96 7.06 1.42 1.079 -10.96 7.06 1.49 0.832 0.48 4.52 1.62 0.501
Populaton growth (%) -3.34 4.53 0.87 1.241 -3.61 3.79 1.13 1.334 -3.34 6.09 0.74 1.226 -4.04 6.09 0.77 1.317 -2.21 4.13 1.33 1.048
Inflation (%) -35.84 109.68 6.58 7.767 -8.97 431.70 4.23 15.146 -35.84 1,096.68 5.30 18.627 -35.84 431.70 5.79 10.970 -0.70 26.67 6.41 4.288
Bank MFIs Credit Union MFIs NBFI MFIs NGO MFIs Rural Bank MFIs
N=844
n=260 n=671 n=873 n=839 n=162
N=1,983 N=3,124 N=5,965 N=6,018
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Table 3: MFI Descriptive Statistics by Age Groups 
 
Figure 16: Bank MFIs: Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD Min Max Median STD
Return on Assets -4.48 0.67 0.01 0.263 -5.32 0.80 0.02 0.169 -3.45 1.01 0.02 0.112
Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita 0 3,827.53 0.31 75.902 0 557.73 0.31 10.010 0 242.71 0.29 4.122
Number of Active Borrowers over Assets 0 12,734 0 261 0 7 0 0 0 10 0 0
Percentage of female borrowers 0 4 64% 0.3 0 6.6891 65% 0.3 0 1.2719 65% 0.3
Debt to Assets  Ratio 0 11.53 0.00 0.410 0.00 2.38 0.19 0.321 -0.0943 72.18 0.27 0.784
Equity to Asset Ratio -2.13 156.07 0.36 3.021 -18.35 5.92 0.29 0.507 -5.36 17.75 0.23 0.347
Donations to Assets Ratio 0 6.91 0.00 0.306 0 686.77 0.00 11.806 0 5.83 0.00 0.110
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.00 8.96 0.35 0.474 0.00 5.70 0.33 0.375 0.00 14.62 0.46 0.339
Natural Log of Personnel 0.00 10.65 3.22 1.439 0.00 12.48 3.91 1.530 0.00 11.68 4.73 1.676
Portfolio at risk > 30 days 0 6.84 0.02 0.195 0 5.48 0.03 0.162 0 7.11 0.04 0.138
Provision for loan impairment/ assets -0.18 1.26 0.01 0.048 -0.32 0.65 0.01 0.035 -0.61 1.08 0.01 0.039
Yield on gross portfolio (real) -0.22 10.62 0.23 0.408 -0.25 2.22 0.23 0.221 -1.31 1.49 0.20 0.161
Operating expense/ assets 0 4.76 0.20 0.273 0 12.75 0.16 0.334 -1.0825 3.09 0.13 0.141
Natural Log of Assets -0.69 21.03 13.81 2.151 4.06 20.82 14.83 1.937 1.93 24.47 15.90 2.100
GDP per capita growth (%) -47.92 50.12 4.13 4.459 -47.92 33.03 3.89 4.546 -29.89 33.03 3.27 3.311
Rural population growth (%) -10.96 7.06 1.62 1.198 -2.85 7.06 1.56 1.076 -3.11 7.06 1.50 0.927
Populaton growth (%) -3.34 6.09 1.10 1.253 -3.29 6.09 0.96 1.217 -4.04 6.09 0.76 1.265
Inflation (%) -35.84 431.70 6.87 16.452 -8.28 1,096.68 5.83 19.915 -35.84 431.70 5.21 11.146
Where n is number of MFIs and N is MFI-Fiscal Year observations
N=3,602 N=3,042 N=11,265
n=1,152 n=1,334 n=1,827
New MFIs Young MFIs Mature MFIs
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Figure 15 shows the funding source mix by life cycle proxied by bank MFI age. Not 
surprisingly, bank MFIs receive little or no donations, or subsidies. Debt use by bank MFIs in my 
dataset is quite low across all ages. It appears that the preferred source of funding for Bank MFIs 
is deposit; which is in line with my insights from the industry. 
The graph also shows that bank MFIs use a higher share of equity capital in the new phase. 
The equity share seems to decline as they transition through to the mature phase. Bank MFIs also 
make significant use of deposits as they reach the mature stage. Also, mature bank MFIs show 
liquidity from internal sources, including retained earnings; they may also raise equity from 
investors, who do not require dividend payments and are therefore cheaper funding sources.  
Figure 16 shows credit union MFI funding sources by age, including a high use of both 
debt and deposits. 
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Table 4: Bank MFIs: Correlation Between Predictor Variables 
 
Pearson's correlation coefficients: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 significant levels 
 
Correlation between the covariates is generally low, except for a couple of instances where 
the covariates have coefficient of correlation (CoC) above 0.5 absolute value. For instance, the 
negative and moderately high CoC between Deposit and Debt is very much expected. For the rest 
of this section, I present correlation tables for the funding mix regressors by legal charters and 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 1
P-values -
N 1,880
2 Equity to Asset Ratio -0.180*** 1
P-values 0.000 -
N 1,862 1,862
3 Donations to Assets Ratio -0.075*** 0.264*** 1
P-values 0.001 0.000 -
N 1,880 1,862 1,880
4 Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.542*** -0.150*** -0.113*** 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
N 1,392 1,381 1,392 1,392
5 Natural Log of Personnel 0.183*** -0.377*** -0.155*** 0.0154 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.585 -
N 1,686 1,673 1,686 1,257 1,769
6 Portfolio at risk > 30 days -0.027 -0.007 -0.024 0.0379 -0.124*** 1
P-values 0.310 0.794 0.369 0.223 0.000 -
N 1,395 1,393 1,395 1,033 1,395 1,437
7 Provision for loan impairment/ assets 0.076*** 0.019 0.033 -0.116*** -0.0129 0.115*** 1
P-values 0.003 0.465 0.192 0.000 0.626 0.000 -
N 1,555 1,551 1,555 1,178 1,434 1,290 1,557
8 Yield on gross portfolio (real) -0.026 0.332*** 0.114*** -0.178*** -0.071* 0.0233 0.302*** 1
P-values 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.433 0.000 -
N 1,339 1,336 1,339 1,167 1,245 1,139 1,326 1,345
9 Operating expense/ assets -0.046* 0.384*** 0.395*** -0.238*** -0.246*** 0.0105 0.280*** 0.684*** 1
P-values 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.000 -
N 1,563 1,559 1,563 1,187 1,440 1,294 1,555 1,333 1,565
10 Natural log of Assets 0.143*** -0.462*** -0.194*** 0.0478 0.786*** -0.091*** -0.058* -0.261*** -0.433*** 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000 -
N 1,880 1,862 1,880 1,392 1,686 1,395 1,555 1,339 1,563 1,880
11 GDP per capita growth (%) 0.060*** -0.025 -0.002 -0.0108 0.0257 -0.063* -0.162*** -0.0283 -0.0443 0.0152 1
P-values 0.009 0.277 0.920 0.689 0.280 0.017 0.000 0.301 0.081 0.510 -
N 1,871 1,853 1,871 1,384 1,767 1,435 1,549 1,337 1,556 1,871 1,976
12 Population growth (%) -0.244*** 0.144*** 0.008 0.089*** -0.258*** 0.061* 0.0386 0.229*** 0.252*** -0.336*** -0.155*** 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.726 0.001 0.000 0.020 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
N 1,871 1,853 1,871 1,384 1,767 1,435 1,549 1,337 1,556 1,871 1,976 1,976
13 Inflation (%) -0.070*** 0.144*** 0.037 -0.0044 -0.197*** 0.0073 -0.0427 -0.179*** 0.070** -0.214*** -0.058* 0.159*** 1
P-values 0.002 0.000 0.110 0.871 0.000 0.781 0.093 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.000 -
N 1,871 1,853 1,871 1,384 1,767 1,435 1,549 1,337 1,556 1,871 1,976 1,976 1,976
 83 
 
highlight CoCs above 0.5 absolute value. It is clear from the tables that autocorrelation is not an 
issue for the regressors and the other covariates. 
Figure 17: Credit Union MFIs: Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
As Figure 17 shows, the various funds used by credit union MFIs in the dataset do not vary 
much with age: deposits are the dominant source of funding, followed by debt. As credit union 
MFIs age, debt assumes a smaller role in their funding. 
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Table 5: Credit Union MFIs: Correlation Between the Funding Source Mix Metrics 
  
Pearson's correlation coefficients: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 significant levels 
 
Figure 18: Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) MFIs: Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
As with the previously discussed institutions, NBFI MFIs use a high level of debt across 
all ages (see Figure 18). Like their bank counterparts, NBFI MFIs in the sample use increasing 
1 2 3 4
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 1
P-values -
N 2,782
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.539*** 1
P-values 0.000 -
N 2,769 2,769
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.032* 0.030 1
P-values 0.096 0.112 -
N 2,782 2,769 2,782
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.492*** 0.186*** -0.034 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.144 -
N 1,874 1,866 1,874 1,874
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amounts of debt as they age. The opposite is true of their equity capital use: median deposits and 
donations for NBFIs appear to be zero. 
As Figure 19 shows, NGO MFIs also show funding mix trends that are similar to the other 
institutions—that is, higher debt and decreasing or negligible levels of donations as they age. 
Table 6: NBFI MFIs: Correlation Between the Funding Source Mix Metrics 
 
Pearson's correlation coefficients: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 significant levels 
 
Figure 19: Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) MFIs: Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
1 2 3 4
1 Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 1
P-values -
N 5,612
2 Equity to Asset Ratio -0.541*** 1
P-values 0.000 -
N 5,578 5,578
3 Donations to Assets Ratio -0.017 -0.015 1
P-values 0.196 0.269 -
N 5,612 5,578 5,612
4 Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.517*** -0.335*** -0.168*** 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
N 1,811 1,807 1,811 1,811
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NGO MFIs use significant levels of debt to fund their operations, and the median of that 
debt usage increases with age. Equity usage appears flat across all life cycle stages, while median 
donations reduce as NGO MFIs age. 
Table 7: NGO MFIs: Correlation Between the Funding Source Mix Metrics 
 
Pearson's correlation coefficients: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 significant levels 
 
 
Figure 20: Rural Bank MFIs: Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
1 2 3 4
1 Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 1
P-values -
N 5,509
2 Equity to Asset Ratio 0.304*** 1
P-values 0.000 -
N 5,479 5,490
3 Donations to Assets Ratio -0.108*** 0.022 1
P-values 0.000 0.110 -
N 5,509 5,479 5,509
4 Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.270*** -0.011 -0.060** 1
P-values 0.000 0.639 0.013 -
N 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,748
 87 
 
Finally, although rural bank MFIs show high usage of debt, the young institutions use the 
highest level of debt for this group. As Figure 20 shows, however, their primary funding source 
appears to be Deposits. Interestingly, the median deposit utilization does not appear to change 
significantly across the three age bands. Median equity usage is also relatively flat across age 
groups, while median donations once again appear to be zero. 
Table 8: Rural Bank MFIs: Correlation Between the Funding Source Mix Metrics 
 
Pearson's correlation coefficients: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<=0.1 significant levels 
IV.3.2 Operating Models  
My core analysis centers around linear relationships between performance and funding 
source mix captured by the regression models. The base models consist of the performance-
measuring variables as the left-hand-side, or dependent, variables, and 15 right-hand-side, or 
independent, variables.  
Equation 2: ROA as the Dependent Variable  
 
1 2 3 4
1 Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 1
P-values -
N 790
2 Equity to Asset Ratio -0.016 1
P-values 0.664 -
N 789 789
3 Donations to Assets Ratio -0.006 0.169*** 1
P-values 0.862 0.000 -
N 790 789 790
4 Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.483*** 0.518*** -0.040 1
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.311 -
N 633 632 633 633
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𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 𝐎𝐧 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬𝐋𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 +∑𝛃𝐣𝐗 +
𝟒
𝐣=𝟏
∑𝛃𝐣𝐘 +
𝟏𝟎
𝐣=𝟓
∑ 𝛃𝐣𝐙 +
𝟏𝟓
𝐣=𝟏𝟏
 𝛜𝐢 
Where ROA measures profitability or financial performance, L represents the five MFI 
legal charters, X represents the four MFI funding source mix variables, Y represents MFI firm-
level performance variables, Z represents country-level macroeconomic indicators, and ϵ_i is the 
usual regression error term of unobserved components. Additionally, I introduce dummy variables 
into the equation to control for other factors that my explain performance, other than funding 
source mix. The maximum number of explanatory variables may reach as high as 32 depending 
on the model type.  
Equation 3: Average Loan per Borrower/ GNI per Capita as the Dependent Variable 
𝐀𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐋𝐨𝐚𝐧 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫/ 𝐆𝐍𝐈 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚 𝐋𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 +∑𝛃𝐣𝐗 +
𝟒
𝐣=𝟏
∑𝛃𝐣𝐘 +
𝟏𝟎
𝐣=𝟓
∑ 𝛃𝐣𝐙 +
𝟏𝟓
𝐣=𝟏𝟏
 𝛜𝐢 
In Equation 3, the average loan balance per borrower compared to the local GNI per capita 
(here, the ALB) is a social measure. I use it to measure the depth of outreach to the poor, as I 
discussed earlier. The independent variables are the same as those defined in Equation 2. 
Equation 4: Number of Active Borrowers per Assets as the Dependent Variable 
𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐬/𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 𝐋𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 +∑𝛃𝐣𝐗 +
𝟒
𝐣=𝟏
∑𝛃𝐣𝐘 +
𝟏𝟎
𝐣=𝟓
∑ 𝛃𝐣𝐙 +
𝟏𝟓
𝐣=𝟏𝟏
 𝛜𝐢 
In Equation 4, the number of active borrowers per assets (or NAB) is a social performance 
measure that compares the efficiency of an MFI’s outreach breadth to the poor to that of other 
MFIs. The independent variables are again the same as defined in Equation 2. 
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Equation 5: Percentage of Female Borrowers as the Dependent Variable 
𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐅𝐞𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐬  𝐋𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 +∑𝛃𝐣𝐗 +
𝟒
𝐣=𝟏
∑𝛃𝐣𝐘 +
𝟏𝟎
𝐣=𝟓
∑ 𝛃𝐣𝐙 +
𝟏𝟓
𝐣=𝟏𝟏
 𝛜𝐢 
 
In Equation 5, the percentage of female borrowers (or PFB) is used as a measure of social 
performance. As I discussed earlier, MFIs explicitly target women because more women than men 
are poor, especially in rural areas; and they also spend a higher percentage of money on education 
and healthcare (Hartarska, Mersland, and Nadolnyak, 2014). 
 
Equation 6: The MLCT – Funding Source Mix and Dual Performance Outcomes Linkage to 
Age 
Equation 6: The MLCT 
𝐀𝐠𝐞  𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 +∑𝛃𝐣𝐗 +
𝟒
𝐣=𝟏
∑𝛃𝐣𝐘
𝟖
𝐣=𝟓
+ ∑𝛃𝐣𝐙
𝟗
𝐣=𝟗
+  𝛜𝐢 
Where i represents the three developmental stages of the MFI life-cycle namely, New, Young, and 
Mature; X is the four funding source mix variables, Y represents the performance outcome 
variables, and Z represents the control variable Size (i.e. natural log of Assets).   
In Equation 6, I use MFI age as measure for the MCLT dependent variable and funding 
source mix, performance outcomes as well as the Size of the MFI (i.e. measured by logarithm of 
Assets) as independent variables to assess the relationship between the ages of MFIs and their 
performance and funding sources. Again, this approach to empirically testing the MCLT has 
precedence in the literature (Bogan, 2012). 
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IV.3.3 Empirical Method 
In the empirical analysis that follows, I used fixed-effects (within) regression designed for 
panel data analysis to estimate the linear models. These estimators control for individual firm-level 
effects. In statistical modeling, two estimator properties are most desirable: consistency and 
efficiency. If an unobserved component in the error term is related to the regressors, our estimators 
lack consistency. Two popular estimators that overcome this problem are the fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimators. I performed a Hausman test on both estimators, and the fixed-effects 
proved to be a more appropriate estimator for my model (Greene, 2012). This makes sense as my 
models include variables with effects that vary over time and therefore need to be estimated using 
dummy variables (Green, 2012; Wooldridge, 2003). Having already defined the relevant variables, 
I grouped the data by legal charter and age groups and estimated the regression by identifying the 
coefficients parameters of the regressions described earlier. I tested the estimated coefficients’ 
values, sign, and significance to help me answer the research question. I also applied statistical 
tests to validate the model. Because my dataset is panel data—that is, it includes many observations 
for each MFI over several years—the standard errors may be correlated. I therefore utilized 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to ensure that ordinary least-square (OLS) standard errors 
are corrected if they are correlated (Petersen, 2009). It is safe to use the robust standard errors, 
especially since I have a large sample size. Further, even if no heteroskedasticity exists, the robust 
standard errors are still appropriate to use even under homoscedastic conditions—that is, even 
when the regression errors have the same finite variance. Also, I used some dummy variables to 
control for MFI attribute-specific effects such as the influence on social and financial performance, 
financial intermediation level, target market, scale of operations, geographical region of operation, 
profit orientation, regulation, and age since starting its operations. Additionally, because an 
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unobservable incident in a specific year could influence the observations, I control for time effects 
by including dummy variables for each year from 1999 to 2016. 
The model’s firm-level control variables include personnel, portfolio at risk > 30 days, 
provision for loan impairment/assets, yield on gross portfolio (real), operating expense over assets, 
and the natural log of assets as a measure of firm size (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). I control for 
these variables because they have been found to correlate with MFI performance measures (Cull 
et al., 2007; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Zacharias, 2008, Campbell and Rogers, 2012; Bogan, 
2012). Controlling for these variables ensures that their differences do not contribute to the 
performance–regressors relationship. Also, research has found that an MFI’s age can positively 
impact its efficiency (Caudill et al., 2009). Moreover, larger MFIs often have lower costs per 
borrower and lower costs per dollar lent; because larger MFIs are likely to be older, we can explain 
this relationship by either scale or a learning-curve effect (González, 2011). I therefore control for 
MFI scale. 
Also, two of the social measures—PFB and ALB—effect each other in ways that are 
opposite of what is expected. The reason for this is that the female variable is positively related to 
outreach (that is, it increases outreach), while ALB is negatively related to outreach. 
For size, I use the natural logarithm of total MFI assets. Finally, as I defined it earlier, age 
refers to the number of years an institution has been active, using the year of inception as the 
starting point.  
I fitted the model using the fixed-effects (within) estimator to estimate the relationship 
between performance and the independent variables described in the previous chapter. The 
estimation already accounts for individual firm heterogeneity and time-invariant characteristic 
effects such as country and geographical region.  
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I also tested for omitted variables. As I described earlier, I included several control 
variables in the model. However, despite this effort to account for everything, it is still possible 
that I omitted some relevant covariates. To test for this, I introduced a dummy variable for each 
MFI in the fixed-effects model. Each institution’s dummy variable allows for a different intercept 
in the model (Wooldridge, 2003). The institutional dummy will, therefore, control for specific MFI 
characteristics that could influence both financial and social performance and erase the relationship 
between the measures that produce biased test results. For example, management quality or human 
resources quality might influence both the dependent and independent variables; to control for this 
endogeneity, I included 2,955 dummy variables in the fixed-effects regression to account for all 
MFIs while using one MFI as a reference group. The dummy variables control for all the MFIs’ 
time-invariant, unobservable characteristics that could affect the dependent variable by monitoring 
the unobserved heterogeneity between MFIs (Wooldridge, 2003). This is a very strong test, which 
controls for all the individual MFI characteristics that could influence the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. An initial run of the model revealed that there was almost 
no variation in the MFIs individual dummy variables. I therefore eliminated them from the model. 
Having described the models, I now share their results. 
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V RESULTS 
I now present my results from the econometric models I used to understand how funding 
mix sources impact MFIs’ financial and social performance. I also present evidence on how the 
social–financial performance relationship varies across MFI legal charters and age, and summarize 
my results and findings on the MLCT for each legal charter. 
Past research has produced mixed results regarding the MFI funding source mix’s impact 
on financial and social performance goals. Many of these differences in research outcomes can be 
traced to differences in measurement approach, in how MFIs are defined, and in the granularity of 
the data analyzed. However, a significant cause of the varying conclusions might also emanate 
from the fact that MFIs are bulked together into a single homogeneous group. In truth, the various 
legal charters of these institutions create very real and specific distinctions among them. They 
should thus be analyzed accordingly. The results below are consistent with most leading MFI 
analyses, but they offer deeper insights into how and where funding source mix varies with social 
and financial performance. I also provide results of social and financial performance outcomes by 
MFI age to ascertain if funding and performance vary over time. 
I divide the dataset into five groups corresponding to the five legal charters discussed in 
Chapter 2—that is, bank, credit union, NBFI, NGO, and rural bank MFIs. I then run the model for 
each of these datasets to analyze the relationship between the financial and social performance 
measures and the funding source mix variables for each legal charter.  
In subsequent tables, I present results from the model’s linear regressions that estimate the 
relationship between these dual performance 20  outcomes and funding source mix. Each 
                                                 
20 Again, there are four performance outcomes comprising ROA as a financial performance outcome—average loan 
per borrower per GNI per capita (ALB), number of active borrowers per assets (NAB), and percentage of female 
borrowers (PFB)—all of which are social performance outcomes.  
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relationship is first captured under five different models: A, B, C, D, and E. Model A captures 
results from the base regression equation using the performance outcomes as dependent variables 
(DVs), and the four funding source mix regressors21 as independent variables (IVs). Model B 
includes all IVs in model A, along with an age dummy variable. Model C comprises all IVs in 
model B, along with six MFI firm-level performance control variables and three macroeconomic 
indicator control variables. Model D consists of all IVs introduced in model C, along with year 
dummy variables to control for year-specific effects that may impact performance outcomes. 
Model E includes all the variables in model D, along with dummy variables to control for 
performance variations that may be attributed to different levels of MFI financial intermediation. 
Finally, I focus on model E alone, breaking it into three age groups to further analyze the 
relationships between MFIs’ dual performance goals and the funding source mix metrics. 
For the rest of this chapter, I adopt a consistent pattern to present the estimation results 
from the regressions. First, I present the summary of important findings. Second, I present results 
for all MFIs, regardless of legal charter. Finally, I present the result by legal charters. For each of 
the last two categories (sections 5.2 and 5.3), I further divide the results into three subcategories: 
1) financial performance, 2) social performance, and 3) evidence from MLCT. I analyze these 
three subcategories overall, then by MFI age groups. 
 
V.1 Summarized Results 
V.1.1 Dual Performance Outcomes and Funding Source Mix 
                                                 
21 The regressors of interest (funding source mix) are debt-to-assets, equity-to-assets, donation-to-assets, and 
deposit-to-assets ratios. 
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The results indicate that, generally, both social and financial performance outcomes vary 
with funding sources. Of particular interest is the negative association between the financial 
performance outcome, ROA, and donation. Higher donations are associated with a lower ROA for 
all MFIs. This relationship is confirmed by regressions across MFI ages and legal charters. A unit 
increase in the donation-to-asset ratio is associated with a 22.7% reduction in ROA, at a 1% 
significance level for all five models. Thus, rather than positively associating financial 
performance, donation funding associates negatively. 
MFI cumulative-level regression estimates show that the debt-to-assets ratio is positively 
associated with at least one social performance outcome (ALB and NAB), and the financial 
performance outcome, ROA. A unit increase in debt-to-assets ratio is associated with 1.5% 
increase in NAB and 2.3% in ROA. The relationships described here vary with MFI age. More 
debt funding positively impacts new MFIs’ ALB, NAB, and ROA at 5%, 1%, and 5% levels, 
respectively. As MFIs transition from the new to young stages, debt funding associates positively 
only with ROA (5% significance level). At the mature stage, debt has a positive association only 
with NAB (1% significance level). Thus, debt takes on different age-dependent roles in its 
relationship with the dual performance outcomes. 
The equity-to-assets ratio is positively associated with financial objectives (ROA); as far 
as social performance, it is positively associated with two outcomes for mature forms and one for 
young MFIs. For new MFIs, funding seems to be non-significant. 
Deposits related positively to NAB across all ages. Increased deposits seem to associate 
with higher ALB and NAB for mature MFIs; on aggregate, increased deposits are associated with 
both social and financial performance for all MFIs. However, deposits to assets have an 
unexpectedly negative association with PFB for young MFIs, at a 10% significance level. 
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Also, it appears that, overall, funding source mix is not associated with dual performance 
for bank MFIs. That said, there are significant associations as we look at bank MFIs by age. For 
example, the donation-to-assets ratio is positively and significantly associated with both ALB and 
NAB for mature banks. Thus, all things being equal, providing more donations to mature bank 
MFIs can lead to increases in depth and breadth of outreach to the poor.  
The relationship between dual performance outcomes and funding source mix metrics also 
varies across legal charters. The strongest significant association between ROA and debt- and 
equity-to-assets ratios is observed in NBFI MFIs. However, young credit union MFIs show the 
highest association, with 16.3% between ROA and equity. 
V.1.2 Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT  
As I have just shown, funding source mix generally varies with both social and financial 
performance outcomes across age groups and legal charters; funding sources are also significantly 
associated with different stages of MFIs development, as measured in the age dummy regressions. 
While these associations are interesting, I wanted to quantify their impact on performance 
outcomes at both aggregate MFI and legal charter levels. To do this, I included three dummy 
variables—one each for each MFI developmental stage (age). I did this to further test the MLCT, 
which links funding sources and MFI performance to different MFI developmental stages. 
At the aggregate level, MFI social performance outcomes (NAB and PFB) show significant 
variations by age. The coefficient of the new and young MFIs’ dummy variables are significant at 
a 1% level for PFB, indicating that new and young MFIs attain, on average, 3.1% and 1.7% lower 
PFBs, respectively, than mature MFIs. Again, new and young MFIs attain 0.1% and 0.06% lower 
NAB per assets, respectively, compared to mature MFIs, although these estimates are significant 
at 10% levels. Also, new MFIs’ ROA is an average of 3% higher than mature MFIs’ ROA, at a 
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1% significance level. However, young and mature MFI ROAs show no significant differences. I 
offer details by legal charter in section 5.3. 
V.2  MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix—Aggregate MFI Level Results  
Table 8 shows the results of estimated coefficients, their robust standard errors (S.E.), 
significance levels (indicated by stars), and p-values. The table, like the many that follow it, 
presents the overall, within, and between variabilities of the DVs explained by the models’ IVs 
(R2). Because I fitted the model with within or fixed-effects estimator regressions, I am particularly 
interested in the variation among individual MFIs over time—that is, the within R2. At the 
regression levels, all of the models are very significant at less than 1%. The regression coefficient 
estimates retain their signs across models A–E. The scenarios show how the regression statistics, 
estimated coefficients, standard errors, and significance evolve as more covariates enter the models 
as control variables. 
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Table 9: MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix—Aggregate Level 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.048** 0.039* 0.022* 0.023* 0.023* -0.037 -0.032 -0.047 0.019 0.021 -0.124 -0.126 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.009 -0.009
S.E. (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.115) (0.116) (0.093) (0.089) (0.089) (0.130) (0.133) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
P-values 0.018 0.054 0.071 0.056 0.059 0.746 0.781 0.609 0.835 0.810 0.342 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.245 0.283 0.371 0.678 0.670
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.001 0.001 0.126 0.211** 0.209** 0.012* 0.012* 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.017 -0.017 -0.029** -0.020 -0.019
S.E. (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.081) (0.093) (0.091) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.860 0.868 0.118 0.023 0.023 0.064 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.187 0.039 0.159 0.167
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.548*** -0.522*** -0.225*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.003 0.030 0.269** 0.096 0.097 -0.002 -0.017 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.061** 0.058** 0.041 0.017 0.017
S.E. (0.096) (0.097) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.076) (0.080) (0.137) (0.127) (0.126) (0.023) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.964 0.710 0.049 0.450 0.440 0.919 0.637 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.032 0.143 0.526 0.527
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.084 0.073 0.346 0.513** 0.574** 0.252 0.257 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.024 -0.019 -0.003 0.016 0.000
S.E. (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.139) (0.139) (0.228) (0.216) (0.250) (0.260) (0.265) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
P-values 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.544 0.599 0.130 0.018 0.022 0.331 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.334 0.459 0.925 0.585 0.987
Age: New - -0.053*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.028*** - -0.067 0.231 0.190 0.190 - 0.029 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* - 0.008 -0.025* -0.031** -0.031**
S.E. (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.108) (0.142) (0.138) (0.138) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.533 0.103 0.168 0.168 0.350 0.096 0.060 0.060 0.512 0.094 0.031 0.032
Age: Young - 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.002 - -0.046 0.091 0.046 0.047 - 0.015 0.000 -0.001* -0.001* - 0.014** -0.011 -0.016** -0.017**
S.E. (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.041) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
P-values 0.888 0.258 0.462 0.478 0.261 0.180 0.442 0.434 0.348 0.132 0.063 0.060 0.048 0.208 0.047 0.043
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included - No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included - No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Constants -0.077*** -0.058*** 0.105** 0.036 0.039 0.861*** 0.880*** -3.681*** -6.163*** -6.188*** 0.300*** 0.293*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.667*** 0.662*** 0.929*** 0.660*** 0.663***
S.E. (0.016) (0.016) (0.041) (0.063) (0.063) (0.033) (0.037) (1.368) (2.122) (2.127) (0.083) (0.091) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.104) (0.151) (0.151)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.564 0.536 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall 0.43 0.44 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Between 0.56 0.55 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Within 0.21 0.24 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04
F 20.00 19.80 36.80 22.30 21.70 0.40 0.40 4.60 3.70 3.60 1.80 1.10 15.70 13.00 12.60 1.60 1.60 2.20 2.70 2.70
No. Obs 6,245 6,245 5,126 5,126 5,126 6,629 6,629 5,077 5,077 5,077 6,664 6,664 5,083 5,083 5,083 5,249 5,249 4,382 4,382 4,382
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) ; Robust standard errors (S.E.) are reported in parentheses;  P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Other Microfinance characteristics include MFIs' Financial Intermediation, Target Market, Scale of operations, Region, Profit orientation and whether the institution is Regulated
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from  zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
DV: NAB DV: PFBDV: ROA DV: ALB
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•  Aggregate Level MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
In Table 8, the link between ROA and the funding source mix metrics is captured in the 
first column. The models’ F-test results indicate high significance at regressions levels, and the 
within R2 ranges are from 0.21 to .66 for models A–E, respectively. The IVs explain almost two-
thirds of Model E’s ROA variability.  
Overall, the financial performance outcome, ROA, is positively associated with the funding 
source mix metrics except for in the donation-to-assets ratio, which shows a very significant but 
negative ROA association. A unit increase each in debt-to-assets, equity-to-assets, and deposit-to-
assets is, on average, associated with an ROA increase of 2.3%, 8.6%, and 4.6%, respectively. 
Equity, therefore, seems to give MFIs a faster way to improve financial performance as 
measured by ROA. Further, each unit of donation-to-assets is associated with an average ROA 
decrease of 22.7%.  
Breaking aggregate MFI results by age groups, we see that higher debt-to-assets ratio levels 
are positively associated with a much higher ROA for new MFIs (9.3%) than for young MFIs 
(4.3%).  
As already established, the equity-to-assets ratio is positively associated with ROA. 
However, viewed by age groups, young MFIs are likely to produce higher ROA per unit of equity 
increase (12.3%) than mature MFIs (9.0%). New MFIs show no significant association between 
their ROA and equity-to-assets.  
Donation is negatively associated with ROA for all age groups. A unit increase in donation-
to-assets ratio is related to ROA decreases of 13.7% and 26.4% for young and mature MFIs, 
respectively. 
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Although a unit increase in deposit-to-assets ratio is associated with an average ROA increase 
of 4.3%, no significant associations were observed when I group MFIs by ages. 
 
•  Aggregate Level MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
Noteworthy associations between MFI social performance metrics ALB, NAB, and PFB 
and funding source mix metrics are as follows. 
On the average, a unit increase in deposit-to-assets ratio is associated with the highest 
increase in ALB ($0.57), while a similar increase in equity-to-assets ratio leads to $.21 more ALB. 
Thus, to effectively increase the size of average loans per borrower, the MFI’s deposits 
mobilization capacity is key. That said, a look at MFIs by age group shows that debt is a close 
runner-up to deposits for increasing ALB. A unit increase in debt-to-assets ratio associates with an 
increase of $0.67 for new MFIs’ ALB, while the same increase in deposit-to-assets ratio for mature 
MFIs associates with an ALB increase of $0.68. Thus, on aggregate, stakeholders looking to 
increase ALB might explore the option of issuing debt in new MFIs or increasing deposit 
mobilization efforts for mature MFIs. 
As noted earlier, NAB is the number of clients divided by the MFI’s total assets. On 
average, all funding sources significantly and positively associate with NAB. The highest increase 
in NAB is associated with a unit increase of equity-to-assets ratio. The smallest NAB increase is 
related to an increase in the donation-to-assets ratio. Thus, even when donations have a positive 
association, they may still be a least-effective funding source for achieving performance. By age 
group, mature MFIs show the greatest increase in NAB per unit of increase in any of the funding 
source metrics. For these mature institutions, the most effective funding source is equity (0.02), 
followed by a tie between debt and deposits, and then donations. 
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Generally, funding source mix is not actively associated with PFB, except for a weakly 
significant and negative association with the deposit-to-assets ratio. 
 
•  Aggregate Level MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.  
At the aggregate MFI level, the MLCT seems confirmed for PFB and NAB. On average, new and 
young MFIs achieve lower PFBs of 3.1% and 1.7%, respectively, compared to mature MFIs. These 
results are significant at the 5% level. A similar result is observed for NAB, where new and young 
MFIs achieve 0.001 fewer clients in relation to assets compared to mature MFIs. 
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Table 10: Aggregate MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.023* 0.093** 0.043** 0.001 0.021 0.668** 0.776 -0.143 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.016*** -0.009 -0.024 -0.028 0.020
S.E. (0.012) (0.037) (0.018) (0.025) (0.089) (0.325) (0.774) (0.109) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.035) (0.053) (0.029)
P-values 0.059 0.013 0.018 0.963 0.810 0.041 0.316 0.191 0.000 0.001 0.963 0.000 0.670 0.497 0.595 0.497
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.086*** 0.013 0.123*** 0.090*** 0.209** 0.165 0.697 0.174* 0.019*** 0.001 0.000 0.020*** -0.019 -0.005 -0.064 -0.027
S.E. (0.013) (0.052) (0.027) (0.025) (0.091) (0.377) (0.985) (0.104) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.037) (0.079) (0.017)
P-values 0.000 0.803 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.661 0.480 0.094 0.000 0.209 0.817 0.000 0.167 0.896 0.422 0.123
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.227*** -0.102 -0.137** -0.264** 0.097 0.348 -0.083 0.205 0.006*** -0.002* -0.001 0.008** 0.017 -0.055 0.074 0.030
S.E. (0.064) (0.073) (0.057) (0.114) (0.126) (0.369) (0.210) (0.128) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.026) (0.060) (0.075) (0.042)
P-values 0.000 0.160 0.017 0.021 0.440 0.346 0.693 0.110 0.002 0.087 0.686 0.023 0.527 0.361 0.324 0.472
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.043*** 0.072 0.047 0.025 0.574** -1.349 1.773 0.682** 0.015*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.016*** 0.000 -0.044 -0.152* 0.000
S.E. (0.014) (0.045) (0.033) (0.022) (0.250) (1.563) (2.270) (0.274) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.030) (0.045) (0.083) (0.041)
P-values 0.002 0.108 0.149 0.259 0.022 0.389 0.435 0.013 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.000 0.987 0.320 0.069 0.999
Age: New -0.028*** - - - 0.190 - - - -0.001* - - - -0.031** - - -
S.E. (0.007) (0.138) (0.000) (0.014)
P-values 0.000 0.168 0.060 0.032
Age: Young 0.002 - - - 0.047 - - - -0.001* - - - -0.017** - - -
S.E. (0.003) (0.060) (0.000) (0.008)
P-values 0.478 0.434 0.060 0.043
Constants 0.039 0.029 -0.332** -0.001 -6.188*** -3.695 -1.967 -8.485*** 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.007 0.663*** 0.819*** 0.952** 0.498**
S.E. (0.063) (0.325) (0.162) (0.078) (2.127) (2.310) (2.544) (3.209) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.151) (0.253) (0.402) (0.208)
P-values 0.536 0.928 0.041 0.987 0.004 0.111 0.440 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.017
Overall 0.71 0.69 0.42 0.76 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.42 0.14 0.22 0.54 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00
Between 0.71 0.68 0.46 0.78 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00
Within 0.66 0.73 0.57 0.64 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.10 0.69 0.38 0.30 0.77 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.05
F 21.68 21.15 18.42 12.62 3.58 1.55 1.45 3.35 12.64 4.43 4.63 10.37 2.65 1.38 1.92 3.16
No. Obs 5,126 448 889 3,789 5,077 444 883 3,750 5,083 447 883 3,753 4,382 399 764 3,219
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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V.3  MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix—MFI Legal Charter Level Results  
V.3.1 Bank MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Table 10 shows results on the relationship between bank MFIs’ dual performance outcomes 
for ROA, ALB, NAB, and PFB and the funding source mix metrics (debt-to-assets ratio, equity-
to-assets ratio, donation-to-assets ratio, and deposit-to-assets ratio). Again, I describe the models 
at regression level, and then analyze the coefficient estimation results.  
Of the five model scenarios, A and B do not seem significant at the regression level for all 
the performance outcomes, except for ROA for model B. The rest of the models show high 
significance. Focusing on model E, the regression level F-statistics are highly significant at 
F(29,159) = 12.1, p < 0.001 for ROA. The within R2 at the aggregate legal charter level is .52. 
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Table 11: Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio -0.026 -0.039 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.345 0.386 0.320 0.433 0.452 -3.824 -3.754 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.046 -0.066 -0.054 -0.051 -0.051
s.e. (0.043) (0.043) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.933) (0.914) (1.124) (1.123) (1.118) (4.051) (3.991) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.061) (0.055) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)
p-values 0.547 0.370 0.899 0.896 0.895 0.712 0.673 0.776 0.700 0.687 0.346 0.348 0.629 0.758 0.744 0.449 0.228 0.432 0.448 0.445
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.007 0.004 0.019 0.024 0.024 -0.506 -0.711 1.118 1.421 1.371 -9.045 -9.844 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.049 0.056 0.040 0.054 0.052
s.e. (0.050) (0.051) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.737) (0.825) (1.417) (1.584) (1.564) (9.261) (10.066) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.073) (0.070) (0.086) (0.077) (0.076)
p-values 0.881 0.932 0.509 0.423 0.422 0.493 0.390 0.431 0.371 0.382 0.330 0.329 0.367 0.260 0.241 0.505 0.425 0.646 0.486 0.498
Donations to Assets Ratio -1.344* -1.371* -0.257 -0.259 -0.260 2.525 2.667 3.438** 2.171* 2.030 8.207 8.490 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.111 -0.145 -0.147 -0.192** -0.199**
s.e. (0.729) (0.725) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (2.352) (2.194) (1.535) (1.280) (1.250) (8.660) (8.829) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.099) (0.092) (0.090) (0.078) (0.082)
p-values 0.067 0.060 0.256 0.253 0.252 0.284 0.226 0.027 0.092 0.106 0.344 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.116 0.105 0.016 0.016
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.014 -0.036 -0.005 0.003 0.004 0.479 0.675 1.068 1.512 1.655 -2.759 -1.949 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.030 -0.071 -0.054 -0.041 -0.031
s.e. (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.608) (0.526) (1.375) (1.344) (1.387) (3.093) (2.389) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.063) (0.055) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067)
p-values 0.702 0.326 0.804 0.879 0.882 0.432 0.200 0.438 0.262 0.235 0.373 0.416 0.587 0.948 0.869 0.634 0.204 0.426 0.540 0.640
Age: New - -0.033*** -0.026** -0.028** -0.028** - 0.378 0.505 0.493 0.477 - 1.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 - -0.045* -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.083***
S.E. (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.425) (0.462) (0.459) (0.462) (1.587) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
P-values 0.009 0.033 0.017 0.017 0.376 0.276 0.285 0.303 0.329 0.397 0.278 0.297 0.079 0.004 0.001 0.001
Age: Young - 0.010** 0.005 0.001 0.001 - 0.041 -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 - 0.587 0.000 0.000* 0.000* - 0.019 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013
S.E. (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.121) (0.183) (0.168) (0.168) (0.603) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
P-values 0.032 0.280 0.769 0.768 0.736 0.986 0.938 0.948 0.331 0.318 0.098 0.097 0.174 0.696 0.384 0.383
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Constants 0.027 0.041 0.105* -0.036 -0.036 1.781*** 1.640*** -7.466 -12.177 -12.175 6.336 5.694 0.012*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.522*** 0.548*** 0.871*** 0.739** 0.741**
s.e. (0.035) (0.035) (0.062) (0.089) (0.090) (0.496) (0.420) (5.639) (10.507) (10.514) (4.482) (3.871) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.057) (0.050) (0.208) (0.308) (0.307)
p-values 0.433 0.236 0.094 0.685 0.685 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.248 0.249 0.159 0.143 0.000 0.047 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.017
Overall 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04
Between 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Within 0.25 0.28 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.16
F 1.50 4.20 11.50 11.90 12.10 0.80 0.80 2.30 2.50 2.40 0.20 0.20 11.00 6.30 6.00 1.20 2.00 2.50 3.80 3.70
Number of Observations 1,192 1,192 947 947 947 1,200 1,200 930 930 930 1,209 1,209 931 931 931 867 867 750 750 75
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses, and p-values below s.e. calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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• Bank MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
At the aggregate bank MFI level, none of the funding source mix metrics significantly 
relate to ROA. Thus, on average, funding seems to be unimportant for bank MFIs’ financial 
performance.  
Grouped by age, important associations become noticeable. The donation-to-assets ratio is 
negatively associated with ROA for young and mature bank MFIs. A unit increase in the 
donation-to-assets ratio relates to a 125.4% and 24.7% ROA reduction for young and 
mature bank MFIs, respectively. Also, a unit increase in debt- and deposit-to-assets ratios 
are associated with a 5.3% and 3% ROA, respectively, for mature bank MFIs. All other 
relationships between ROA and funding metrics are not significant.  
 
• Bank MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
The regressions for Bank MFIs’ social performance outcomes are all very significant at 
F(29,156) = 2.35, p < 0.001; F(29,156) = 6.03, p < 0.001; and F(29,138) = 3.67 < 0.001 for 
ALB, NAB, and PFB, respectively. The within R2 are .11, .45, and .16 for ALB, NAB, and 
PFB, respectively.  
At the aggregate bank MFIs level, there seem to be no significant relationships between 
ALB and the funding source mix metrics. However, when grouped by ages, important 
associations arise that are worth analyzing. For young bank MFIs, ALB is positively 
associated with all funding source mix metrics except the donation-to-assets ratio, with a 
unit increase in debt-, equity-, and deposit-to-assets ratios associated with an ALB of $18.9, 
$18.6, and $17.9, respectively. So, as long as the funding source is not donations, an 
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increase in funding may increase ALB size by a similar amount. For mature bank MFIs, 
however, the donation-to-assets ratio positively associates with ALB.  
Regarding NAB, on average, a unit increase in the donation-to-assets ratio associates with 
only a 0.023 increase. Further analysis of bank MFIs by age group shows that donation 
impacts NAB positively only for mature bank MFIs. Although debt- and deposit-to-assets 
ratios also have significant associations with NAB for mature bank MFIs, these 
relationships are negative. 
All associations between PFB and funding source mix metrics are not significant on the 
average, except for the negative relationship with the donation-to-assets ratio. An increase 
of one unit in donation is associated with an average decrease of 20% in PFB overall, and 
a 101.6% decrease for young bank MFIs.  
Table 11 provides further details on the variability between performance and funding 
source mix metrics for bank MFIs. 
 
• Bank MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.  
I did not find evidence of the MLCT at work in bank MFIs. Although a strong significant 
difference exists between financial performance of new bank MFIs compared to mature 
ones, I did not find a significant difference between young and mature MFIs’ ROAs. On 
average, new MFIs attain 2.8% lower ROA compared to mature MFIs. Young bank MFIs’ 
ROA does not significantly differ on average from that of mature bank MFIs.  
Also, while new bank MFIs have, on average, an 8.3% lower PFB than mature bank MFIs, 
there appears to be no significant difference in PFB for young and mature bank MFIs. So, 
instead of three-stage performance outcomes, I can identify only two: from new to mature. 
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Table 12: Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.003 0.105 0.006 -0.053** 0.452 1.178 18.918** -0.610 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003** -0.051 0.051 0.027 -0.185*
S.E. (0.022) (0.113) (0.057) (0.021) (1.118) (0.856) (8.202) (0.862) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.121) (0.186) (0.095)
P-values 0.895 0.357 0.924 0.015 0.687 0.174 0.024 0.481 0.744 0.903 0.449 0.022 0.445 0.675 0.884 0.054
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.024 0.033 0.025 0.051 1.371 1.306 18.577** 2.097 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.052 0.092 0.391* -0.056
S.E. (0.029) (0.106) (0.060) (0.045) (1.564) (0.798) (9.114) (1.777) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.076) (0.115) (0.212) (0.076)
P-values 0.422 0.758 0.681 0.260 0.382 0.107 0.046 0.240 0.241 0.296 0.148 0.576 0.498 0.426 0.070 0.461
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.260 -0.824 -1.254*** -0.247** 2.030 2.272 12.926 3.766* 0.023*** -0.006 -0.005 0.026*** -0.199** 0.794 -1.016*** -0.126
S.E. (0.226) (0.499) (0.262) (0.106) (1.250) (3.334) (8.398) (1.928) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.082) (0.686) (0.331) (0.096)
P-values 0.252 0.104 0.000 0.021 0.106 0.499 0.129 0.053 0.000 0.358 0.186 0.000 0.016 0.253 0.004 0.193
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.004 -0.021 -0.018 -0.030* 1.655 0.503 17.914** 0.282 0.000 0.005 0.001 -0.003** -0.031 0.341 -0.197 -0.168
S.E. (0.025) (0.100) (0.050) (0.018) (1.387) (1.062) (8.070) (0.984) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.203) (0.169) (0.103)
P-values 0.882 0.833 0.723 0.091 0.235 0.638 0.030 0.775 0.869 0.182 0.285 0.033 0.640 0.100 0.249 0.107
Age: New -0.028** - - - 0.477 - - - 0.000 - - - -0.083*** - - -
S.E. (0.012) (0.462) (0.000) (0.024)
P-values 0.017 0.303 0.297 0.001
Age: Young 0.001 - - - -0.011 - - - 0.000* - - - -0.013 - - -
S.E. (0.004) (0.168) (0.000) (0.014)
P-values 0.768 0.948 0.097 0.383
Constants -0.036 0.711** -0.112 -0.142* -12.175 -2.037 -14.070 -20.799 0.007** 0.012 -0.006 0.007** 0.741** -0.015 -0.779 0.812**
S.E. (0.090) (0.342) (0.241) (0.075) (10.514) (5.432) (19.784) (15.626) (0.003) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.307) (0.729) (0.673) (0.360)
P-values 0.685 0.042 0.642 0.060 0.249 0.709 0.480 0.186 0.045 0.433 0.357 0.014 0.017 0.984 0.253 0.026
Overall 0.45 0.19 0.32 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.00 0.40 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.13
Between 0.56 0.16 0.20 0.51 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.39 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06
Within 0.52 0.88 0.67 0.52 0.11 0.70 0.44 0.19 0.45 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.16 0.65 0.58 0.23
F 12.11 . 16.48 52.12 2.35 . 2.21 2.27 6.03 . 3.01 157.83 3.67 . 44.94 3.75
No. Obs 947 106 172 669 930 106 170 654 931 106 170 655 750 86 124 540
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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V.3.2 Credit Union MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Table 12 shows the model results from fixed-effects panel models that estimate the 
relationship between credit union MFIs’ social and financial performance and funding source mix 
metrics.  
• Credit Union MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
At the regression level, the models for estimating the results are all very significant. The 
covariates explain 57% of the overall variation in credit union MFIs’ ROA at F(29,1135) 
= 9.15, p < 0.001.  
At the aggregate credit union MFI level, two important associations exist between ROA 
and equity- or donation-to-assets ratios. A unit increase in equity-to-assets ratio associates 
with a 7.7% increase in ROA, while the same increase in donation-to-assets associates with 
a 20% decrease in ROA. Grouped by ages, donation-to-assets relates negatively to ROA 
across all age groups. A unit increase in donation funding is associated with ROA decreases 
of 84.3%, 48.7%, and 28.9% for new, young, and mature MFIs, respectively. All funding 
source metrics other than donation have positive and very significant associations with 
ROA for young credit union MFIs. A unit increase in equity-to-assets ratio relates to the 
ROA highest increase (16.3%) for this age group, followed by deposit-to-assets ratio 
(12.9%) and debt-to-assets ratio (6.3%).  
• Credit Union MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
No significant relationship exists between ALB and the funding source mix measures at 
the aggregate credit union MFI level. As expected, however, the deposit-to-assets ratio 
associates positively with ALB for mature credit union MFIs. A unit increase in deposits 
is associated with $0.73 increase in ALB. 
 109 
 
In terms of outreach breadth (NAB), I found no significant association, except for a 
negative relationship with donation-to-assets ratio.  
PFB relates significantly and negatively with debt-, equity-, and deposit-to-assets ratios at 
the aggregate credit union MFI level, decreasing PFB by 17.9%, 19.7%, and 19.2%, 
respectively. Mature credit union MFIs reflect this pattern of association, with 19.9%, 
22.2%, and 24.7% decreases in PFB given a unit increase in the three funding metrics, 
respectively. For further details, see Tables 12 and 13. 
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Table 13: Credit Union MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio -0.020 -0.020 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.212 0.225 0.085 0.175 0.157 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.203*** -0.187*** -0.179***
S.E. (0.053) (0.053) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.164) (0.160) (0.256) (0.278) (0.269) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.067) (0.064)
P-values 0.705 0.705 0.400 0.387 0.366 0.198 0.159 0.741 0.531 0.560 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.301 0.299 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.006
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.076 0.076 0.066* 0.075* 0.077* -0.102 -0.123 0.449 0.835 0.814 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.172** -0.177** -0.234** -0.209** -0.197**
S.E. (0.046) (0.047) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.180) (0.168) (0.516) (0.530) (0.512) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.078) (0.079) (0.092) (0.092) (0.086)
P-values 0.102 0.102 0.094 0.065 0.060 0.572 0.464 0.384 0.116 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.567 0.556 0.029 0.025 0.012 0.024 0.022
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.432** -0.427** -0.201* -0.193* -0.197* -0.209 -0.428* 0.034 0.045 0.091 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 0.020 0.005 0.036 0.018 0.004
S.E. (0.183) (0.184) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.224) (0.258) (0.375) (0.352) (0.350) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.091) (0.095) (0.085) (0.092) (0.093)
P-values 0.019 0.021 0.079 0.090 0.084 0.352 0.098 0.927 0.898 0.796 0.104 0.066 0.066 0.124 0.138 0.829 0.959 0.672 0.843 0.966
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.037 -0.037 0.015 0.027 0.014 -0.144 -0.135 -0.116 0.247 0.385 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 -0.095 -0.095 -0.145* -0.136* -0.192**
S.E. (0.057) (0.057) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.161) (0.156) (0.311) (0.335) (0.299) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.067) (0.068) (0.081) (0.080) (0.084)
P-values 0.522 0.515 0.653 0.419 0.679 0.373 0.389 0.708 0.461 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.811 0.955 0.156 0.162 0.073 0.090 0.023
Age: New - -0.006 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 - 0.193 0.398 0.339 0.326 - 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 - 0.015 -0.026 -0.030 -0.025
S.E. (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.155) (0.252) (0.243) (0.241) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
P-values 0.698 0.164 0.111 0.136 0.216 0.115 0.164 0.178 0.003 0.003 0.351 0.312 0.678 0.609 0.537 0.608
Age: Young - -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 - 0.047 0.171 0.125 0.121 - 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 - 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
S.E. (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.068) (0.114) (0.111) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
P-values 0.635 0.468 0.614 0.563 0.492 0.137 0.260 0.262 0.002 0.002 0.123 0.122 0.495 0.713 0.689 0.744
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Constants 0.022 0.023 0.025 -0.088 -0.086 1.002*** 0.976*** -1.643 -4.958** -4.970** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.637*** 0.635*** 0.962*** 0.914*** 0.901***
S.E. (0.049) (0.049) (0.081) (0.119) (0.117) (0.073) (0.066) (1.225) (2.048) (2.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.055) (0.056) (0.233) (0.303) (0.301)
P-values 0.650 0.633 0.760 0.461 0.462 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.016 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003
Overall 0.14 0.14 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
Between 0.16 0.16 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Within 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07
F 4.20 3.20 11.90 9.00 9.20 0.60 1.20 1.30 2.20 2.20 9,352.40 6,326.20 6,326.20 2.50 2.50 2.70 1.80 1.40 1.80 1.90
No. Obs 1,458 1,458 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,533 1,533 1,118 1,118 1,118 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,119 1,119 1,244 1,244 1,017 1,017 1,017
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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• Credit Union MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.  
On average, I found no significant estimates for the age group dummies. However, the 
relationship between financial performance (ROA) and donation-to-assets seems to follow 
the MLCT for credit union MFIs.  
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Table 14: Credit Union MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.028 -0.082 0.063*** 0.029 0.157 -1.823* -0.147 0.340 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.179*** -0.875 0.026 -0.199*
S.E. (0.030) (0.249) (0.016) (0.027) (0.269) (0.996) (0.091) (0.506) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.064) (0.711) (0.134) (0.107)
P-values 0.366 0.745 0.000 0.289 0.560 0.073 0.108 0.502 0.299 0.184 0.127 0.823 0.006 0.224 0.847 0.064
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.077* 0.119 0.163*** 0.037 0.814 -3.663** -0.055 0.565 -0.001 0.008* 0.000 0.000 -0.197** -1.006 0.181 -0.222*
S.E. (0.041) (0.217) (0.061) (0.033) (0.512) (1.380) (0.295) (0.546) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.086) (0.985) (0.185) (0.124)
P-values 0.060 0.585 0.009 0.269 0.112 0.010 0.853 0.301 0.556 0.087 0.942 0.788 0.022 0.312 0.329 0.076
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.197* -0.843** -0.487** -0.289* 0.091 -0.140 0.241 -0.159 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.002* 0.002 0.004 -1.901** 0.155 -0.001
S.E. (0.114) (0.322) (0.223) (0.149) (0.350) (1.357) (0.881) (1.572) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.093) (0.918) (0.343) (0.264)
P-values 0.084 0.011 0.031 0.053 0.796 0.918 0.785 0.919 0.138 0.010 0.055 0.544 0.966 0.043 0.654 0.996
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.014 -0.038 0.129** 0.008 0.385 -1.596* -0.456* 0.753* 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.192** -0.982 0.015 -0.247**
S.E. (0.034) (0.259) (0.053) (0.028) (0.299) (0.919) (0.267) (0.453) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.084) (0.858) (0.180) (0.125)
P-values 0.679 0.885 0.017 0.772 0.199 0.088 0.091 0.098 0.955 0.354 0.569 0.417 0.023 0.258 0.933 0.050
Age: New -0.014 - - - 0.326 - - - 0.000 - - - -0.025 - - -
S.E. (0.009) (0.241) (0.000) (0.049)
P-values 0.136 0.178 0.312 0.608
Age: Young 0.003 - - - 0.121 - - - 0.000 - - - -0.006 - - -
S.E. (0.005) (0.108) (0.000) (0.018)
P-values 0.563 0.262 0.122 0.745
Constants -0.086 -2.020*** 0.002 -0.100 -4.970** -6.054** 0.847 -4.804*** 0.016** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.017** 0.901*** -2.423 -0.977 1.235***
S.E. (0.117) (0.733) (0.335) (0.086) (2.027) (2.460) (1.321) (1.748) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.301) (1.932) (1.050) (0.323)
P-values 0.462 0.008 0.995 0.248 0.015 0.017 0.523 0.007 0.027 0.001 0.005 0.031 0.003 0.215 0.354 0.000
Overall 0.42 0.07 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
Between 0.43 0.06 0.27 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00
Within 0.57 0.86 0.74 0.57 0.12 0.69 0.29 0.11 0.10 0.91 0.38 0.13 0.07 0.66 0.43 0.10
F 9.15 . . 12.40 2.16 . . 2.09 2.50 . . 2.40 1.87 . . 2.04
No. Obs 1,135 87 201 847 1,118 87 200 831 1,119 87 200 832 1,017 82 179 756
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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V.3.3  NBFI MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Table 14 shows results from the regression model fitted with fixed-effects or within 
estimators for NBFI MFIs. The overall regressions are very significant, with F(29, 1,345) = 17.55, 
p < 0.001 for ROA; F(29, 1,336) = 3.0, p < 0.001 for ALB; F(29, 1,337) = 5.67, p < 0.001 for 
NAB; and F(29, 1,330) = 2.38, p < 0.001 for PFB. R2 of the regressions have high explanatory 
powers of .66, .17, .52, and .08, respectively. 
• NBFI MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix. The results show a positive 
association between ROA and all funding sources metrics except for the donation-to-assets 
ratio, which has a negative association with ROA at aggregate NBFI MFI levels. This 
highly significant negative relationship between ROA and donation-to-assets ratio is 
expected. The highest ROA increase per unit increase of funding comes from equity 
(16.8%), followed by debt (9.0%) and deposits (8.9%). Observing the relationship by age 
group, equity maintains its positive association with ROA for mature NBFI MFIs, as does 
deposit for new NBFI MFIs. However, all other associations between ROA and funding 
sources are not significant.  
• NBFI MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
On aggregate NBFI MFIs level, I found a positive association between donation-to-assets 
ratio and ALB. All other relationships at this level are not significant. By age group, 
negative associations exist between ALB and the debt- and equity-to-assets ratios for 
mature NBFI MFIs. All other relationships are not significant. 
On the average, NAB is positively associated with all funding sources except the donation-
to-assets ratio. By age group, only the equity- and deposit-to-assets ratios are associated 
with NAB. Increased equity and deposits relate to increases in NAB only for mature NBFI 
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MFIs. PFB is not significantly associated with any of the funding source mix metrics. 
However, as with NAB, PFB is positively associated with the debt- and equity-to-assets 
ratios for mature NBFI MFIs. 
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Table 15: NBFI MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.238*** 0.217*** 0.092** 0.088** 0.090** 0.068 0.059 -0.062 -0.036 -0.011 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.044 0.050 0.006 0.012 0.014
S.E. (0.091) (0.080) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.184) (0.185) (0.196) (0.203) (0.201) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.041) (0.040) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054)
P-values 0.010 0.007 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.712 0.751 0.753 0.861 0.956 0.185 0.170 0.027 0.052 0.049 0.292 0.213 0.911 0.830 0.792
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.314*** 0.298*** 0.166*** 0.163*** 0.168*** -0.100 -0.087 0.047 0.064 0.111 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.051 0.051 0.011 0.020 0.025
S.E. (0.096) (0.088) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.139) (0.143) (0.194) (0.197) (0.200) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054)
P-values 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.473 0.546 0.807 0.746 0.582 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.263 0.254 0.834 0.714 0.648
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.449*** -0.367*** -0.118** -0.121*** -0.121*** 0.453 0.579** 0.703** 0.559* 0.564* 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.076 -0.039 -0.047 -0.047
S.E. (0.145) (0.131) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.287) (0.255) (0.346) (0.297) (0.303) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.075) (0.075) (0.079) (0.075) (0.075)
P-values 0.002 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.116 0.024 0.043 0.061 0.063 0.403 0.810 0.902 0.743 0.746 0.185 0.314 0.621 0.529 0.531
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.271*** 0.234*** 0.109** 0.106** 0.089** 0.298 0.269 0.346 0.371 0.207 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.045 -0.035 -0.036 0.003 -0.015
S.E. (0.090) (0.077) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.326) (0.332) (0.296) (0.327) (0.396) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052)
P-values 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.036 0.361 0.419 0.243 0.257 0.601 0.515 0.325 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.397 0.507 0.470 0.960 0.768
Age: New - -0.092*** -0.019 -0.020* -0.021* - -0.165 0.054 0.034 0.023 - 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.035* 0.025 0.018 0.017
S.E. (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.135) (0.163) (0.155) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
P-values 0.000 0.112 0.086 0.066 0.221 0.740 0.824 0.884 0.000 0.710 0.741 0.717 0.059 0.353 0.475 0.502
Age: Young - -0.008 0.012* 0.011* 0.010 - -0.033 0.107** 0.078* 0.071 - 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.008 -0.003 -0.012 -0.013
S.E. (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.047) (0.049) (0.045) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
P-values 0.285 0.083 0.095 0.110 0.477 0.029 0.082 0.117 0.000 0.598 0.608 0.618 0.559 0.833 0.443 0.410
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Constants -0.246*** -0.209*** 0.112 0.088 0.092 0.646*** 0.685*** -5.347*** -6.465*** -6.420*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.641*** 0.629*** 0.707*** 0.454* 0.451*
S.E. (0.084) (0.072) (0.122) (0.142) (0.141) (0.097) (0.108) (1.601) (1.768) (1.738) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.032) (0.240) (0.272) (0.273)
P-values 0.004 0.004 0.358 0.537 0.512 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.097 0.099
Overall 0.20 0.27 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.02
Between 0.19 0.23 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03
Within 0.13 0.20 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.08
F 5.10 6.10 31.10 17.90 17.50 0.80 1.60 3.40 2.90 3.00 19.20 17.30 7.50 5.80 5.70 1.00 1.50 1.80 2.40 2.40
No. Obs 1,564 1,564 1,345 1,345 1,345 1,676 1,676 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,685 1,685 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,345 1,345 1,130 1,130 1,130
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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• NBFI MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT. 
The MLCT was not observed for NBFI MFIs performance, given the non-significant 
coefficients for the age dummy variables across all performance outcomes.  
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Table 16: NBFI MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.090** 0.067 0.094 0.008 -0.011 0.701 0.077 -0.489* 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014 -0.065 -0.004 0.198**
S.E. (0.040) (0.078) (0.059) (0.034) (0.201) (1.098) (0.196) (0.275) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.069) (0.090) (0.083)
P-values 0.024 0.399 0.113 0.804 0.956 0.525 0.696 0.077 0.049 0.728 0.139 0.254 0.792 0.352 0.969 0.018
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.168*** 0.006 0.111 0.135** 0.111 -0.083 -0.362 -0.564** 0.003*** -0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.025 -0.125* -0.026 0.137*
S.E. (0.048) (0.084) (0.075) (0.057) (0.200) (1.635) (0.235) (0.264) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.054) (0.069) (0.117) (0.070)
P-values 0.001 0.943 0.145 0.018 0.582 0.960 0.125 0.034 0.001 0.710 0.344 0.005 0.648 0.074 0.822 0.053
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.121*** -0.145 -0.113** -0.219* 0.564* 0.231 0.116 -0.209 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.047 -0.012 0.136 -0.159
S.E. (0.046) (0.107) (0.055) (0.122) (0.303) (1.727) (0.288) (0.505) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.075) (0.092) (0.157) (0.098)
P-values 0.009 0.177 0.042 0.074 0.063 0.894 0.687 0.680 0.746 0.422 0.307 0.310 0.531 0.898 0.390 0.109
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.089** 0.116* 0.025 0.008 0.207 -5.817 0.334 0.281 0.002*** 0.000 0.002 0.002* -0.015 -0.055 0.040 0.024
S.E. (0.042) (0.065) (0.093) (0.046) (0.396) (4.194) (0.501) (0.300) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.052) (0.070) (0.167) (0.085)
P-values 0.036 0.080 0.793 0.869 0.601 0.169 0.506 0.350 0.002 0.949 0.210 0.060 0.768 0.432 0.814 0.773
Age: New -0.021* - - - 0.023 - - - 0.000 - - - 0.017 - - -
S.E. (0.011) (0.157) (0.000) (0.025)
P-values 0.066 0.884 0.717 0.502
Age: Young 0.010 - - - 0.071 - - - 0.000 - - - -0.013 - - -
S.E. (0.006) (0.045) (0.000) (0.016)
P-values 0.110 0.117 0.618 0.410
Constants 0.092 0.088 -0.253 0.054 -6.420*** -22.291 -1.895 -8.171*** 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.024** 0.009* 0.451* 0.547 0.705 -0.192
S.E. (0.141) (0.487) (0.219) (0.133) (1.738) (15.392) (1.234) (1.794) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.273) (0.352) (0.544) (0.513)
P-values 0.512 0.857 0.250 0.685 0.000 0.151 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.020 0.063 0.099 0.124 0.197 0.709
Overall 0.69 0.57 0.67 0.38 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
Between 0.66 0.50 0.63 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01
Within 0.66 0.86 0.68 0.54 0.17 0.43 0.28 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.08 0.55 0.21 0.14
F 17.55 . 30.51 8.81 3.00 . 1.75 3.75 5.67 . 10.80 3.82 2.38 . 4.37 4.48
No. Obs 1,345 165 272 908 1,336 164 269 903 1,337 165 269 903 1,130 150 240 740
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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V.3.4 NGO MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Table 16 shows results from the regression model fitted with fixed-effects or within 
estimators for NGO MFIs. The overall regressions are very significant, with F(29, 1,275) = 24.54, 
p < 0.001 for ROA; F(29, 1,272) = 3.95, p < 0.001 for ALB; F(29, 1,275) = 41.67, p < 0.001 for 
NAB; and F(29, 1,189) = 1.89, p < 0.005 for PFB. R2 of the regressions have high explanatory 
powers of .76, .13, .84, and .08, respectively. 
• NGO MFIs: Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
At the aggregate NGO MFIs level, ROA relates positively to the equity and deposit-to-
assets ratios, but negatively to donation-to-assets ratio, as expected. A unit increase in 
deposit-to-assets is associated with 13.1% in ROA compared to 7.9% for the equity-to-
assets ratio. What makes this result interesting is that, normally, NGO MFIs do not accept 
saving and deposits. But, all things being equal, deposits for these institutions seem to be 
key for financial performance. The relationship between ROA and debt-to-assets ratio is 
not significant.  
At the age group level, ROA again relates positively to equity and deposit-to-assets ratios 
for young and mature NGO MFIs, but not for new MFIs. Mature NGO MFIs, however, 
exhibit a significantly negative relationship between ROA and donation-to-assets ratio. A 
unit increase in donations associates with a 22.4% decrease in ROA. All other relationships 
are not significant. 
• NGO MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
On the NGO MFI aggregate level, ALB is positively related only to the equity-to-assets 
ratio. This performance outcome’s relationship with other funding sources is not 
significant. A review by MFI age groups shows two additional associations: ALB relates 
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positively to the equity-to-assets ratio for mature and new NGO MFIs, but negatively to 
the donation-to-assets ratio for new NGO MFIs.  
Further, NAB is positively associated with all funding source mix metrics except for the 
donation-to-assets ratio. This pattern of association is also observed for mature NGO MFIs. 
Increased deposits associate with higher NAB only for new NGO MFIs. PFB relates 
negatively to the equity-to-assets ratio, but positively to the deposit-to-assets ratio.  
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Table 17: NGO MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.011 0.002 0.013 0.016 0.016 -0.087 -0.095 -0.053 0.001 0.001 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.014 0.014
S.E. (0.026) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.080) (0.079) (0.064) (0.053) (0.053) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
P-values 0.669 0.936 0.512 0.406 0.407 0.281 0.231 0.413 0.985 0.983 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.908 0.888 0.659 0.659
Equity to Assets Ratio 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.006 0.007 0.073 0.106** 0.107** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.024* -0.024 -0.046*** -0.036** -0.036**
S.E. (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.045) (0.053) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.213 0.106 0.047 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.101 0.006 0.031 0.030
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.555*** -0.534*** -0.242*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.060 -0.032 0.004 -0.049 -0.048 0.021 0.020 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.048* 0.049* 0.075* 0.053 0.053
S.E. (0.127) (0.131) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.055) (0.044) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.276 0.457 0.948 0.496 0.502 0.102 0.121 0.200 0.283 0.282 0.070 0.083 0.058 0.183 0.186
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.088** 0.071* 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.131*** -0.209* -0.245* -0.111 0.009 -0.031 0.009 0.009 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.088 0.088 0.126 0.161* 0.160*
S.E. (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.118) (0.126) (0.111) (0.100) (0.089) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.064) (0.066) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
P-values 0.017 0.078 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.078 0.053 0.317 0.925 0.729 0.446 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.181 0.135 0.059 0.061
Age: New - -0.051** -0.028* -0.026 -0.026 - -0.095 0.007 -0.024 -0.024 - 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 - 0.000 -0.021 -0.031 -0.031
S.E. (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.097) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
P-values 0.029 0.077 0.113 0.112 0.329 0.819 0.507 0.513 0.873 0.227 0.162 0.162 1.000 0.272 0.118 0.118
Age: Young - 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 - -0.043 0.051** 0.008 0.008 - 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 - 0.019 -0.011 -0.023 -0.023
S.E. (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.069) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
P-values 0.794 0.871 0.886 0.879 0.529 0.031 0.795 0.803 0.921 0.273 0.162 0.161 0.299 0.597 0.241 0.239
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Constants -0.054*** -0.043** 0.109 0.059 0.057 0.366*** 0.391*** -0.478*** -2.310** -2.297** 0.002 0.002 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.853*** 0.849*** 1.109*** 0.635** 0.636**
S.E. (0.016) (0.019) (0.077) (0.133) (0.134) (0.053) (0.059) (0.171) (1.069) (1.077) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.164) (0.279) (0.276)
P-values 0.001 0.028 0.156 0.659 0.674 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.032 0.034 0.673 0.657 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.022
Overall 0.66 0.64 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Between 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Within 0.36 0.37 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.08
F 20.00 16.10 33.70 22.20 24.50 1.30 1.30 4.00 3.80 3.90 21,587.60 15,593.00 35.20 43.00 41.70 1.10 0.80 1.60 1.90 1.90
No. Obs 1,517 1,517 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,650 1,650 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,658 1,658 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,414 1,414 1,189 1,189 1,189
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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• NGO MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.  
Given the non-significant coefficients for the age dummy variables across all performance 
outcomes, I did not observe an MLCT linkage to NBFI MFI performance. 
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Table 18: NGO MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.016 -0.012 0.006 0.010 0.001 -0.034 -0.021 -0.091 0.017*** -0.001 0.000 0.018*** 0.014 0.053 0.053 0.033
S.E. (0.020) (0.089) (0.017) (0.032) (0.053) (0.082) (0.026) (0.090) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.031) (0.182) (0.068) (0.046)
P-values 0.407 0.892 0.733 0.750 0.984 0.678 0.423 0.316 0.000 0.630 0.734 0.000 0.659 0.774 0.437 0.469
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.079*** -0.117 0.151*** 0.069*** 0.107** 0.169* -0.063 0.133** 0.021*** -0.004 0.002 0.021*** -0.036** 0.174 -0.101 -0.045**
S.E. (0.021) (0.172) (0.032) (0.025) (0.052) (0.086) (0.040) (0.066) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.244) (0.081) (0.021)
P-values 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.005 0.041 0.057 0.117 0.044 0.000 0.207 0.350 0.000 0.030 0.480 0.212 0.034
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.244*** 0.135 -0.067 -0.224** -0.048 -0.336*** -0.049 -0.016 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.053 -0.132 -0.116 0.057
S.E. (0.088) (0.212) (0.065) (0.109) (0.072) (0.041) (0.058) (0.084) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.040) (0.113) (0.144) (0.054)
P-values 0.006 0.527 0.311 0.040 0.502 0.000 0.402 0.847 0.282 0.737 0.415 0.134 0.186 0.251 0.423 0.290
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.131*** 0.497 0.204** 0.114** -0.031 -0.220 -0.254 -0.085 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.020*** 0.160* -0.149 0.049 0.205**
S.E. (0.037) (0.410) (0.081) (0.048) (0.089) (0.292) (0.169) (0.124) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.085) (0.809) (0.338) (0.104)
P-values 0.001 0.232 0.014 0.018 0.729 0.456 0.136 0.494 0.000 0.005 0.275 0.000 0.061 0.855 0.884 0.050
Age: New -0.026 - - - -0.024 - - - -0.002 - - - -0.031 - - -
S.E. (0.016) (0.037) (0.001) (0.019)
P-values 0.112 0.513 0.162 0.118
Age: Young 0.001 - - - 0.008 - - - -0.001 - - - -0.023 - - -
S.E. (0.009) (0.031) (0.001) (0.019)
P-values 0.879 0.803 0.161 0.239
Constants 0.057 -2.132 -1.054*** -0.027 -2.297** -0.948 -0.144 -3.135** 0.038*** 0.056* 0.053*** 0.021* 0.636** 3.268** 1.786*** 0.478
S.E. (0.134) (1.348) (0.229) (0.126) (1.077) (0.858) (0.381) (1.590) (0.012) (0.029) (0.016) (0.011) (0.276) (1.362) (0.676) (0.342)
P-values 0.674 0.121 0.000 0.831 0.034 0.276 0.707 0.050 0.002 0.061 0.001 0.066 0.022 0.021 0.010 0.164
Overall 0.84 0.00 0.25 0.87 0.12 0.47 0.19 0.05 0.59 0.06 0.36 0.61 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Between 0.85 0.01 0.22 0.88 0.11 0.48 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Within 0.76 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.13 0.86 0.21 0.16 0.84 0.82 0.44 0.89 0.08 0.79 0.30 0.10
F 24.54 . 75.39 17.66 3.95 . 10.69 5.60 41.67 . 6.75 34.10 1.89 . 270.25 1.32
No. Obs 1,275 76 211 988 1,272 74 211 987 1,275 76 211 988 1,189 73 193 923
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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V.3.5 Rural Bank MFI Performance and Funding Source Mix 
Table 19 shows results from the regression model fitted with fixed-effects or within 
estimators for rural bank MFIs. At the aggregate rural bank level, the fitted regressions are very 
significant, with F(29, 424) = 271.38, p < 0.001 for ROA; F(29, 421) = 1,224.36, p < 0.001 for 
ALB; F(29, 421) = 35.04, p < 0.001 for NAB; and F(29, 296) = 2.68, p < 0.005 for PFB. R2 of the 
regressions have high explanatory powers of .68, 0.37, 0.55, and 0.20, respectively.  
• Rural Bank MFI Financial Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
The results show a significant negative relationship between ROA and donations-to-assets 
as expected, but no other significant relationship with funding source mix metrics. On 
average, a $1 increase in donations associates with a 145.3% ROA reduction. At age group 
levels, the results for new and young rural bank MFIs’ cannot be interpreted due to 
insufficient data. However, mature rural bank MFIs exhibit a positive relationship between 
ROA and equity-to-assets ratio, where a $1 increase in equity relates to a 6.5% increase in 
ROA.   
• Rural Bank MFI Social Performance and Funding Source Mix.  
At the aggregate level, no significant relationship exists between social performance as 
measured by ALB and the funding source mix measures for rural bank MFIs. Likewise, 
relationships between NAB and PFB and the funding source mix measures are not 
significant.  
• Rural Bank MFI Performance, Funding Source Mix, and the MLCT.  
The MLCT seems to hold for rural bank MFI social performance outcomes (that is, ALB). 
Estimation coefficients for the age dummy variables indicate that, on average, new and 
young rural banks provide $0.65 and $0.47 lower ALB to their clients, respectively, 
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compared to mature rural bank MFIs. These average loan size decreases are significant at 
the 5% level.  
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Table 19: Rural Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix 
 
Dependent variables:
Models: A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Independent Variables
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.007 0.003 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 0.327 0.380 0.316 0.358 0.367 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.109 -0.134 -0.122 -0.102 -0.086
S.E. (0.033) (0.032) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.282) (0.314) (0.245) (0.299) (0.297) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.143) (0.142) (0.146) (0.197) (0.203)
P-values 0.834 0.916 0.200 0.200 0.184 0.248 0.229 0.200 0.233 0.220 0.179 0.205 0.173 0.160 0.149 0.445 0.347 0.403 0.606 0.674
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.243*** 0.249*** 0.058* 0.046 0.047 -1.137 -0.926 -0.298 -0.079 -0.058 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.084 -0.078 -0.043 -0.032 -0.010
S.E. (0.088) (0.076) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (1.045) (0.770) (0.641) (0.424) (0.436) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.122) (0.120) (0.259) (0.233) (0.242)
P-values 0.007 0.001 0.058 0.172 0.149 0.279 0.231 0.643 0.853 0.894 0.396 0.263 0.554 0.412 0.442 0.489 0.518 0.869 0.890 0.967
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.159 -0.111 -1.474*** -1.452*** -1.453*** -1.760 -0.673 -6.719*** -4.908* -4.916* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.184 0.153 0.974 0.897 0.976
S.E. (0.403) (0.324) (0.127) (0.136) (0.136) (2.112) (0.869) (2.305) (2.884) (2.892) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.163) (0.119) (0.632) (0.826) (0.847)
P-values 0.693 0.732 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.406 0.440 0.004 0.091 0.092 0.295 0.517 0.799 0.824 0.826 0.261 0.202 0.126 0.280 0.252
Deposits to Assets Ratio 0.048 0.005 -0.020 -0.016 -0.016 1.002* 0.364 0.321 0.508 0.498 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.053 0.051 -0.190 -0.200 -0.229
S.E. (0.059) (0.045) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.523) (0.386) (0.273) (0.347) (0.358) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.175) (0.174) (0.235) (0.244) (0.255)
P-values 0.411 0.911 0.392 0.468 0.471 0.057 0.346 0.241 0.145 0.167 0.760 0.324 0.326 0.291 0.309 0.764 0.769 0.420 0.416 0.373
Age: New - -0.054 -0.030 -0.028 -0.028 - -1.006** -0.696** -0.653** -0.651** - 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.013 -0.086** -0.011 -0.004
S.E. (0.036) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.398) (0.339) (0.295) (0.297) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.042) (0.054) (0.057)
P-values 0.137 0.211 0.231 0.232 0.013 0.042 0.029 0.030 0.001 0.709 0.993 0.976 0.784 0.041 0.837 0.946
Age: Young - -0.024 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 - -0.647** -0.484 -0.468** -0.468** - 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000 - 0.032 -0.046* -0.014 -0.018
S.E. (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.277) (0.295) (0.228) (0.228) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
P-values 0.160 0.332 0.246 0.246 0.021 0.104 0.042 0.042 0.022 0.102 0.192 0.185 0.124 0.052 0.543 0.468
MFI & Macro Level Controls Included No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Included No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Financial Intermediation Dummies Included No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Constants -0.043 -0.013 -0.081 -0.067 -0.067 0.119 0.579* 1.367 0.555 0.576 0.001 0.001 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.555*** 0.556*** 0.745* 0.470 0.522
S.E. (0.051) (0.039) (0.070) (0.068) (0.067) (0.394) (0.335) (1.483) (1.376) (1.362) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.130) (0.127) (0.442) (0.616) (0.605)
P-values 0.398 0.733 0.249 0.328 0.324 0.764 0.086 0.359 0.687 0.673 0.132 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.447 0.390
Overall 0.07 0.15 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.11
Between 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.06
Within 0.13 0.19 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.10 0.27 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.03 0.11 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.20 0.20
F 3.80 3.30 135.30 280.40 271.40 1.40 3.80 50.80 1,222.60 1,224.40 1.10 5.00 11.60 33.80 35.00 0.80 0.80 7.10 5.00 2.70
No. Obs 514 514 424 424 424 570 570 421 421 421 570 570 421 421 421 379 379 296 296 296
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is the Percentage of Female Borrowers
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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Table 20: Rural Bank MFIs: Performance and Funding Source Mix by Age 
 
I also use ordered Logit and Probit models to estimate the link between age of MFIs on one side 
and performance and financing on the other. The results confirm what I have described in the 
results so far, namely, financing and performance outcomes are linked to the different stages of 
the MLCT when MFIs are grouped by legal charters.  
Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature Aggregate New Young Mature
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio -0.022 2.717 0.193*** -0.024 0.367 -26.549*** 14.821*** 0.370 0.001 -0.002*** -0.007 0.001 -0.086 - 5.920 -0.082
S.E. (0.017) . (0.000) (0.015) (0.297) (0.002) (0.002) (0.345) (0.001) (0.000) . (0.001) (0.203) . (0.199)
P-values 0.184 . 0.000 0.116 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.285 0.149 0.000 . 0.317 0.675 . 0.681
Equity to Asset Ratio 0.047 2.395 -0.246*** 0.065** -0.058 -6.028*** 114.089*** 0.379 -0.001 -0.011*** 0.032 -0.002 -0.010 -0.149*** 13.513 0.011
S.E. (0.032) . (0.004) (0.032) (0.436) (0.001) (0.012) (0.410) (0.002) (0.000) . (0.002) (0.242) (0.000) . (0.233)
P-values 0.149 . 0.000 0.047 0.894 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.442 0.000 . 0.194 0.967 0.000 . 0.964
Donations to Assets Ratio -1.453*** 29.991 1.974*** -1.141*** -4.916* -340.628*** -57.019*** 1.050 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.033*** 0.976 -150.317*** -29.100 -0.068
S.E. (0.136) . (0.002) (0.108) (2.892) (0.017) (0.007) (1.385) (0.009) (0.000) . (0.004) (0.847) (0.000) . (1.683)
P-values 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.450 0.826 0.753 . 0.000 0.252 0.000 . 0.968
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.016 3.109 -0.676*** -0.010 0.498 -31.173*** 53.425*** 0.810 0.001 -0.004*** 0.021 0.001 -0.229 - 6.724 -0.346
S.E. (0.022) . (0.002) (0.023) (0.358) (0.002) (0.007) (0.509) (0.001) (0.000) . (0.002) (0.255) . (0.296)
P-values 0.471 . 0.000 0.658 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.309 0.000 . 0.453 0.373 . 0.246
Age: New -0.028 - - - -0.651** - - - 0.000 - - - -0.004 - - -
S.E. (0.023) (0.297) (0.000) (0.057)
P-values 0.233 0.030 0.976 0.946
Age: Young -0.008 - - - -0.468** - - - 0.000 - - - -0.018 - - -
S.E. (0.007) (0.228) (0.000) (0.025)
P-values 0.246 0.042 0.185 0.468
Constants -0.067 -3.983 -1.648*** -0.274*** 0.576 35.571*** -53.638*** -3.833*** 0.016*** 0.002*** -0.009 0.012*** 0.522 0.711*** -10.001 0.868
S.E. (0.067) . (0.001) (0.080) (1.362) (0.002) (0.004) (1.062) (0.004) (0.000) . (0.004) (0.605) (0.000) . (0.724)
P-values 0.324 . 0.000 0.001 0.673 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 . 0.001 0.390 0.000 . 0.234
Overall 0.50 0.26 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.66 0.24 0.11 0.01 0.32 0.24
Between 0.41 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.23 0.55 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.23 0.11
Within 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.18 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.22
F 271.38 . . 1,119.06 1,224.36 . . 6.14 35.04 . . 1,511.41 2.68 . . 3.30
No. Obs 424 14 33 377 421 13 33 375 421 13 33 375 296 8 28 260
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Models incldue macroeconomic indicator control variables and MFI firm levels control variables
DV: ROA DV: ALB DV: NAB DV: PFB
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VI DISCUSSION 
The results from extant research reveal, to some extent, the source of the seemingly 
conflicting outcomes related to MFIs’ social and financial performance and their funding source 
mix. These results suggest that the divergent research conclusions can be traced to the varied 
approaches, varied estimation models and analysis scope specifications, and, more importantly, 
the varied definitions of what MFIs really are. Often, these conflicting outcomes arise simply from 
viewing all MFIs as homogeneous financial institutions with homogeneous legal charters. Other 
times, microfinance researchers focus on specific geographical locations or a single aspect of 
microfinance data, and then attempt to generalize for the entire universe of institutions, which vary 
widely in legal structure, size, and age.  
Generally speaking, the results of my research show that, when grouped by legal charter, 
MFIs exhibit surprising, significant relationships between funding source mix (capital structure) 
and social and financial performance. Some of these relationships are revealed upon categorizing 
the MFIs into legal charters and age groups—an approach left largely unexplored by the extant 
literature.  
VI.1 Key Findings—Microfinance Dual Performance and Funding Source Mix 
That debt and equity are positively associated with both social and financial performance 
outcomes aligns with my hypotheses 1a and 1b across all legal charters. The positive association 
between ROA and debt-to-assets ratio is consistent with other research findings. Focusing on small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), capital structure, and profitability, Abor (2005) shows that short-
term debt ratio is positively correlated with return on equity. This confirms Michaelas et al. (1999), 
who found a positive impact on performance of interest-bearing debt since providers have return 
expectations. These investors provide more commercial funding in the form of debt or equity to 
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profitable MFIs. Commercially funded MFIs are more incentivized to operate efficiently, 
increasing outreach by serving poorer or rural clients who have higher delivery costs (Armendáriz 
de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Further, MFIs that use debt are more likely to achieve high social 
performance (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Von Stauffenberg and Rosas 2011; Cobb, Wry, and Zhao, 
2016).  
That said, it could also be that shareholders opt for interest-bearing debt as a way of 
managing agency costs, disciplining management to be more efficient by reducing managerial 
cash-flow waste (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Williams 1987; Kar, 2012), or pressuring managers 
to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (Jensen, 1986; Abor, 2005).  
Also, while equity providers have incentives for higher profitability, they may not be averse 
to social performance. Most equity holders who are not also borrowers have significant control 
rights and strong profit motives. This became obvious in 2007, for example, when Compartamos, 
a bank MFI in Mexico that served low-income women with non-collateralized micro loans to 
support small businesses (e.g., neighborhood shops or tortilla-making businesses), had its public 
issuance of equity oversubscribed by 13 times (Rosenberg, 2007; Malkin, 2008; Accion 
International, 2007). This initial public offering (IPO) was heralded as “a future in which 
microfinance routinely attracts investment from the private sector, freeing it from the ghetto of 
high-minded, donor-supported initiatives.” (Cull, Demirgu¨c-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). 
Compartamos, previously a small, unknown bank MFI, became one of the largest MFIs in Latin 
America with its net worth skyrocketing to $1.6 billion. The institution’s growth and expansion 
between 2000 and 2007 had been aggressive, driven primarily by its retained earnings. Within this 
short period, it grew its borrower base from 60,000 to more than 800,000. The Compartamos 
experience shows the power of profit in boosting equity to finance both social and financial goals.  
 129 
 
As already discussed, I found that the equity-to-assets ratio positively associates with 
profitability (ROA). This finding contradicts that of Bogan (2012), who found a negative 
relationship between share capital as a percentage of assets and sustainability. She argues that her 
finding is consistent with those of Osterloh and Barrett (2007), who show that financial service 
association microfinance models, which harness local equity capital by selling shares, do not 
demonstrate sound screening and lending practices. Thus, share capital that includes local equity 
capital would not generate the profit incentive efficiencies of the typical lending institution. These 
findings are problematic, however, for several reasons.  
First, Bogan’s (2012) focus was on share capital, which excludes other aspects of equity 
that impact financing decisions—aspects such as share premium, donated equity, retained 
earnings, reserves, and treasury shares. The difference between my equity definition and Bogan’s 
(2012) may be crucial in deciding the direction of the relationship between performance outcome 
and funding. Second, the findings from Osterloh and Barrett’s (2007) research on particular MFI 
factors and their impact on the institution share value focused on a very small geographical location 
in Kenya; they should not be generalized for global MFI outcomes unless conditions in Kenya are 
representative of the global environment. Third, both Osterloh and Barrett (2007) and Bogan 
(2012) focus on large MFIs as representative of all MFIs.  
Given these three factors, a reasonable explanation for the positive association between 
equity funding and profitability could be that regulators may set minimums requirements for equity 
capital as a way of deterring excessive risk-taking, which in turn may affect MFI financing choices, 
with positive implications on profitability. Alternatively, profitable MFIs—and especially those 
legal charters that are not obliged to distribute profits—may generate additional equity by 
accumulating retained earnings. These equity forms are a cheap source of funding for the 
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institutions and could be used to fund operational and developmental growth, and therefore the 
institutions’ profitability. My research strongly supports this explanation. Young and mature MFIs 
across all legal charters are more profitable than new MFIs. Apart from bank MFIs, all other legal 
charters are not obliged to distribute their retained earnings. Interestingly, the equity-to-assets ratio 
is very significantly and positively associated with ROA only for this group of MFIs—that is, for 
young and mature MFIs with credit union, NBFI, NGO, and rural bank legal structures.  
Similarly, socially oriented investors who do not demand profit or dividends may direct 
them toward social outreach, thereby positively impacting social performance outcomes, as in the 
case of mature NBFIs and NGOs. Cases such as the Compartamos IPO make it possible to assert 
that investors can provide $30 billion annually to fund microfinance globally (Funk, 2007) against 
the $4 billion a year projected by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest in 2008. Indeed, the 
power of profit makes it possible to imagine serving more than one billion low-income 
customers—rather than the approximately 175 million families projected for 2015 (Daley-Harris, 
2007).  
MFIs that receive relatively higher donations show lower ROA. This finding generally 
holds for all MFIs, regardless of age group or legal charter. The negative association between ROA 
and donations is an important insight especially because it supports the profit-incentive theory. It 
also helps the microfinance industry, which supports the notion that MFIs should decrease their 
reliance on donations, soft loans, and other types of donor funding (Bogan, 2012). Donation 
funding can create moral hazard, high agency costs, and inefficiencies in MFI operations, with 
adverse consequences for profitability. Additionally, donations may increase incentives for risk 
shifting or lax risk-management styles that can also negatively affect profitability. Tchakoute 
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Tchuigoua (2013) finds that donations are significantly correlated with past-due loans and tangible 
assets, indicating that donors or their mandates care about risk when they decide to give. 
Scholars and practitioners alike have advanced the idea that donations are most beneficial 
when used to fund start-up costs for younger MFIs (Morduch, 2005). However, I did not find 
empirical evidence to support this assertion; the association between financial performance and 
the donation-to-assets ratio is not significant for new MFIs, regardless of legal charter and age 
grouping. Further, even the social performance outcomes do not seem to support the assertion that 
donations are beneficial for new MFIs. Indeed, the only significant relationship between donation 
funding and social performance outcomes was negative. Higher donations are associated with 
decreased ALB for new NGO MFIs and decreased NAB and PFB for new and young credit union 
MFIs, respectively. 
Deposits are positively related mainly to social outcomes across age, but also to ROA on 
average. Deposits are low-cost, longer-term funds, and they are a far more stable source of funds 
than debts, which are usually short-term for most MFIs (Christen and Mas, 2009); they are 
therefore preferred to debt (Muriu, 2011). Deposits are a cheap source of funding for banks and 
other financial services institutions. They have a relatively low cost of capital and make the most 
sense for institutions with the option of raising capital by collecting savings deposits (Cull, 
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). Usually, the deposit-taking institution pays very low or no 
interest on the funds—thus the low cost. As long as there is no run on the institution, and the cost 
of mobilizing deposits is reasonably low, a significant portion of the deposits (the core) can become 
a long-term funding source for funding short- to long-term loans, guaranteeing the institution high-
interest margins. Given all this, it is not surprising that higher rates of deposit significantly 
associate with higher MFI profitability. 
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Also, in MFIs, deposits are viewed as ﬁnancial products consisting of short-term demand 
deposits (savings accounts) or time deposits (remunerated savings accounts). From a ﬁnancial 
intermediation viewpoint, deposits can be seen as a resource that MFIs use to fund their operations 
and make loans (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor [CGAP], 2011; Cull et al., 2009). 
Moreover, some deposit-taking MFIs use deposits as a tool to reinforce contracts. In this sense, 
deposits could be viewed as ﬁnancial collateral required from borrowers to secure a loan 
(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004, 2010). In countries with better creditor protections and 
better law enforcement, deposits are likely less important as a tool for risk management. However, 
MFIs operate mostly in countries with weaker institutions for credit protection; in such countries, 
deposits would be more signiﬁcant and could positively impact loan provision—or even bad 
debt—and therefore profitability. 
VI.2 Research Contribution and Limitations 
VI.2.1 Contribution to Theory 
My research addresses conflicting research outcomes on how funding source mix relates 
to MFIs’ social and financial performance. I dealt with the issue of why some researchers find that 
debt and equity have a negative relationship with profitability (Bogan, 2012), while others find a 
positive relationship (Muriu, 2011). Further, using legal charters to analyze the relationship 
direction between funding sources and MFIs’ dual performance provides deeper insights into the 
important associations between key variables that could be lost at the aggregated analysis level. 
My findings can offer researchers a new perspective on how performance and funding vehicle 
dynamics evolve as MFIs mature. To the best of my knowledge, rigorous empirical evidence based 
on credible control-treatment evaluations is scanty regarding MFI dual performance and funding 
source mix on this point. Also, because many microfinance researchers view MFIs as 
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homogeneous institutions, they analyze them at the aggregate level. Although such analysis 
provides insights into these institutions, it also overlooks details lurking beneath the aggregation. 
Having analyzed MFIs by legal charter and age groups, I address some of the gaps in the discussion 
on how funding impacts dual microfinance performance. Finally, I provide rigorous empirical 
evidence for the MLCT and for which legal charters’ funding and performance types conform to 
it. 
VI.2.2 Contribution to Practice 
VI.2.2.1 MFI managers, insights on funding choices for optimal performance 
The findings in this research will offer managers a detailed resource on the links between 
funding and the dual MFI performance outcomes. Such information will be a useful input to 
managerial capital structure decisions targeted at optimizing profitability, ALB, the number of 
clients, and outreach to women. Additionally, as managers formulate corporate strategies to grow 
their institutions, this research offers a clear perspective on which financing strategies will work 
for them given their legal structures. My research will also inform MFI managers when they face 
choices about alternative funding instruments. Managers who can identify the optimal capital 
structure will be rewarded for minimizing their institutions’ cost of finance and maximizing their 
firm's income.  
VI.2.2.2 Marginal effects input for the sector’s policymakers 
Because they specify quantified relationships and even causalities between MFIs’ dual 
performance and funding sources, my findings would be useful for informing government and 
private policymakers in setting specific policy targets. Littlefield and Kneiding (2009) and some 
microfinance researchers argue that increasing funding for MFIs during financial crisis effectively 
supports these institutions in weathering the storm only for the short term. My findings could help 
 134 
 
policymakers craft laser-focused funding decisions that optimize outcomes during times of crises. 
They can achieve this optimized policy outcome by using my research to determine which type of 
funding will be effective for different types of MFIs. 
Policymakers and social investors also must grapple with the question of whether the costs 
of subsidizing microfinance activities actually generate large, important social benefits and/or 
benefits the poor in large numbers when compared to alternative interventions (Cull, Demirgu¨c-
Kunt, and Morduch, 2009). Findings in this research provide inputs to help answer these policy 
questions. For example, having read my research, a policymaker interested in policies to spur MFI 
profitability growth would avoid encouraging donations as that funding type is associated with 
decreasing, rather than increasing, MFI profitability. 
VI.2.2.3 Guidance for optimizing investor and philanthropist investment decisions 
Both public and private funders, as well as hybrid investors, require good screening 
systems for choosing potential MFIs investment targets that meet their social and profitability 
goals. The findings in this research could be a great resource to help investors make informed 
decisions about MFI investment targets. The research will help investors and financiers understand 
MFI risk-management strategies, as well as focus on financing structures that improve MFI 
performance toward both social and financial goals. 
VI.2.3 Limitations of the Research 
This research has several limitations that future researchers could pursue to further 
contribute to the conversation on MFI performance and funding. 
First, I measure MFIs’ financial performance using their ROA. The ROA indicates how 
well the MFI can generate profit from its assets; it is calculated as after-tax net operating income 
over average annual assets. While I provide evidence for how specific funding sources impact 
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ROA in relation to various MFI charters and age groups, I do not consider the impact of funding 
strategies on risk-adjusted financial performance outcomes. Profit-oriented microfinance investors 
who are interested in the risk and return dynamics of their investment decisions would benefit from 
a study that quantifies the association between the various funding sources and risk-adjusted ROA 
or other financial return metrics.  
In this research, I also consider the impact of funding source mix on three important social 
performance outcomes: ALB, NAB, and PFB. I chose these variables because they are often used 
for measuring social performance in the microfinance literature. Some researchers argue that social 
performance measures have failed to achieve the same clarity, consistency, and acceptance level 
as ﬁnancial performance measures such as ROA (Copestake, 2007). However, it is an arduous task 
to find a generally accepted social performance measure that reflects all the relevant aspects of 
MFIs’ social goals, which include mission, ownership, management principles, relation to and care 
for their staff, outreach, services, products, market behavior, and relationships with clients and 
other stakeholders, such as community, social, and political organizations. Future research might 
involve finding an index that better reflects these aspects of social performance. 
Finally, although I have controlled for endogeneity in my model, I am still not confident 
that even the highly significant associations between performance outcomes and the funding 
source mix metrics have causal interpretations, which I wanted to achieve. An alternative approach 
might be to use dynamic panel models that include instrumental variables to separate the impact 
of regressors that correlate with the latent variables in the errors term (individual effects). This 
approach might help establish causal effects for the performance outcomes, and at least for the 
equity-, donation-, and deposit-to-assets ratios across legal charters and age groups. Achieving 
such causal results would be most useful for policymakers. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: MFI Region Details 
 
Table A2: Country Details 
 
No. Region No. of MFIs Obs
1 Africa 856 4,140
2 Latin America 611 5,037
3 Eastern Europe 516 3,197
4 South Asia 470 3,110
5 East Asia 420 2,307
6 Middle East 80 699
7 North America 1 2
Total 2,954 18,492
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No. Country MFIs No. Obs No. Country MFIs No. Obs
1 India 237 1,419 64 Malawi 10 73
2 Russia 128 548 65 Papua New Guinea 10 62
3 Philippines 120 787 66 Yemen 10 62
4 Mexico 115 683 67 Zambia 10 62
5 Nigeria 87 317 68 Myanmar 10 27
6 Bangladesh 85 631 69 Jordan 9 97
7 Ghana 85 336 70 Zimbabwe 9 32
8 Senegal 84 282 71 Haiti 8 92
9 China 81 303 72 Albania 8 82
10 Indonesia 78 361 73 Romania 8 79
11 Peru 75 778 74 Panama 8 62
12 Ecuador 71 680 75 Guinea 8 44
13 Pakistan 54 385 76 Paraguay 7 84
14 Brazil 53 300 77 Chile 7 56
15 Rwanda 52 195 78 Jamaica 7 31
16 Vietnam 51 281 79 South Sudan 7 26
17 Tajikistan 49 312 80 Lebanon 6 49
18 Kazakhstan 48 249 81 Congo, Republic 6 42
19 Nepal 47 357 82 Liberia 5 18
20 Kenya 47 278 83 Serbia 4 57
21 Kyrgyzstan 47 262 84 Macedonia 4 56
22 Colombia 46 350 85 Montenegro 4 30
23 Azerbaijan 43 303 86 Poland 4 29
24 Uganda 39 211 87 Chad 4 24
25 Nicaragua 37 357 88 Trinidad 4 15
26 Benin 37 234 89 Guinea-Bissau 4 12
27 Togo 36 162 90 Comoros 4 7
28 Laos 36 145 91 Ukraine 3 31
29 Uzbekistan 36 145 92 East Timol 3 29
30 Cameroon 33 181 93 Syria 3 27
31 Cote d'Iviore 33 132 94 Gambia 3 17
32 Burkina 32 142 95 Thailand 3 16
33 Congo, Democratic 31 127 96 Suriname 3 11
34 Bolivia 28 341 97 Belarus 3 8
35 Honduras 28 271 98 Angola 2 18
36 Sri Lank 28 177 99 Turkey 2 18
37 Guatemala 27 235 100 Venezuel 2 18
38 Ethiopia 27 195 101 Croatia 2 16
39 Bulgaria 26 188 102 Swaziland 2 15
40 Tanzania 24 162 103 Sudan 2 14
41 Mali 23 153 104 Namibia 2 12
42 Cambodia 22 253 105 Uruguay 2 9
43 Burundi 22 121 106 Central African Republic 2 8
44 Niger 22 105 107 Guyana 2 7
45 Georgia 21 152 108 Grenada 2 5
46 El Salvadore 20 183 109 Gabon 2 4
47 Argentina 19 156 110 Saint Luis 2 4
48 Dominican Republic 19 138 111 Tunisia 1 18
49 Costa Rica 18 166 112 Samoa 1 17
50 Afghanistan 18 134 113 Tonga 1 8
51 South Africa 18 77 114 Bhutan 1 7
52 Bosnia 17 199 115 Fiji 1 7
53 Armenia 17 148 116 Belize 1 5
54 Madagasca 17 148 117 Hungary 1 5
55 Egypt 16 152 118 Israel 1 5
56 Mongolia 16 99 119 Malaysia 1 5
57 Sierra Leone 13 55 120 Solomon Islands 1 4
58 Kosovo 12 122 121 Slovakia 1 3
59 Mozambique 12 99 122 United States 1 2
60 Iraq 12 62 123 Vanuatu 1 2
61 Moldova 12 56
62 Morocco 11 132 Total 2,954 18,492
63 Palestinia 11 95
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Table A3: Sample MFI Balance Sheet 
 
Source: SEEP Network and Calmeadow (1995) and Ledgerwood (1999) 
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Table A4: Sample MFI Income Statement 
 
Source: SEEP Network and Calmeadow (1995) and Ledgerwood (1999) 
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Table A5: Donation Usage Trends by Legal Charters 
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Table A6: Ordered Logit Model Result on MLCT – ROA and ALB 
 
Table A7: Ordered Logit Model Result on MLCT – NAB and PFB 
 
 
Independent Variables Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank
Performance Outcome 2.592*** 3.679** 1.324 2.763*** 4.155*** - 0.048** 0.012 -0.070 0.138** -0.017 -
S.E. (0.615) (1.607) (2.051) (0.822) (1.159) (0.023) (0.016) (0.193) (0.060) (0.342)
P-values 0.000 0.022 0.518 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.451 0.717 0.021 0.961
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.261 1.972* 0.153 2.141** 0.524 - 0.386* 1.368 -0.961 2.510*** 0.276 -
S.E. (0.385) (1.162) (1.506) (0.938) (0.560) (0.204) (0.848) (1.588) (0.874) (0.595)
P-values 0.498 0.090 0.919 0.023 0.349 0.058 0.107 0.545 0.004 0.642
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.545 1.122 -0.893 1.727 -0.670 - -0.066*** 0.710 -2.228 2.066** -0.057 -
S.E. (0.338) (1.008) (1.636) (1.086) (0.425) (0.015) (0.550) (1.614) (0.926) (0.045)
P-values 0.106 0.266 0.585 0.112 0.115 0.000 0.197 0.168 0.026 0.203
Donations to Assets Ratio 0.998 7.887* 1.547 1.291 0.937 - -0.188 1.394 0.249 0.274 -0.658 -
S.E. (0.730) (4.605) (3.205) (1.372) (1.156) (0.592) (3.337) (2.616) (1.193) (0.611)
P-values 0.172 0.087 0.629 0.347 0.418 0.751 0.676 0.924 0.818 0.281
Deposits to Assets Ratio -1.084*** -0.605 -0.363 1.305 -3.398*** - -0.622*** -0.523** -1.906 1.161 -2.531** -
S.E. (0.420) (1.022) (1.678) (0.961) (1.247) (0.196) (0.231) (1.614) (0.973) (1.259)
P-values 0.010 0.554 0.829 0.174 0.006 0.002 0.024 0.238 0.233 0.045
Log of Assets -0.845*** -0.619*** -1.152*** -1.058*** -1.014*** - -0.722*** -0.542*** -1.089*** -0.802*** -0.754*** -
S.E. (0.061) (0.100) (0.140) (0.115) (0.175) (0.049) (0.083) (0.124) (0.088) (0.144)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Performance Outcome: ROA Performance Outcome: ALB
Independent Variables Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank
Performance Outcome 0.000*** 0.000*** -57.356 -10.132 0.021 - 0.114 0.626 -0.294 0.161 1.387 -
S.E. (0.000) (0.000) (48.341) (19.953) (0.400) (0.355) (0.888) (0.884) (0.621) (0.923)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.235 0.612 0.958 0.749 0.481 0.740 0.795 0.133
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.408** 1.406* -0.747 2.611*** 0.272 - 0.059 0.699 -0.519 2.197*** 0.079 -
S.E. (0.197) (0.855) (1.460) (0.850) (0.591) (0.402) (1.487) (1.897) (0.813) (0.577)
P-values 0.039 0.100 0.609 0.002 0.646 0.883 0.638 0.784 0.007 0.891
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.068*** 0.693 -2.043 2.083** -0.057 - -0.112 1.609 -1.217 1.923** -0.105 -
S.E. (0.015) (0.527) (1.492) (0.907) (0.045) (0.347) (1.445) (1.991) (0.858) (0.367)
P-values 0.000 0.189 0.171 0.022 0.201 0.747 0.265 0.541 0.025 0.774
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.176 1.520 0.088 0.351 -0.677 - -0.418 0.274 0.533 0.289 -0.979 -
S.E. (0.597) (3.338) (2.805) (1.216) (0.615) (0.660) (3.657) (2.817) (1.436) (0.793)
P-values 0.768 0.649 0.975 0.773 0.271 0.527 0.940 0.850 0.840 0.217
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.607*** -0.515** -1.792 1.351 -2.540** - -0.823* -0.139 -0.781 1.542* -2.638* -
S.E. (0.193) (0.234) (1.485) (0.963) (1.253) (0.452) (1.395) (2.063) (0.897) (1.360)
P-values 0.002 0.028 0.227 0.160 0.043 0.069 0.920 0.705 0.086 0.052
Log of Assets -0.717*** -0.545*** -1.118*** -0.817*** -0.754*** - -0.741*** -0.581*** -1.055*** -0.794*** -0.880*** -
S.E. (0.049) (0.083) (0.127) (0.094) (0.141) (0.055) (0.102) (0.126) (0.093) (0.153)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Performance Outcome: NAB Performance Outcome: PFB
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Table A8: Ordered Probit Model Result on MLCT – NAB and PFB 
 
Independent Variables Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank
Performance Outcome 1.450*** 2.115** 0.733 1.528*** 2.233*** - 0.029** 0.007 -0.026 0.078** -0.013 -
S.E. (0.344) (0.850) (1.078) (0.478) (0.661) (0.014) (0.010) (0.104) (0.032) (0.190)
P-values 0.000 0.013 0.496 0.001 0.001 0.033 0.439 0.803 0.016 0.946
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.129 1.192* -0.012 1.168** 0.255 - 0.214* 0.838* -0.574 1.400*** 0.121 -
S.E. (0.220) (0.690) (0.830) (0.536) (0.327) (0.121) (0.477) (0.805) (0.495) (0.336)
P-values 0.559 0.084 0.989 0.029 0.435 0.076 0.079 0.476 0.005 0.719
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.316* 0.701 -0.626 0.927 -0.363 - -0.038*** 0.434 -1.314 1.151** -0.031 -
S.E. (0.190) (0.625) (0.894) (0.610) (0.245) (0.009) (0.327) (0.841) (0.522) (0.025)
P-values 0.096 0.262 0.484 0.128 0.139 0.000 0.185 0.118 0.027 0.221
Donations to Assets Ratio 0.582 4.449* 0.848 0.782 0.478 - -0.092 1.062 0.238 0.140 -0.360 -
S.E. (0.414) (2.416) (1.492) (0.778) (0.643) (0.332) (1.883) (1.347) (0.655) (0.377)
P-values 0.160 0.066 0.570 0.315 0.457 0.782 0.573 0.860 0.830 0.340
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.648*** -0.337 -0.343 0.708 -1.977*** - -0.368*** -0.308** -1.145 0.645 -1.446** -
S.E. (0.241) (0.627) (0.918) (0.542) (0.735) (0.114) (0.136) (0.839) (0.546) (0.731)
P-values 0.007 0.590 0.708 0.192 0.007 0.001 0.024 0.172 0.237 0.048
Log of Assets -0.501*** -0.371*** -0.670*** -0.614*** -0.601*** - -0.431*** -0.325*** -0.640*** -0.474*** -0.453*** -
S.E. (0.034) (0.058) (0.077) (0.062) (0.095) (0.028) (0.048) (0.069) (0.049) (0.077)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Performance Outcome: ROA Performance Outcome: ALB
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Table A9: Ordered Probit Model Result on MLCT – NAB and PFB 
 
  
Independent Variables Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank Aggregate Bank Credit Union NBFI NGO Rural Bank
Performance Outcome 0.000*** 0.000*** -30.923 -5.901 -0.026 - 0.074 0.322 -0.156 0.094 0.818 -
S.E. (0.000) (0.000) (28.359) (11.677) (0.200) (0.204) (0.509) (0.492) (0.356) (0.531)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.613 0.896 0.718 0.527 0.751 0.792 0.123
Debt Relative to Assets  Ratio 0.226* 0.858* -0.469 1.464*** 0.119 - 0.022 0.530 -0.340 1.256*** 0.000 -
S.E. (0.116) (0.480) (0.755) (0.483) (0.335) (0.229) (0.875) (0.956) (0.474) (0.325)
P-values 0.052 0.074 0.534 0.002 0.721 0.925 0.544 0.722 0.008 0.999
Equity to Asset Ratio -0.039*** 0.424 -1.222 1.175** -0.031 - -0.065 1.032 -0.782 1.097** -0.083 -
S.E. (0.009) (0.315) (0.790) (0.513) (0.025) (0.198) (0.867) (1.030) (0.494) (0.215)
P-values 0.000 0.178 0.122 0.022 0.223 0.743 0.234 0.448 0.026 0.700
Donations to Assets Ratio -0.083 1.135 0.135 0.193 -0.369 - -0.216 0.400 0.354 0.160 -0.518 -
S.E. (0.334) (1.880) (1.419) (0.666) (0.379) (0.377) (2.048) (1.478) (0.781) (0.463)
P-values 0.804 0.546 0.924 0.772 0.330 0.567 0.845 0.811 0.838 0.263
Deposits to Assets Ratio -0.358*** -0.302** -1.087 0.751 -1.452** - -0.485* -0.003 -0.541 0.884* -1.481* -
S.E. (0.112) (0.138) (0.786) (0.540) (0.729) (0.258) (0.833) (1.058) (0.518) (0.793)
P-values 0.001 0.028 0.167 0.164 0.046 0.060 0.998 0.609 0.088 0.062
Log of Assets -0.429*** -0.327*** -0.653*** -0.482*** -0.453*** - -0.440*** -0.347*** -0.614*** -0.471*** -0.514*** -
S.E. (0.028) (0.048) (0.070) (0.053) (0.076) (0.031) (0.059) (0.070) (0.053) (0.084)
P-values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and, 10% level (*) 
Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses, and P-values below S.E.s calculated based on robust standard errors
Where : 
ROA is Return on Assets, 
ALB is Average Loan per Borrower per GNI per Capita
NAB is Number of Active Borrowers per Assets
PFB is Percentage of Female Borrowers
Performance Outcome: NAB Performance Outcome: PFB
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